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Abstract
Analytic philosophy since Plato has been notoriously hostile to literature, and yet in
recent years, increasing numbers of philosophers within the tradition have sought to
take seriously the question of how it is that literature can be philosophical. Analytic
philosophy has also been noted for its hostility to women and resistance to feminism.
In this thesis I seek to make connections between firstly the prejudice against, and then
the potential for, the contribution of the perspectives of literature and feminism in
philosophy, attempting to answer simultaneously the two questions;
How can literature be philosophical?
How can feminists write philosophy?
In the sense that I attempt to take these questions seriously, and answer them
precisely, this thesis fits into the analytic philosophical tradition. However, my
response to these questions, and thus the majority of this thesis, takes the form of a
non-traditional demonstration of the philosophical potential of literature presented
through three feminist literary genres; autographical fiction, Utopian fiction, and
detective fiction.
Using generic divisions seems to be an appropriate strategy for reclaiming literature as
philosophical, since it suggests an identification with the Aristotelian defence of literary
arts against Plato's assault. However, I will argue that these literary genres have
traditionally been defined in terms which prohibit a philosophical reading. I will
expose and then recover this anti-philosophical bias, particularly when it coincides with
feminist genre revisions. This recovery will take the form of a philosophical
reconceptualizing of each genre, and a specific comparative analysis of two texts
adopted as representative of each genre as I conceive it. In this way I hope to show
that it is not only possible, but highly advantageous, to learn from the novel.
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Introductions: Learning From the Novel
This thesis represents a defence and celebration of the notion that it is both possible and
desirable to learn from the novel. In using this phrase, I do not intend to smuggle in any
secondary meanings, but rather to refer to a number of possibilities in the most efficient way.
I mean "novel" as both a work of literature and something unfamiliar. In the first case, my
aim is to show that readers are justified in believing that we may acquire new understanding
from the novels which we read. The invocation of the unfamiliar in the second case
recognizes and attempts to reassess the restrictive power of tradition, particularly in
philosophy. However, this is not regarded as an opportunity to side-step the core issues of
each discipline; rather it represents an attempt to find a new way of looking at issues which
have been seen through a similar pattern for some time. This is one sense in which my thesis
promotes learning. Another sense of this word is referred to in my focus on epistemological
issues in literature. I interpret "epistemological" in its broadest sense such that it is not
dependent upon a notion of absolute truth.1 That is to say, it is not incoherent, in my view, to
talk about pragmatism as a theory of knowledge. If it were incoherent, then the propositions
of pragmatism would have no implications for our systems of belief. All these considerations
lead me to attempt to demonstrate how it is possible to learn from the novel in terms of what
it is to be a feminist philosophical novel.
The inspirations for this thesis arise from my interest in two intriguing questions.
How Can Literature Be Philosophical?
How Can Feminists Write Philosophy?
The first question in this pair has been raised in the analytic aesthetic tradition. Philosophers
have attempted to answer it in terms of a specific examination of the role of figurative
language, or the rhetorical origins of language, or by reconceiving truth. And yet the
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question, with its attendant tone of incredulity, still remains. One reason for this is, I suggest,
that the conceptual structures in terms of which this question is approached, remain either
unacknowledged or unquestioned. Specifically, by drawing attention to the ways in which
Plato's prescription of the relationship between philosophy and literature has set the agenda
for the discussion, I hope to offer a different approach to the question, one which connects it
with a feminist agenda.
The second question springs from a western feminist tradition which sees philosophy as a
paradigm of patriarchy in the academy. For feminists to involve ourselves in philosophical
study, it is said, is for us to sacrifice ourselves to the patriarchal tradition. Other ways of
representing feminist thought must be found. I regard the form of the novel in terms of a
feminist tradition. By showing that - and how - literature may be philosophical, this thesis
discovers new possibilities for a feminist philosophy which is both in and on feminists' own
terms. This will call into question the traditions of feminism, philosophy and literature, as
each will come to have new relevance for one another. There is an apparently paradoxical
aim for this thesis, then, which is the hope that the future will change the past; that my
method will spread in all directions facilitating new histories of the disciplines. Yet it is also
a claim for the future; I hope to show that this way of bringing together the three elements
can be a way of rejuvenating them. In other words, I will provide an in-depth analysis of the
edges of philosophy, literature and feminism, as a way of investigating each to the core.
The theme of couplings will reverberate throughout this thesis, since I make a number of
divisions in order to explore their validity. I make a distinction between literature and
philosophy in order that the division between them be questioned, and the threads which
connect them named and explored. The division between women, or more specifically
feminism, and philosophy is grafted on to the distinction between literature and philosophy.
' This contrasts, for example, with Susan Hekman's view that the very notion of a feminist epistemology is incompatible with
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A feminist perspective will be crucial to this thesis, and I take the critique of couplings to be
an aspect of this perspective.
I will also refer to and utilize a traditional division between Analytic and Continental
philosophy. This is largely a pragmatic rather than an ontological distinction; I am aware that
both traditions may be described as fundamentally Kantian, and that the suggestions of
geographical specificity are somewhat misleading. However, as an undergraduate I was
introduced to the question of how literature can be philosophical from the perspective of an
analytic tradition. It seemed to me then, and still does now, that many of the difficulties
experienced by those within this tradition who address the question of the relationship
between philosophy and literature arise as a result of a reluctance to look beyond their
analytic philosophical tradition. On the other hand, continental philosophers have tended to
break down the relationship between the two disciplines without exegesis.
Since the question of how it is possible for literature to be philosophical has been raised in
the analytic tradition, I propose to answer it as such. More specifically, this thesis relates to
analytic philosophy in three ways. First, it is motivated by and written in response to work
done by analytic philosophers in connection with the relationship between philosophy and
literature. Second, it works out of an analytic tradition. Third, it belongs within the analytic
tradition. However, I also believe that any answer to the question of how literature can be
philosophical needs to take literature seriously, as continental philosophy so often does, and
analytic philosophy so often does not. This is why I choose to offer the bulk ofmy argument
in the form of textual analysis. Since this thesis is written within the terms of the analytic
philosophical tradition, this choice may be seen as contentious. However, such a method is
commensurate with my broader aims of exploring boundaries in an attempt to expand
territories. It does not compromise my claim to be doing analytic philosophy.
postmodernism. See her Gender and Knowledge: Elements ofa Postmodern Feminism (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 16-17.
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Aristotle's defence of literature against the Platonic onslaught is presented in terms of
generic divisions. As such, it strikes me as a particularly appropriate choice of method for
my project. I also use the method of genre because it makes my theories with regard to
specific texts applicable to other texts. In other words, the use of the method of genre is an
attempt to claim wider significance for my thesis. This is not to say that it is an attempt to
construct a conclusive grand narrative. That is, in the terms of literary criticism, I do not
claim that the key to textual meaning may be discovered in philosophical interpretations.
Similarly, in the terms of analytic philosophy, I do not offer an essential definition of
philosophical literature, in the sense of necessary and sufficient a priori conditions for texts
to count as such. Rather, I suggest a way of looking at texts which may be helpful to both
philosophical and literary disciplines. More specifically, I hope to reconcile the two
questions above, and offer a new way of looking at the pair together, through literary genres.
Another reason for the critical adoption of generic divisions relates to the theme of exploring
and exposing structures which have a bearing upon the question of how it is possible for
literature to be philosophical. I do not claim to offer an exhaustive analysis of either generic
literary theory per se, or any of the particular genres I examine. Chapters Two, Three and
Four will deal with genre rather as a means to an end, with an eye always on the prize of
showing that literature can be philosophical.
Because I am attempting to draw together so many different notions and ways of discussing, I
begin by sketching a clear picture of the place at which I enter the debates involved. Chapter
One, then, will be such a construction. In it, I will establish the Platonic domination of the
analytic philosophical conception of the relationship between philosophy and literature,
demonstrate the contribution which feminist perspectives can make to the debate, and justify
the choices I have made with regard to the methodology I adopt for the remaining three
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chapters of the thesis. Chapter Two will discuss the genre of autographical fiction, focusing
on some of the ways in which this genre has been neglected or dismissed by philosophers,
literary critics, and feminists, before reclaiming it as a feminist philosophical genre, and
demonstrating this reclamation with the use of two specific examples, Sylvia Plath's The Bell
Jar, and Jeanette Winterson's Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit. Chapter Three will look at
the ways in which the genre of Utopian fiction has been predominantly understood in an anti-
philosophical manner, and will redress this, and once more demonstrate its philosophical
potential in terms of two examples, Marge Piercy's Woman On the Edge of Time, and Sally
Miller Gearhart's The Wanderground. Chapter Four will follow the same pattern, this time
with the genre of detective fiction, exemplified by the novels of Sara Paretsky featuring the
detective V. I. Warshawski, and those of Barbara Wilson featuring Pam Nilsen.
All of these chapters raise more questions than they answer. The most frequent response to
papers I have given in relation to this subject is that I have not said what people expect me to
say. A general interest provoked by my two questions seems to entice listeners into
assumptions about any possible answers. I ought, perhaps, to make clear that I regard the
satisfaction of expectations to be outside my remit, and indeed to be outside the remit of any
feminist philosophical text. Throughout this thesis I see myself as telling a story about
connections between feminism, philosophy and literature. It is only one possible story, told
in one possible way. Yet I believe it to be a story worth telling.
A note on style
Deborah Cameron speaks of her preferred use of feminine generic pronouns in place of
masculine generic pronouns as a way of redressing the traditional imbalance of patriarchal
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texts, and drawing the attention of readers to the way in which they are being addressed.2 I
take Cameron's aim here to be both noble and desirable, but disagree on the method which
she proposes for achieving this aim. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, I think that the
problem with the use of "he" and "him" as universal is that they simply are not; they do not
function as generic. This is just as much the case for "she" and "her". Secondly, I am
suspicious of the proposal to use terminology which will 'emphasize women's presence in
the world' (p. 126). My alternative proposal is the use of disrupted pronouns s/he and he/r,
which are inclusive rather than exclusive, yet also resist the temptation to emphasize
anyone's presence, instead merely offering a space for all readers should they choose to
activate it. This method leaves me free to use gender specific pronouns purposively.
Although I identify myself as a feminist, and as a reader, and in both of these contexts use
collective vocabulary, as far as possible I avoid the oppressive and restrictive form "we", in
such constructions as for example "we have seen now that...". Instead I take responsibility
for my argument, with the use of the first person pronoun. This is a contentious action,
which I perform on the understanding that it signals commitment, and offers the option of
reader involvement.3 My attitude in this matter will form an important part ofmy argument
in Chapter Two, on autographical fiction.
On a more general note, the tone and style of this thesis are largely autobiographical, since it
represents my ongoing attempts to speak to and from two disparate and estranged academic
disciplines. In addition, writing as a feminist means for me continually revising strategies of
expression, which often necessitates rejecting the teaching of both disciplines. There are
dangers here; to philosophers I may often sound whimsical and obtuse; literary critics may
hear the same words as hectoring and simplistic; to feminists I may also sound aggressive and
2 See Deborah Cameron, Feminism and Linguistic Theory, 2nd edn. (London: MacMillan, 1992), pp. 125-6. Subsequent page
references will be given in the text.
'
For an evocation of a feminist perspective against using the first person pronoun see Virginia Woolf, A Room ofOne's Own
(London: Penguin, 1945), pp. 98-99.
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individualistic. Although I strive to write as clearly as possible on the issues as I see them, I
am also keen to incorporate into my writing a sense that things are rarely as simple as they
seem. In this way I attempt to produce a text which enacts one of my principles of
connection between the three disciplines which I invoke; specifically I would like it to
function as an incitement to read.
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Chapter One
Overture: Philosophy, Literature, Feminism
Interdisciplinary relationships between the three elements of this thesis are becoming
increasingly difficult to ignore. For example, it is now possible to refer to feminist
philosophy, feminist literature, philosophical literature and literary philosophy as specific
areas of study. Yet in each of these cases there may be said to be a master discipline. In
other words, just as the noun controls the adjective in grammatical terms, so one discipline
controls the other. This controlling effect works in two contradictory ways. Whilst
interdisciplinary concerns remain confined within the noun discipline, they also remain
marginalized within that discipline, and so ultimately regarded as unconnected with and
unnecessary for, the important concerns of the field. Viewed from within the boundaries of
each discipline, combination with another is often seen as a dilution of its strength, or worse,
as if interdisciplinarity involves adding impurities to the pure. The suggestion seems to be
that nothing is gained, and something vital is lost when any intellectual coupling takes place.
If pairings are looked upon with such suspicion, my task of bringing together three
disciplines seems quite daunting, and if progress is to be made, a reconsideration of the
interdisciplinary relationships involved will be crucial. In this first chapter, then, I intend to
draw a conceptual picture of the interaction of the three disciplines, within the terms of a
structure of tradition.
Those texts which form part of a tradition are chosen for many reasons other than that they
are the best or most accurate ideological texts. Indeed, it is not even clear what criteria could
be used to decide what would make a text a "good" or "accurate" part of a tradition. As part
of my investigation into how traditions work, I will attempt to find representative examples
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of cultural attitudes which will contribute towards an explanation of the continued
estrangement, and the potential for conciliation, of the mainstreams of both philosophy and
literature. I do not claim to be exhaustive in this endeavour. Rather I intend to trace a range
of representative conceptions of the relationships between, and avail myself of any useful
strategies for conciliation I find along the way.
I will attempt to overcome the problems identified by trying to find out how the relevant
interdisciplinary relationships are possible, establishing what it is about each element which
touches on the others. The combination, and eventually mixture, may then be seen to work
with rather than against the principles and practices of each discipline. In this way I hope to
dispense with the notion of master disciplines, and use disciplinary adjectives with impunity.
My approach is an analytic one, and the philosophers I seek to address are those in the
analytic tradition who have attempted to deal with the problem of how it is that literature
might be philosophical. That the question arises in the analytic tradition is something I find
particularly fascinating, since this school of philosophy has been traditionally hostile towards
literature.1 I aim to draw to the attention of these philosophers certain connections between
this question and the question of how it is possible for feminists to write philosophy. Such
connections have not been made to date by any analytic philosophers. I intend to make it
here, in order to construct coherent responses to both questions. I take as my starting point
the premise that analytic philosophy has expressed a traditional hostility to the role of both
literature and feminism in philosophy, and seek to confront these hostilities in collaboration.
I shall begin this project chronologically, focusing first on the 'ancient quarrel' between
philosophy and literature, and thus introducing my claim that Plato's analysis of the
relationship between the two in the Republic has cast a shadow upon analyses of their
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relationship in the two thousand years which have followed. From there, I will move on to
describe contributions made to each of these disciplines by feminism. By looking at feminist
perspectives on the two, I will suggest, again with the use of representative examples, that
where philosophy has been mistrustful of the contributions to be made by feminists, literature
has at least been ambiguous in its attitude. I will then be in a position to state clearly my
method for and purpose in showing what it means to be a feminist philosophical novel, and
so provide a prelude to the following chapters' celebrations of learning from the novel. This
celebration will involve taking work written in the form of the novel seriously, and also
recognizing the progressive effects which practitioners in the fields of feminism, philosophy,
and literature can potentially have on each other's worlds.
' For an exposition of the history of this hostility, see Jonathan Ree, Philosophical Tales: An Essay On Philosophy and
Literature (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 1-4.
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A. The Ancient Quarrel
Although the general subject areas of philosophy and literature have many points of contact,
there are relatively few explicit studies of how it might be possible for literature to be
philosophical. Perhaps, it may be suggested, such a study is not needed. After all, isn't it
self-evident that the two impinge on each other? Whilst it is true that literary theory in the
twentieth century has crept further and further into the field of philosophy, and also that
philosophers are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of the ways in which they
write, the two disciplines remain as distant and mutually mistrustful as ever. Meetings are
temporary and conditional, and fail to affect either field. That this is the case is due, I
suggest, to two dominant attitudes towards the subject upon which I now write; from the
philosopher's perspective, that literary art cannot approach philosophical ideas in a
satisfactory manner, and from literature, that it is so obvious that literary art does discuss
such ideas, that there is no need to defend the notion at all.
I suggest that these two attitudes, although apparently contradictory, in fact are related in
interesting ways, and may be traced back to their inheritance of a tradition which has
confined and delimited the potential of the relationship. I will begin this section by looking
at ways in which philosophy has touched upon literature, and vice versa, in order to gain
insights into the difficult dynamics of the relationship, in particular as it is determined within
the terms of a tradition. Only when I have exposed these dynamics will it be possible to
move on to a third point of view, which proposes to show precisely that literature can be
philosophical; that in this way it is possible to learn from a novel. The defence of this
proposition, in its strongest form, will provide the conclusion for this section.
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1. PHILOSOPHY
Poetry might accuse us of insensitivity and lack of culture, so we'd better tell her that
there's an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy.2
I want to talk about Plato's attitude to the relationship between philosophy and literature for
two fundamental, connected reasons. One is that it is a clearly defined, widely read, early
statement of a position which I will go on to show has been remarkably influential. The other
reason I want to start with Plato is that the way in which his position is put, and the way in
which others have accepted it, highlights one of the most important ways in which traditions
operate in the fields of both literature and philosophy. My attitude is that this operation has
typically taken place behind the scenes. So for example, although analytic philosophers often
pick up on Plato's critique of imitative art, few choose to make explicit the extent to which
the resulting conception of literature is fundamentally dependent upon a particular
interpretation of the role and significance of philosophy.3 Those who do perceive the
structural significance of Plato's conception of a literature defined in terms of a negation of
philosophy have failed to draw out the force of the distinction by neglecting to take into
account the sexual politics of the system.4 One of the tasks of this thesis is to drag the
presentation of the relationship between literature and philosophy in the Republic to centre
stage, and to offer an original interpretation of that relationship as one which takes account of
2 Plato's Republic, trans, and ed. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 607b. Subsequent paragraph
references will be given in the text.
3 A rare recent exception to this may be found in Christopher Janaway's thorough and brilliant Images ofExcellence: Plato's
Critique of the Arts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), which offers a survey of Plato's attitude towards art throughout his works.
Janaway acknowledges that in the Phaedrus. Plato defines literary skill negatively in order to 'discriminate the philosopher from
the mere writer, or the poet' (p. 167). However, Janaway's uncritical project leaves this discrimination unquestioned, and so the
author misses the opportunity to explore further the interdependency of the Platonic conceptions of literature and philosophy.
4 See for example Stanley Rosen, The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry: Studies In Ancient Thought (New York:
Routledge, 1988). The value of Rosen's argument here may be seen in his acknowledging the radical implications of Plato's
analysis of the relationship between literature and philosophy. Rosen asserts that 'the possibility of philosophy depends upon
whether the coherence of diversity [...] provides us with the means to a poetic production of the whole, without itself being a
poem' (p. xi). But Rosen seeks to argue that the distinction between Plato and Socrates serves to figure a disruption of
oppositions such as that between literature and philosophy, and that the presentation of the ancient quarrel in the Republic
participates in that feature of Plato's philosophical works which may be seen in terms of their being ' philosophically "self-
conscious"' (p. 31). As such, the ancient quarrel demonstrated in the Republic may be seen to present an organic whole, which
successfully presents a problem, and in doing so, offers that presentation as the solution to the problem. For a more general
application of the principle that the way in which Plato constructs his dialogues as literature has a bearing upon the
philosophical implications of the works, see Eugenio Benitez, 'Characterisation and Interpretation: The Importance of Drama in
Plato's Sophist', Journal of the Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics, 6 (1996), 27-39. For both of these commentators,
the literary status of the dialogues complicates their philosophical implications, but ultimately may be seen to present an original
key to the texts, a way of making them mean. In contrast, it is my suggestion that a reading of the presentation of the ancient
quarrel between philosophy and literature in the Republic which takes gender into account complicates without offering
solutions.
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a feminist politics, and which, as a result of this new perspective, is able to analyse the
relationship between literature and philosophy from a different and enlightening perspective.
With references in the Republic to an 'ancient quarrel', Plato naturalizes the dichotomy he
sets up between literature and philosophy.5 Waiving responsibility for the system he outlines
allows Plato's judgements to remain unchallenged, and makes the unquestioned acceptance
of the dichotomy and its associations by subsequent writers almost inevitable. In very simple
terms, this describes a significant way in which traditions may operate.
In the Republic, Plato is famously hostile to artists, in particular literary artists, and their
creations. In Book 2 of the Republic Socrates warns of the dangerous power of stories and
how they may affect societies - fictitious stories are thought to be particularly harmful,
especially to those who don't know any better, for example children. Planning primary
education in the ideal state, Socrates asks rhetorically;
Shall we, then, casually allow our children to listen to any old stories, made up by just
anyone, and to take into their minds views which, on the whole, contradict those we'll
want them to have as adults? (377b)
The only possible conclusion is that citizens of the ideal society may only be exposed to
literature which has undergone heavy censorship. The role of fiction in the new republic is to
work with the establishment and so texts must be approved by the guardians of the society.
Part of the reason that poets are considered so dangerous in the Republic is that their skills
are not based on reason but rather produce artefacts which are the enemies of reason, inciting
subversive elements and exciting baser instincts. This is because they appeal to the irrational
part of our natures, and encourage emotional reactions to events;
5
Throughout the Republic, Plato refers to arts as a whole, arguing that what is said of one art may be applied to the arts
generally. Throughout, I take Plato's remarks about narrative poetry to be similarly applicable to all literature, and particularly
novels, since this latter may be said to constitute the popular form which narrative poetry was when the Republic was written.
This is a fairly conventional interpretation, for a full exposition of which see James O. Urmson, 'Plato and the Poets', in Plato
on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts, ed. by Julius Moravcsik and Philip Temko (Totawa, NJ: Rowman &AUenheld, 1982), pp.
125-136. For an unconventional interpretation of Plato's generic applicability see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy:
Out of the Spirit ofMusic, trans, by Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin, 1993), esp. pp. 67-70.
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If you admit the entertaining Muse of lyric and epic poetry, then instead of law and the
shared acceptance of reason as the best guide, the kings of your community will be
pleasure and pain. (607a)
In Book 10, Socrates places his criticisms in the context of an ancient quarrel between poets
and philosophers. Historically, both of these professions claimed to offer truths about our
lives and the world. As Iris Murdoch points out;
the poets had existed, as prophets and sages, long before the emergence of philosophers,
and were the traditional purveyors of theological and cosmological information.6
In crude terms, the philosophers represent oracular competition for the poets. Yet for Plato,
only the philosophers - who will also rule his Utopian society - have access to true knowledge
and the Forms, or the ideal world of universals. According to Plato's metaphysics, the world
that people see and live in is an imperfect copy of this ideal - and only truly real - world, and
it is this world which artists choose to represent. By analogy, Socrates argues that this places
poets at a third remove from reality (595a-602b). Moreover, to write in a literary form is to
admit to not really knowing about the subject; after all, Socrates says
I'm sure that if [the poet] really knew about the things he was copying in his
representations, he'd put far more effort into producing real objects. (599b)
Here Plato focuses on the creators for criticism; it is their failings which make their works
dangerous. Thus literature is intolerable in the ideal society because its creators are writing
about subjects of which they have no knowledge, and truths to which they have no access.
Literature, and those who insist upon creating it, are to be banished from the republic.
Plato does allow for the possibility that poetry may be reintroduced into the republic in the
future. Poets may be admitted back into the republic if, instead of writing 'for pleasure', they
'come up with a rational argument for their inclusion' (607c). Another option is to allow
those who are not poets, but could argue for poetry, to defend it in the poets' absence (607d).
Most importantly, the readmission of literary artists into the republic should not involve
'compromising the truth as we see it' (607c). Literary artists, then, must adapt their
conceptions as well as their expressions to those of philosophy, and if they are unable to do
this, must rely on others outside the field of literature to prove the potential and worth of
literature, by interpreting the literature which cannot justify itself.
In the Republic, Plato tells us that the relationship between literary artists and philosophers
has long since been characterized by antagonism. As a philosopher, Plato seeks to preserve
this tradition by recommending that literary art be banned from any ideal society. He
6 Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 1. Subsequent page
references will be given in the text.
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associates literature with moral turpitude, and labels her an enemy to truth. In contrast
philosophers are to be entrusted with ruling the Utopian republic, making its laws and
preserving its citizens from all that may endanger the society. Literary art, then, is depicted
as an element which threatens the truth and moral purity of a world created by philosophers -
she is an agent of corruption, to be feared by all who value a philosophical outlook.
However, literature may be used as a tool by the philosopher. This is made clear in two
ways; firstly, with the creation of the Republic as itself a literary text, and secondly, with an
explicit defence of literary forms by Socrates as philosopher in Book 6, where he asserts his
right to prove a philosophical point in the only way he sees possible, telling Adeimantus;
'it'll take an analogy to answer your question' (487e).7
Literature, here in the form of the dialogue, is a tool, to be called upon by the philosopher in
his attempt to relate his ideas to other lesser beings. Within this literary form, the literary
form of the analogue may be used to make points clearer. As a non-poet, Socrates does not
need to have these stories interpreted. His profession allows him to assert
I'm sure you don't need an analysis of the analogy [...] I'm sure you take my point.
(489a)
With this, Plato offers us a simple answer to the question of how literature can be
philosophical, which is also how literature might be valuable; by being written by a
philosopher, and being a part of philosophy. As a result, I shall refer to the sanctioned
manipulation of literature by philosophers as their taking the Socratic stance.
A summary of Plato's conception of the relationship between philosophy and literature may
be outlined in terms of four Platonic claims;
1. Literature presents a danger to philosophy from which the latter must be protected.
2. Where philosophy expresses and develops the rational and the true, literature may be
associated with the irrational and the false.
3. Literary artists are intellectually inferior to philosophers, and to write literature is to admit
to a lack of knowledge about philosophical matters.
4. Literature may be manipulated by philosophers to become ethically and socially
acceptable, perhaps even valuable.
7 Earlier translations incorporate an even greater sense of compulsion here. See Plato, The Republic, trans, by Paul Shorey
(London: Heinemann, 1935), where Socrates says that Adeimantus' question 'requires an answer expressed in a comparison or
parable'; Plato, The Republic, trans, by Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1987), where Socrates admits that he 'must give
[Adeimantus] an illustration'; and the translation which appears in Francis MacDonald Cornford, The Republic of Plato (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1951), where Socrates says he has been asked 'a question which needs to be answered by means
of a parable'.
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The first three descriptions of the relationship between philosophy and literature facilitate the
fourth and final prescriptive claim. As the culmination of the value system, it forms a crucial
consideration for my analysis of how literature might be philosophical, because it offers an
explanation of what is to be done about the quarrel between philosophy and literature. I will
argue that it is this prescription which has proved most problematic for attempts to answer
the question.
In the meantime I want to draw attention to the patriarchal terms of the Platonic value system,
created through the four Platonic claims. Explicitly, literature is said to be dangerous
because it brings about a state of mind which is associated with women (605d-e). Even
without explicit genderizations of the debate, the value system which is naturalized in Plato's
conception of the relationship between literature and philosophy is implicitly patriarchal.
Literature is criticized as immoral and lacking wisdom, in contrast with philosophy, which
has positive, opposing associations, and as such is properly superior to literature. Literature
is depicted as unpredictable and hopelessly unreliable, unless placed under the subjection of
philosophers. Literature is a paradigm case of the patriarchal other; she is the threat from
whom male philosophers should be protected, and that which must come under their control.
Plato's value system preserves a tradition whereby philosophy is valued over literature; the
practitioners of the first have intellectual and, ideally, political power, whilst the practitioners
of the second will be excluded from society. In cultures where gender divisions are similarly
evaluative, the two sides of the dichotomy are easily translated into biological terms; it
becomes accepted that men write philosophy, which is important, whilst women write
literature, which isn't. This is how the aesthetic preference of an 'authoritarian moralist'
(Murdoch, p. 86) is turned into biological determinism. The gender associations of
philosophy and literature, and the cultural implications of these associations, may be
perpetuated by any collusion with the Platonic forms.
One of the most common forms of collusion is, I suggest, apparent in the operation of the
sanctioned manipulation of literature by philosophers, or their taking the Socratic stance.
Radical manifestations of this principle occur in both analytic and non-analytic philosophy.
A recent example of the former would be Jostein Gaarder, who, in the novel Sophie's World,
seeks to present philosophical ideas in a literary form.8 In the case of non-analytic
8
Sophie's World: A Novel About the History ofPhilosophy, trans, by Paulette Mailer (London: Pheonix, 1995). Other
successful examples in recent years include Robert M. Pirsig's two novels, Zen and The Art ofMotorcycle Maintenance: An
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philosophy, Sartre is a philosopher who has famously attempted to express his philosophical
ideas in literary form.
In both of these cases, literature has been courted at the expense of marginalization from the
philosophical establishment. For example, having conducted a straw poll amongst a number
of contemporary British philosophers, a Guardian journalist writes with confidence that
despite its popularity 'Sophie's World is utter junk. Pretty well all professional philosophers
think so' .9 This remark is ironic because when Gaarder wrote this novel he was employed as
a philosopher. The distinction between a novelist and professional philosopher seems natural
precisely because the one is taken by definition to exclude the other, or, in Gaarder's case,
perhaps, the professionalism of the philosopher is understood to be compromised by the
adoption of the Socratic stance.
Less harshly, but perhaps more patronizingly, in a summary/ introduction to Sartre's
philosophical novel Nausea designed for undergraduate students, Stephen Priest writes;
The fictional format allows [Sartre] to dispense with arguing for existentialism and in
the absence of argument we might as well believe the opposite.10
I take Priest's remarks on Sartre's oeuvre to be representative of the attitude that
philosophers' sojourns into literature can be legitimately ignored by philosophers. According
to such an attitude, literature, even literature produced by a philosopher who takes the
Socratic stance, has nothing to offer philosophical debate. This is because it adopts the
wrong style, a style which is characterized by absence; it lacks an argumentative posture.
The fact of its having a literary style prevents it from counting as philosophy. This hostility
towards literature may be said to have its roots in the Republic, where Plato wants literary
works first censored, and then banished, so that he does not have to deal with them at all.
Literary works, because they are literary, are to be curtailed in significance, and then made
invisible to philosophers.
As a result, whilst it may seem that these philosophers are successfully overcoming the
Platonic value system, in fact they are conforming faithfully to it. Adoption of the Socratic
stance leaves in place the patriarchal value system which sees literature as a tool at the
disposal of the philosopher, whose position, both within the tradition and as originator and
controller of the ideas of that tradition, remains pivotal and unquestioned. When
Inquiry Into Values (London: Vintage, 1991), and Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals (London: Bantam, 1991), and Tibor Fischer's
The Thought Gang (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1994).
9
Jenny Turner, 'Laura and Paul Do Profundity', Weekend Guardian, 8 June 1996, pp. 22-28 (p. 23).
'
Stephen Priest, 'Jean-Paul Sartre: An Introduction', in Philosophy ICH 1994/5: Course Reader and Lecture Summary (Dept
of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 97-149 (p. 102).
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philosophers appropriate literary forms, such forms no longer present the threat which so
worried Plato, because the literature remains under the control of the omniscient philosopher.
This is because the kind of thinking which the philosopher has achieved may be thought of as
enabling him to use certain ideas which, in others, would prove dangerous.11 In other words,
when philosophers adopt the Socratic stance, it matters not whether the resulting texts are
labelled philosophical literature or literary philosophy; philosophy, understood as a
personification of the creator behind it, counts as the master discipline, and, in the terms of
the Platonic value system, as the discipline of the master.
This is why the mere fact of philosophical ideas being written in a literary form does not
constitute a resolution of the problem of how it is that literature can be philosophical. It does
not confront the Platonic value system. A more radical response is required. Richard Rorty
is a philosopher who has presented such a response. He has sought to reverse the Platonic
binary opposition which always prioritizes philosophy over literature. Explicitly proclaiming
the end of philosophy, he prophecies that the ideas which philosophy formerly contained will
be liberated by a literature which supersedes it.
Rorty argues that the Platonic influence on philosophy has been fundamentally misguided. It
has effectively restricted the scope of its own concerns.12 Rorty argues that traditional
(Platonic) philosophy makes the mistake of defining its project as the search for absolute
truth and absolute value. Rorty's pragmatism seeks to encourage philosophers to abandon
this project, and instead to concentrate on the search for the most useful styles and modes of
expression of ideas about the world. Once this has been achieved, philosophers can
appreciate, as 'literary criticism' already has, that
the creed or the philosophical doctrine becomes the emblem of the novelist's character
or the poet's image, rather than converseley [sic].13
In addition, Rorty's conception of traditional philosophy seems to offer a new awareness of
the sexual politics involved, by developing a Derridean notion of philosophy and writing as
distinct forms of sexual activity;14
1
Similarly, Descartes' search for a model of scientific, excessively objectified knowledge is presented by Susan Bordo in terms
of a desire for a 'state of mental readiness,' after the achievement of which 'the mind's subjective responses - its convictions -
can be trusted.' See The Flight To Objectivity: Essays On Cartesianism and Culture (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1987), p. 92, author's italics.
12 See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
13 See Richard Rorty, 'Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendent Culture', in Consequences of Pragmatism: (Essays: 1972-
1980) (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 60-71 (p. 66).
14 Richard Rorty, 'Philosophy as a Kind ofWriting: An Essay On Derrida', in Consequences, pp. 90-109 (pp. 106-109).
Subsequent page references will be given in the text. For Derrida's remarks on this matter see Jacques Derrida, ' "...That
Dangerous Supplement..." ', in OfGrammatology, trans, by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976), pp. 141-164.
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In normal physics, normal philosophy [...] one hopes for the normal thrill of just the
right piece fitting into just the right slot [...] Writing, as Derrida says [...] is to this kind
of simple "getting it right" as masturbation is to standard, solid, reassuring sex. This is
why writers are thought effete in comparison with scientists - the "men of action" of our
latter days. (p. 106)
Rorty challenges this conception, to argue that the "masturbators" may be seen as sexually
adventurous; that post Derrida, the contrast between those embarrassed by the mediated
nature of their work on the one hand, and those who celebrate the written on the other
now appears as that between the man who wants to take (and see) things as they are, and
the man who wants to change the vocabulary presently used for isolating pieces and
holes, (p. 107)
Rorty here offers the suggestion that the masculinism of traditional philosophy may be
rejected for even better things.
At first glance, Rorty's doctrine of pragmatism appears to be an adequate rebuke of the
Platonic value system which I outlined at the beginning of this section. Moreover, the notion
that rejecting traditional Platonic philosophy will mean rejecting the associations of
machismo which philosophy often seems to harbour, is clearly appealing to feminists.
However, in terms of my project, there are two significant problems with Rorty's work. First
of all, Rorty does not dismantle Plato's dichotomy; he merely reverses it. Since under the
Platonic value system, literature is philosophy's negation, it is the obvious place for Rorty to
turn to for salvation. Yet the preservation of Plato's dichotomy, in spite of its being reversed,
entails that literature is valued purely on the basis that it is not philosophy. Literature is
revalued at the expense of philosophy, because literary writing, and the possibilities of
hermeneutics, counts as the dross which remains when metaphysical philosophy has been
discounted.
One of the consequences of this is that all those features which Rorty rejects in philosophy,
must be denied in literature. The principle notions discarded by him are argumentation, and
seriousness. With regard to the former, he offers a definition of literature as 'the areas of
culture which [...] forego argumentation'.15 This places Rorty in agreement with Priest's
(Platonic) remark about Sartre's literature; that it does not constitute an argument because it
is literature.
Neither is literature allowed to be serious. Rorty says, for example, that Dewey is appealing
to the pragmatist because his writing
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helps us to put aside that spirit of seriousness which artists traditionally lack and
philosophers are traditionally supposed to maintain.16
Plato would agree with Rorty on this, as I have suggested, but connections might also be
made with Searle, who identifies the difference between fictional and nonfictional discourses
as one between 'nonserious' and 'serious' uses of language.17 Searle argues that this means
that, for example, the views expressed in a novel are not ones which could be said to be
'seriously committed' (p. 321). The inadequacy of Searle's application of speech act theory
to fictional texts has been roundly criticized.18 Whilst Rorty does not wish to define
literature negatively in this way, he offers a limitation upon his understanding of literature as
philosophical, by saying that the application of this adjective is dependent upon literature
being regarded as nonserious.
As a result, Rorty's understanding of literature is seriously inhibited by his "ulterior
motives". I am referring to the way in which his revaluation of literature at the expense of
philosophy is inextricably connected with his pragmatist philosophy. Again, the pragmatist's
affirmation of the value of literature as offering philosophical understanding most definitely
involves 'compromising the truth as we see it' (Republic, 607c). In this, then, Rorty is in
agreement with Plato, differing only in his view that this danger is not one from which
philosophers should be protected, but rather that they should be exposed to it and admit
defeat. Little wonder then, that philosophers' rendezvous with literature are regarded with
suspicion by traditional philosophers - under a Rortian analysis, these meetings not only
threaten the special powers which philosophers have to offer insights into our lives and the
ways in which we live them, but also threaten to label this endeavour as completely
misguided.
Rorty's version of pragmatism insists that literature is important because philosophy is just
another 'kind of writing' ('Philosophy As', p. 92) and so that there is no reason to value the
latter over the former. On this view, the valuing of literature marks some kind of conclusion
to philosophic study. This attitude is in harmony with Plato's view of the threat which
literature poses for philosophy, insisting as it does that literature threatens to dismantle the
whole philosophical enterprise. As part of this negative focus, Rorty seeks to value the status
of literature as a game, or as merely therapeutic, allowing the writer to make no claims for the
15
'Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism', in Consequences, pp. 139-159 (p. 142).
16
'Dewey's Metaphysics', in Consequences, pp. 72-89 (p. 87, author's italics).
17 John R. Searle, 'The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse', New Literary History, 6:2 (1975), 319-332 (pp. 320-321).
Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
18 See for example Stanley E. Fish, 'How To Do Things With Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism',
Modern Language Notes, 91:5 (1976), 983-1025 (esp. pp. 1011-1023).
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way the world is, and so have no responsibility for its place in the world. Again, this places
Rorty's analysis in the Platonic tradition.
Those who value literature might be wary of Rorty's revaluation, coming as it does as a result
of his despair with philosophy. This is the source of my second problem with Rorty with
regard to a conception of how literature might be philosophical. For pragmatists, literature is
not valued in and for itself; it is valued because it does not make the claims to truths that
characterize philosophical writing. In other words, the revaluation of literature is a
consequence of pragmatism.
From the point of view of the aesthetician, this fact suggests more parallels between Rorty's
attitude towards literature and Plato's. For both of them, their attitude to truth, or opinion
about what philosophy can do, determines the attitude which each will adopt towards
literature. For Rorty, it is the special relation which philosophers claim their study has to
truth which makes philosophy both impossible and unnecessary. Clearly this belief puts
Rorty at odds with much of the philosophical establishment. But he has in common with
them the view that whatever philosophical conclusions he comes to must determine his
understanding of literature. I resist the notion that answers to the question "how can
literature be philosophical" may be expressed in terms of whether or not literary texts
conform to my criteria of truth. I want to rather insist that my attitude towards literature is
not predetermined, and that part of what it means to say that literature is philosophical is that
literature can argue for philosophical positions which may differ from the ones which I
already have. This attitude distinguishes me from the many analytic philosophers who have
chosen to translate the question 'how can literature be philosophical' to the question 'how
can there be truth in fiction?'.19 For precisely the same reason, it also distinguishes me from
those analytic philosophers who translate the question 'how can literature be philosophical
into 'what role does my emotional response to literature play in cognition?'.20 The
distinction allows me greater flexibility of response to the question, since I do not need to
limit myself to arguing that only those literary texts which conform to a particular conception
of truth, or of emotion, count as philosophical. It also offers a greater philosophical
significance to literature, since I argue that literature itself is able to contemplate the
philosophical problem of what constitutes truth, or of what role emotion plays in cognition.
19 For a recent example of such an approach, see Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A
Philosophical Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). A useful survey of the analytic tradition's emphasis on truth in
relation to this question may be found in Peter J. McCormick, Fictions, Philosophies and the Problems ofPoetics (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 82-86.
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I have argued that the dissolution of the boundaries between philosophy and literature
effected by Rorty is complied with the Platonic value system because it conceives literature
as a threat to philosophy, and its revaluation as merely a consequence of pragmatism.21
Traditional analytic philosophers have also seen deconstruction, and particularly the work of
Jacques Derrida, as a threat to their best endeavours.22 However, Derridean deconstruction
has quite separate implications for my study. Although deconstruction does not offer an
explicit answer to the question of how it is possible for literature to be philosophical, the way
in which its practitioners have sought to subject texts from either tradition to similar analysis
has been highly instructive, since it offers a way of approaching texts outwith any traditions
in which they may have been placed.23 One consequence of this practice is that the proposal
to answer the question "how can literature be philosophical" by for example, looking for
formalist answers, is a mistake. There are no formal qualities to be found in literature which
may not be similarly found in philosophy.
My ambition of rereading and rewriting the Platonic value system in order to expose, explore,
and explode its assumptions and conditions is, perhaps, coincident with a deconstructionist
methodology. It seems to echo, for example, de Man's understanding of deconstruction as
something which
always has for its target to reveal the existence of hidden articulations and
fragmentations within assumedly monadic totalities.24
Furthermore, the discussion of philosophical questions which I excavate from novels may be
seen in terms of sets of 'hidden articulations'. The atmosphere and example of
deconstruction, then, is something of which I avail myself, an important supplementary
conception of my method.
More specifically, the project of Derridean deconstruction, and its effect on traditional
philosophy, may be said to have had some influence on this thesis. Its triumph seems to me
to consist in a certain successful philosophical writing about literature, a writing which is
20 For an exploration of the difficulties involved in making assumptions related to philosophical accounts of emotional
experiences of literature, see Jenefer Robinson, 'L'Education Sentimental', in Art and its Messages, ed. by Stephen Davies
(Philadelphia PA: Penn State University Press, 1997) pp. 34-48.
21 In arguing this, I perpetuate a pattern set up by Rorty in the following remark; 'One may say of Heidegger what he himself
says of Nietzsche: misled by a superficial understanding of the Platonic ideas, he tried to replace them, but only translated
Platonism into a newer jargon'; 'Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey', in Consequences, pp. 37-59 (p. 54). In the
terms of my argument, I apply this same criticism in turn to Rorty's attempt to overturn the Platonic conception of philosophy
and literature.
22 See for example Mary Warnock, Imagination and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 96.
23 See for example Christopher Norris, The Deconstructive Turn: Essays In the Rhetoric ofPhilosophy (London: Methuen,
1983).
24 Paul de Man, Allegories ofReading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche. Rillce, and Proust (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1979), p. 249.
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founded upon loyalty to, and careful reading of the literary text. Moreover, such a
perspective, separate as it is from the tradition in philosophy, need not be defensive about the
role of literature, need not exclude the possibility that literature may be found to offer more
than is commonly supposed to philosophy. As a result, there is no reason at all for texts
which participate in Derridean deconstruction to limit literature's role to that of examples for
philosophers' arguments. Derrida makes this point explicitly, saying that
poetry and literature provide or facilitate "phenomenological" access to what makes of a
thesis a thesis as such.'5
In contrast to Rorty, Derrida seems to consider literature's role in the presentation, and
therefore the production, of arguments, or theses, to be crucial. Moreover, Derrida
specifically acknowledges the historical contiguity of deconstruction and feminism ('That
Strange Institution', pp. 57-58). For these reasons alone it might seem that the most efficient
way to complete the terms of my thesis, that is, to successfully answer the philosophical
question how is it possible that literature can be philosophical, would be to adhere absolutely
to Derridean deconstruction, and to confine myself to a development of this thinker's train of
thoughts.
However, I do not choose this course. I have so far highlighted features of Derrida's
approach to literary texts which I deem positive in relation to my project. There are negative
ones too, even in the same article. Derrida feels free to assert that his treatment of literature
does not come from a phenomenological response to the arguments of literary texts,
particularly novels. He says
I must confess that deep down I have probably never drawn great enjoyment from
reading novels, for example, beyond the pleasure taken in analyzing the play of writing,
or else certain naive movements of identification. I like a certain practice of fiction, the
intrusion of an effective simulacrum or of disorder into philosophical writing, for
example, but telling or inventing stories is something that deep down (or rather on the
surface!) does not interest me particularly, (pp. 39-40)
For me, the need to theoretically connect philosophy and literature is a way of explaining, of
making sense of a feeling, often a specifically phenomenological contribution, that literature
has had upon my understanding of the world and its structures. Derrida's contrasting
response serves to relate his project to that of other, mainstream, even analytic philosophers
who attempt to absorb literature as a philosophical project. This is consistent with Derrida's
description of his turn from literature to philosophy, which is also described as a move
beyond literature;
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Jacques Derrida, ' "This Strange Institution Called Literature": An Interview With Jacques Derrida', trans. By Geoffrey
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, in Acts ofLiterature, ed. by Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-75 (p. 46).
24
I had a presentiment that there could sometimes be an innocence or an irresponsibility,
or even an impotence, in literature [...] I quickly got interested in a form of literature
which bore a question about literature, or else a philosophical type of activity which
interrogated the relationship between speech and writing, (p. 39)
Even here, then, there are echoes of the Platonic value system which associates feminine
gender stereotypic features with literature, in contrast to an active philosophy which is
capable of practising interrogation. In many ways, then, Derrida shares an attitude towards
literature with many other philosophers, and although he undoubtedly strives to demonstrate
the philosophical contribution of literature, he does not do this as a specific challenge to the
analytic Platonic tradition as regards the relationship between philosophy and literature as I
have described it, but rather he does this as a way of developing his own interest in the
question of what writing consists in. Although an admirable and interesting project, it is
quite distinct from mine here, as Derrida's confessions of his feelings about literature reveal.
Ironically, my qualms with regard to both analytic appropriations of literary forms and the
pragmatist siding with literature against philosophy reflect similar concerns which Julia
Kristeva has about Derrida et al. Kristeva distinguishes between rhetoricians and writers,
arguing that the former 'does not invent a language', but rather deliberately makes use of the
imaginative capacity of discourse;
he seduces it in the Latin sense of the verb - he "leads it astray" [...] This is indeed what
is happening to the discourse of contemporary philosophers, in France particularly,
when, hemmed in by the breakthroughs in social sciences on the one hand, and social
upheavals on the other, the philosopher begins performing literary tricks, thus arrogating
to himself a power over imaginations.26
This patriarchal arrogation may be explained, I have argued, by the way in which such
philosophers, in many different places, may be said to collude with the Platonic claims.
Attempts to resolve the ancient quarrel by asserting the ability of philosophers to appropriate
literary forms is problematic, and does not contribute helpfully to the question of how it is
possible that literature can be philosophical. In the next section I will shift the camera, to
look at the attitude of literature to couplings with philosophy.
Julia Kristeva, 'From One Identity To An Other', in Desire In Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, trans,
by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 124-147 (pp. 138-139).
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2. LITERATURE
The possibility that one can learn from a novel is perhaps more tempting for literary artists
than it is for philosophers. Indeed, at first glance, it seems that literature has nothing to lose
and much to gain by such a connection. Accordingly, the interdisciplinary journal
'Philosophy and Literature' is to be found in the literature section of the library, and much of
the philosophy which is receptive to literature may be found in the literary sections as well as
(and sometimes instead of) the philosophy sections of both libraries and bookshops.
University literature departments have been happy to look at those philosophies/ ers rejected
by their philosophical counterparts. It may be observed that the notion that literature is more
keen to be close to philosophy than vice versa, fits in perfectly with Plato's model which
posits literature as a seducer of philosophy, initiating relations and insisting on couplings.
In fact literature has been open to interdisciplinary relationships of all kinds, perhaps for no
other reason than because it is a study of writing, and writing may be said to be an issue for
most academic subjects. Yet philosophy does present a special relationship, just because the
questions it poses seem so relevant to the analysis of the significance of texts. Core
questions faced by literary critics have often brought them close to consideration of
philosophical issues connected with the reading as well as the writing experience, and the
proximity of philosophy to many kinds of literary criticism is so wide ranging that it cannot
possibly be given detailed consideration here.
Instead, I want to outline a general attitude of the literary establishment which assumes that
literature is philosophical, and which as a result concerns itself primarily with debating the
different ways in which this is the case. Much twentieth-century criticism has been
characteristically open to and discursive with the philosophy which it touches upon. And yet
theorists stop short of making explicit the reason for this relevance of philosophical matters
to the world of literature. Artists also display an assumption that literature "just is"
philosophical. My suggestion is that this is attitude is part of the heritage set in place by the
Romantic movement in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning
of the nineteenth, which saw poets like Coleridge and Keats producing works which assert
their own philosophical significance without explanation or exegesis. That this critical
assumption (that is, one made at the level of theory), continues to be made can be shown with
reference towards a contemporary reading of Romantic literary theory and practice, which I
take to be symptomatic of the Romanticist assumption of philosophy evident throughout
contemporary literary theory.
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In a difficult and complex text, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe argue that in
particular, early German romanticism may be said to constitute a response to a philosophical
'question of literature' \21
although it is not entirely or simply philosophical, romanticism is rigorously
comprehensible (or even accessible) only on a philosophical basis, in its proper and in
fact unique (in other words, entirely new) articulation with the philosophical, (p. 29,
authors' italics)
Since this literary approach was historically facilitated by Kant, the focus of romanticism
may be regarded as something bequeathed from Kant. This gift, according to the authors,
'was the crisis of the question of the subject'. Moreover, romanticism may be said to provide
a response to this question;
once the idea of mankind itself is "premised" - which obviously means that man as such
is premised - it goes without saying that an at least implicit answer is given to the
question: What is man? As is well known, Kant said that philosophy is forever
incapable of answering this question, (p. 34, authors' italics).
In this way, not only is philosophy assumed by literature, but the inadequacies of philosophy
are taken to be 'well known'. Again;
there is nothing in philosophy [...] that can provide the subject with access to itself. But
on the other hand, there is this (traditional) religious figure of the mediator [...]
incarnated in the artist, (p. 67).
The artist then becomes the focus for the philosophical understanding of romanticism,
overcoming the philosophical crisis of the subject, and knowingly inspiring devotion (p. 70).
Literature of early romanticism in this way provides its own theory of itself, becoming
hermeneutically independent of philosophy and yet capable of answering the philosophical
questions posed by itself in its position as an art. This achievement of progressive self
referentiality is captured in the notion of the literary absolute.
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe demonstrate that romanticism conceives literature as the
culmination of a philosophical culture. Their work may not be defined simply or entirely as
an historical analysis, for two connected reasons. First of all, the two authors persistently
refuse to distinguish between their own perspectives and those of the Romantics as expressed
in the texts they adopt for analysis. Their insistence on sharing the perspective of the authors
whose positions they characterize may be seen in the language used to describe such
positions, which is familiar and assuming. The assertions above that philosophical notions
are 'well known' and 'obvious' are typical. The effect of this style is to create an
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impressionistic conception of philosophy which allows the authors to remain parasitic upon
(traditional) notions of the philosophical whilst at the same time challenging such notions. I
will say more about this in a moment.
Another reason why this work may not be seen as simply or entirely historical is that the
notion of literature proposed by romanticism is taken to provide a grounding for late-
twentieth-century understandings of literature; the romantics in this way may be said to
conceive our notion of literature. There are interesting implications of this position for my
work. The way in which contemporary notions of literature are bound up with those of the
romantic era, the confusion of those two perspectives, and the way in which the authors
suggest that our contemporary philosophical sense of literature can be traced back to the
romantic era, may be extended for my purposes to indicate that if there are senses in which
literature is often understood to be philosophical by literary critics, these may be significantly
influenced by the proposals of romanticism. It would seem that the authors wish to make a
proposal which is diametrically opposed to that of Richard Rorty; where Rorty wants to argue
that philosophy is a literary genre, these two thinkers present the thesis that literature is a
philosophical genre.
However, having proposed this reading of the Jena Romantics, the authors go on to undercut
their own thesis, by insisting that;
the identity of philosophy with literature and of literature with philosophy [...] never
takes place.
The thesis that literature is a philosophical genre is proposed only to be challenged.
Moreover, the organic promise of an holistic, unified theory and practice cannot be fulfilled
by the texts adopted by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe for analysis, since
the identity of literature with itself and philosophy with itself are absent as well.
In other words, the
auto-manifestation of literature ought to be considered as a neutral manifestation, or a
negative [pas] of manifestation [...] such a manifestation is not a manifestation, not in
any of the senses that philosophy can confer on this word. (p. 123)
On the one hand, the notion of literature as inscribed by the Jena Romantics is essentially and
fundamentally philosophical, and to be understood on philosophical terms. Moreover, and in
a specific sense, the Romantic conception of literature exceeds philosophy in that it is able to
approach the question of the subject, through the figure of the artist, as philosophy cannot do.
Literature, then, is defined philosophically, and literary authors can attain to the
philosophical simply by being located as artistic textual source. Against this, philosophy
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cannot be assumed by literature, and the relationship between the two is unresolved in terms
of identity, because each is always both less and more than the other. In other words, despite
an essential philosophical 'articulation' of literature, the language of philosophy is
inadequate for literature.
Having it both ways allows the authors to adopt an association of literature and philosophy,
but at the same time retreat from any useful explanation of how the association places each
side of the equation. So, whilst literature's status is guaranteed by this association, critics
can continue to assume that notion of the other side which suits their purposes. Specifically,
in this instance, philosophy can be that which gives to literature the theme of the thinking
(artistic) subject, but at the same time it can be that which fails to confer adequate sense to
terms such as 'manifestation'.
This is the romanticist thesis which I take to be symptomatic of the contemporary literary
theoretical climate. It consumes philosophical issues, and assumes philosophical status for
literature, but at the same time rejects the possibility of articulation; of making a sense of the
relationship which is said to exist between philosophy and literature.
The romanticist thesis of the possibility of philosophical literature has been most influential,
in terms of studies which aim to show how it is that literature can be philosophical. This is
my concern here, and there are two aspects of this influence which I wish to draw out. The
first is in the focus on the Romantic notion of the philosopher artist as an esoteric King
Midas, the touch of whose pen turns every work to philosophy. In this case, the answer to
how a literary text may be regarded as philosophical is by its being written by a particular
author.28 The second way in which the thesis has been influential is in a more general sense
of a romanticizing of the literature in order to make it philosophical.29 Here, philosophical
status is conferred on a text as a badge of honour, crediting the movement from reification to
abstraction.
Both of these features are exemplified in the work of Stanley Cavell, who erects an elite
canon of literary authors to whom he designates philosophical status, in an idiosyncratic style
28 Authors with a biographical connection to institutional philosophy regularly have their texts designated philosophical. See for
example Merle Williams, Henry James and the Philosophical Novel: Being and Seeing (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993). Whilst James was connected fraternally to philosophy, Iris Murdoch sustains a professional philosophical
connection, having begun her writing career as a philosophy don. Her writings have also proved tempting for philosophers'
philosophical interpretations. Peter Lamarque in particular seems to focus on Murdoch for his philosophical readings of
literature, as for example throughout his Fictional Points of View (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
1JI This means that many regressive philosophical modes may be invoked in the name of philosophical literary criticism. See for
example Konstantin Kolenda, Philosophical Literature: Metaphysical Darkness and Ethical Light (London: MacMillan, 1982).
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which I take to be a romanticizing of the issues.30 Cavell sums up his own project as
follows;
I have argued [...] over the years for Emerson's and Thoreau's characters of mind as
philosophical, for their quality of intellect as equal to an inheritance of philosophy [...]
and for their position, still early by comparison with European time, as all but uniquely
open to a responsiveness to both the German and English traditions of philosophy, to
that spiritual rift in the Western philosophical mind.31
Emerson and Thoreau are presented in the tradition of the Romantic philosopher artist, whose
genius and mastery of their discipline is such that their work may count as philosophical, in
its most inspiring, dramatic sense.32
I have two main problems with this kind of response to the problem of the possibility of
philosophical literature. Perhaps most importantly, concentration on the philosopher artist
represents a regression to the idea that literary works can be philosophical when they are
written by a philosopher taking the Socratic stance. The influence of this notion is, I have
argued, unfortunate, since it indicates collusion with the Platonic value system, and
perpetuation of the notion that there are certain special people, or philosopher artists, who are
able to overcome the distinction between philosophy and literature. In conjunction with a
patriarchal value system such as Plato's, this evocation of a master of their discipline has the
effect of perpetuating dichotomous bias. As such, I reject those works of literary criticism
which have been influenced in this vein, producing texts which focus on the defence of the
notion that literature is philosophical when it is written by someone who attains to the level
of philosopher.
Secondly, Cavell adopts the romanticist impressionistic conception of philosophy, which on
the one hand assumes that literature is essentially philosophical; that literature's capacity for
Darstellung makes literary writing a philosophical act. This suggests that all literature is
inherently philosophical; to say that something is literature is at the same time to say that it is
philosophical. In answer to the question "how can literature be philosophical?" this posits an
identity relation; it says that literature just is philosophical. On the other hand the romantic
impressionistic conception of philosophy refuses to delineate the sense in which literature is
philosophical because the language of philosophy does not allow for such a delineation; only
30
Rorty makes a similar critique of Cavell for different purposes. See Richard Rorty, 'Cavell On Skepticism', in Consequences,
pp. 176-190, where parenthetic reference is made to just 'one of Cavell's lists of heroes', and Cavell's strategy is summed by
Rorty thus;
'usually we Anglo-Americans try to deromanticize our own tradition by showing that it has some good arguments. Cavell tries
to romanticize our own tradition by showing that it does not' (p. 183).
31
Stanley Cavell, A Pitch ofPhilosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 46.
32 These two authors do not exhaust Cavell's canon. A notable exception which nevertheless fulfds the pattern which I identify
is his Disowning Knowledge In Six Plays ofShakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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literature, a literature which has exceeded a necessarily both separate and inadequate
philosophy, can suffice.
As a result of such assumptive reasoning, literary critics may be more likely to deal with the
question of which types of philosophy may be found in which type of literature, than to deal
with that which I have identified as my core question. An example of this is apparent when
the debate as to the distinction between modernism and postmodernism is seen to turn on
whether or not the texts to which either labels apply may be said to deal with epistemological
or ontological questions. Brian McHale argues that where modernism may be said to ask
epistemological questions, postmodernism asks ontological ones.33 Larry McCaffrey
suggests the reverse.34 In spite of their disagreements, these critics share an assumption that
literature just is philosophical, and that the only issue is which kind of philosophy may be
found there. A similar, but clearer assertion of this assumption may be found in the words of
Angela Carter, who, in what appears to be an absolute contradiction of Priest's position,
remarks that 'for me, a narrative is an argument stated in fictional terms'.35
Although Carter here claims the opposite view to Priest's, Plato's and Rorty's, her comment
still amounts to the same dismissal of the issue. By relativizing her opinion, she abdicates
responsibility for providing justification for her position that fictional narratives count as
arguments, in spite of the controversial nature of this position. In the cases of Gaarder and
Sartre, the failure to provide methodological justification for bringing philosophy and
literature together was often explained by the way in which literary connections seemed to
distinguish philosophers from their discipline. Here there is rather an assumption on the part
of literature that philosophy always has been and always will be a factor in their study.
In some sense, this assumption is understandable. To serious readers of literature, it is clear
that reading affects one's understanding of life. Barbara Christian puts this point most
forcefully, when she says
For me, literature is a way of knowing that I am not hallucinating, that whatever I feel/
know is. It is an affirmation that sensuality is intelligence, that sensual language is
language that makes sense.36
Literature often seems to have a power to speak to readers in a way that no other form of
written information can. It speaks to us about our lives, our relationships with other people,
33 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (New York: Methuen, 1987).
34
Larry McCaffrey, The Melaficlional Muse: The Work ofRobert Coover, Donald Barthes, and William H. Gass (Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittburgh Press, 1982).
35
Angela Carter, 'Preface' to Come Unto These Yellow Sands (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1985), pp. 7-13 (p. 7).
36 Barbara Christian, 'The Race ForTheory', Feminist Studies, 14:1 (1988), 67-79 (pp. 77-78, author's italics).
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and the world around us. In addition, literature lovers may assume that all others are aware
of this incredible power and influence which novels have, and so that it does not need to be
defended. Literature can simply revel in is own banishment. My suggestion here is that in
identifying others' perspectives with our own, the assumption that literature just is
philosophical is narrow minded; in refusing to justify itself, it is dogmatic.
In addition, the assumption that literature is philosophical effectively breaks off
communication with the other partner, communication which might be crucial for the
purposes of ultimate conciliation. It leaves philosophers to think negatively of the
combination, effectively saying that literature need not and cannot be considered to provide
such a justification because that is the job of philosophy. Again, the absence of a theory
suggests to philosophers that firstly there cannot be one, and secondly, that if there were one,
it could only be proposed in a philosophical form. Yet in my terms, this is the absolute
antithesis of the idea that literature can be philosophical, and can once more be understood as
the effect of the shadow of the Platonic value system.
So assuming that literature just is philosophical; that readers can learn from literature
"because we do", is to make a mistake which allows philosophers to continue to ignore
literature. It also leaves the assumption to be regarded as neither here nor there. In other
words, if the position is stated and not proved, it is possible that literary critics and authors
may fail to see any point in a potential of literature to be philosophical. Indeed, some
dissenters react with horror to the suggestion that the things that literature says may be taken
as serious proposals.
I take Milan Kundera's arguments to be representative of this view. He frames his proposals
as a response to the fatwa declared by the Iranian government against Salman Rushdie in
1989, and takes this transgression of freedom of speech and human rights as an example of
what happens when readers of literature make the mistake of 'taking it all so seriously'.37
The idea of seriousness is crucial to his argument, and once more recalls connections with
Searle's characterization of literary language as nonserious. Kundera is not suggesting that
literature is unimportant, but he does want to say that its texts are primarily of entertainment
value, unrelated to real people and the world in which they live.
37 Milan Kundera, 'The Enigma of Old Booby Traps', Guardian, 16 September 1995, p. 29. Subsequent page references will be
given in the text.
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I suggest that Kundera here confuses negative critiques with the recognition of literature's
philosophical contribution. When people are offended by, or object to something which they
think a literary work is saying, they only regard the text as philosophical insofar as they wish
to respond with an argument which shows the defects of the literary argument. When a
religious group decide to burn effigies of an author, and threaten that author's life, they are
engaging in a different activity altogether. The one need not lead to the latter; in fact I
suggest that if taken seriously, philosophical criticism never could lead to the latter.
For now it is enough to have noted that Kundera accepts and perpetuates Plato's position on
the relationship between philosophy and literature. For although Kundera manages to expose
the gap of exegesis; or, as he puts it;
Europe's incapacity to defend and explain (explain patiently to itself and to others) that
most European of arts, the art of the novel, (p. 29)
his conception of such a defence would be almost entirely negative; that novels are not to be
taken seriously, that they neither condone nor propose real principles and, most of all, that
one may not expect to learn from them. In this way his analysis is consistent with the idea
that literature is diametrically opposed to philosophy, and also that the former is part of the
less valued side to the dichotomy. So Kundera also ends up returning to Plato, trivializing
literature ironically in an attempt to defend it.
In conclusion, I believe that contributions from literature on this issue have, like those from
philosophy, fitted in neatly with Plato's position as expressed in the Republic. This is
notably true of those critics who have attempted to answer the question of how literature can
be philosophical by focusing on a single author. They have spoken from within the
restrictive tradition, without realizing it. As a result, attempts to defend literature's
philosophical potential have only served once again to divide the two fields, and moreover,
have been blamed by at least.one critic for contributing to the downfall of European literature
as a whole. The answer to my question is not to be found in this section.
I have spent some time criticizing the idea that literature may be assumed to be philosophical,
without showing it. In the next section I want to look at the ways in which certain readers of
philosophy and literature have dealt explicitly with the question.
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3. HOW CAN LITERATURE BE PHILOSOPHICAL?
In the previous two sections I looked at ways in which the mainstreams of analytic
philosophy and literature have regarded their relationship with each other. I claimed that no
successful analyses have been constructed, and that Plato's word on the matter still functions
as authoritative. In this section, I move on to look at those (in the main analytic philosophers,
but also some literary theorists) who have presented direct and explicit responses to the issue
of how it is possible to learn from a novel. The claim that literature can be shown to be
philosophical may have different interpretations, involving different notions of what it means
for literature to be philosophical.
I have already rejected the single author approach as inadequate and undesirable. At this
stage I want to identify and discard two more interpretations of the question of how literature
can be philosophical which I regard as being weak claims. There is a very general view of
philosophy and the philosophical which is taken to refer to a perspective on something called
"the human condition", and the claim that literature can be philosophical in the sense that it
has such an outlook may be said to constitute a weak claim. Stein Haugom Olsen's
suggestion that literature which contains 'perennial thematic concepts' may be considered
philosophical because of these features would be a typical case of such a weak claim.38 It is
an evaluative claim, which says that literature which discusses the issues which I think of as
important, succeeds in being philosophical.
To use the label philosophical in this way seems rather like awarding rosettes to healthy
cattle at a country fair; it is to congratulate literary artists for being able to approach the
problems of a hallowed enclave. Gender associations of philosophy and literature translate
this into a pat on the back for women as they manage to refer loosely and superficially to the
discussions men have lt>ng been having deeply and meaningfully. This claim is not useful for
my purposes.
Another weak interpretation of the notion that literature can be shown to be philosophical
argues that literature can refer to and depict canonical philosophers and their ideas. This is
the sense in which literature may be seen as illustrative of particular philosophical ideas; it
depicts them in novel form. For example, Lawrence Sterne's A Sentimental Journey is often
3K See Stein Haugom Olsen, 'Thematic Concepts: Where Philosophy Meets Literature', in The End i/fLiterary Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 176-195 (p. 185).
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thought to exemplify certain strands of eighteenth-century Empiricist doctrine.39 The level of
exemplification or illustration of philosophy is often deemed an appropriate one for
literature, as Socrates himself conceded. The weakness of this claim consists in its allowing
literature to be dependent upon philosophy, and thus preserving the notion of philosophy as
the master discipline. This problem would not be overcome even if one were to discover
illustrations or examinations of non-traditional philosophers in novels. Although it might be
tempting to find fictional works which demonstrate the philosophical ideas of philosophers
who are sympathetic to the possibilities of literature, I have chosen to avoid such an
approach, because it seems to me to lapse into complicity with the Platonic system, and so to
perpetuate the weaknesses of that system for analyses of the relationship between philosophy
and literature.40
Neither of these claims will be discussed further here, since I wish to uphold a stronger
interpretation of the notion that literature can be shown to be philosophical. This is the claim
that literature is philosophical in that it is able seriously to propose ideas and arguments
which enable readers to read and think more about themselves and the world in which we
live.
Where the weaker claims have been accepted by a majority of literary critics, and many
philosophers, support for the stronger claim has been less common. Yet it has had some
support of varying form and utility. I now wish to examine the ways in which the stronger
claim has been defended, and point out the advantages and limitations of these theories,
before going on to make clear my point of departure from them. As in the previous two
sections, my aim is not to provide an exhaustive history of such discussions, but rather to
refer to a pattern which I see in the work and will try to represent in order to break away from
it.
I want to draw out two different strands here, based upon where defenders of the strongest
claim draw their boundaries. Some theorists place limits on the type of philosophy which
they find in literature, and some place limits upon those types of literature in which they find
it.
39 For an uncommonly sophisticated analysis of this type see Bernard Harrison, 'Sterne and Sentimentalism' in Commitment In
Reflection: Essays In Literature and Moral Philosophy, ed. by Leona Toker (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), pp. 63-100.
40 This is not to say that I intend deliberately to ignore mentions of philosophers when they occur in the literature which I will
examine. The point is more that 1 wish to diminish the significance of such considerations for the purposes of exploring how it
might be possible for literature to be philosophical. See Chapter Four, p. 228.
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Those who choose to place limits on the type of philosophy they will find in literature have
often tended to focus on ethics. An early and full defence of the importance of the
relationship between the two is to be found in R. W. Beardsmore's 1971 monograph Art and
Morality, whose thesis is that contrary to the views of Tolstoy, the function of art is not to
teach ethics, but that contrary to the views of Wilde, art can contribute to our sense of
morality. Beardsmore stakes a claim to the ground between these standpoints, arguing that
art offers
a new conception of some aspect of our lives, a new idea of what it makes sense to say
about war or love or hypocrisy, and thus a new idea of the significance which they may
have for us.41
Beardsmore's argument applies to all art, but recently the focus has come to rest more and
more upon literary art. Literary critics like F. R. Leavis had already established a grounding
for such analysis, by founding a criticism upon the conviction that certain works of literature
can improve one's moral sensibility.42 Leavisite humanist criticism has declined in influence
in literature departments in recent decades, but during the past decade a growing army of
philosophers have proved keen to develop a defence of the idea that literature may be able to
offer insights into moral philosophy.43
An example of a philosopher who has addressed the question of how it is possible to learn
from a novel in these terms is Martha Nussbaum, whose collection of papers entitled Love's
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature has been both popular and influential.
Nussbaum argues that some novels are in fact more properly considered to be works of moral
philosophy, since they present a moral sensibility, and practice moral reasoning, in ways
which may be impossible for works of traditional philosophy. All of the methodological
arguments produced by Nussbaum are geared towards the possibility that moral philosophy,
and no other type, may be found in literature. Indeed, much of this work seems
uncomfortably close to a depiction of the elitist self-importance of the "well read"; it bears
the suggestion that reading the works of certain (usually canonical) authors is likely to make
one a better person, which slides easily into the assumption that the kind of people who have
read such works are prima facie superior to those who have not. One of the problems with
focusing upon moral philosophy, then, as so many theorists seem to do, is that it retains the
difficulties associated with Leavisite criticism.44
41 R. W. Beardsmore, Art and Morality (London: MacMillan, 1971), p. 75.
42 F. R. Leavis, The Living Principle: 'English' as a Discipline ofThought (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975).
43 For an interesting contemporary survey of the interdisciplinary relationships between literature and ethics see Steven Connor,
'Honour Bound', Times Literary Supplement, 5 January 1996, pp. 24-26.
44 For a critique of the elitist assumptions of Leavisite criticism see Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1958), pp. 252-264.
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Nussbaum in particular also appears to dilute the strength of her claim in response to
criticism from the philosophers keen to preserve the tradition in ethics. I think that she is
pushed into this position by the concession which she allows to Wollheim,45 when she says
that
even to begin [seeing philosophy in literature], we need a type of philosophical
commentary.46
I think that the idea of a necessary philosophical commentary reduces philosophical literature
to the status of mere examples, thus invoking the weaker claim that literature can be shown to
be philosophical in the sense of illustrating the ideas of "real" philosophers. Yet Nussbaum
has, I think rightly, already noted the inadequacy of philosophical examples in comparison to
the freedom and depth offered by novels (p. 47). Furthermore, I have already suggested that
to treat novels as illustrations of the substantive claims made by philosophy is a mistake, the
avoidance of which is, I think, important.
Ironically enough, Leavis had already warned of the danger posed by philosophical
interventions. In particular, he takes issue with the assumption of a colleague that 'value-
judgements in literary criticism are to be justified by philosophical analysis', observing that
such an assumption
never escapes from the spectral presence and potency even where it isn't explicit or
conscious.47
As I have observed previously, analyses which take literature to illustrate points made by
philosophers perpetuate the Platonic value system, since under its 'spectral presence',
literature becomes unnecessary decoration for the necessary and serious discussions of the
male philosopher. This is a trap which even comparing philosophical texts to literary ones •
risks, and so cannot be ignored.
I reject then, the notion of a necessary philosophical commentary. Philosophical literature
must be taken seriously as philosophical in its own right. Nussbaum cannot do this, in my
opinion, because her investment in classicism means that she always retains a bias towards
philosophy and its traditional form.48 For example, in her now infamous article in the New
45 See Richard Wollheim, 'Flawed Crystals: James's The Golden Bowl and the Plausibility of Literature as Moral Philosophy'.
New Literary History, 15:1 (1983), 185-191.
46 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays On Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).,
p. 49. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
47 F. R. Leavis, 'Mutually Necessary', New Universities Quarterly, 30:2 (1976), 129-151 (p. 132).
48 For a full analysis of the conflict between Nussbaum's attitudes to feminist philosophy and philosophical literature see my
article 'Martha Nussbaum and Unreasonable Philosophy', in Women Review Philosophy: New Writing By Women In
Philosophy, ed. by Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1996), pp. 85-
101.
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York Review ofBooks Nussbaum objects to certain feminist philosophy on the grounds that it
fails to come up to the philosophical standard of being 'straightforwardly presented [...] with
appropriately rigorous analysis'49 If this is to be a standard of philosophical thinking, then
literature can never hope to count as philosophical. Nussbaum's view of feminist philosophy
as a threat to the tradition of rigorous, rationalist argument, is acutely reminiscent of Plato's
perspective with regard to literature. Despite her claims to the contrary, Nussbaum fails to
value literary features as philosophical.
Yet Nussbaum succeeds in establishing an important principle which anyone interested in a
more general defence of the stronger claim might usefully adopt. This principle is the idea
that novels have to be shown to be philosophical; the ways in which they work
philosophically must be explored and analysed as part of their identification as philosophical.
This is a crucial aspect of my thesis, and as such textual exploration and analysis will provide
the bulk of it. However, in order to avoid Nussbaum's errors, throughout the course of this
exploration, I will resist the temptation to relate particular philosophical interpretations of
literature to the work of traditional philosophers, except where this work can be used to
clarify philosophical arguments of the literary texts. In this way I hope to ensure that it will
not be my commentary which makes the texts I focus upon philosophical. This is an
important consequence of my insistence on representative philosophical interpretations. My
textual analyses will outline a possibility of textual interpretation; they will not themselves
constitute that possibility.
So much for trying to delimit the kind of philosophy which one might find in literature. The
second type of analysis I would like to consider is to be found in the work of those theorists
who suggest that there is a particular type of literature which may be able to present and
develop philosophical notions. The division of literature into types constitutes genre
criticism, which is periodically vilified as a critical method.50 However, using genre criticism
as a strategy for defending the philosophical status of literature is appealing because it has its
origins in Aristotle who argues in The Poetics against Plato that literature has an important
specifically philosophical role to play in the world.
This type of methodological justification of philosophical literature amounts to writers using
a whole genre in the service of the strong claim that literature may be philosophical because
49 Martha Nussbaum, 'Feminists and Philosophy', New York Review ofBooks, 41:17 (1994), 59-63 (p. 62).
5,1 For strongly expressed hostility to genre theory see the views of Benedetto Croce, The Aesthetic as the Science ofExpression
and of the Linguistic In General, trans, by Colin Lyas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 41; and those of
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it enables critics to universalize the philosophical elements which they find in particular
texts, by virtue of their belonging to a genre. In this way the texts may be seen as
representatively philosophical. In other words, the close textual analysis which I have said is
essential to the issue, may be employed in conjunction with the extension which is necessary
if we are to provide an adequate theory of how literature, and not just one particular example
of literature, may be philosophical.
Examples of those theories which have claimed that particular genres may be seen as
philosophical are Tilghman's analysis of nonsense literature as philosophical, and Nicholas
Smith and Fred Miller's philosophical interpretations of science fiction literature.
Both of these theories fit easily into the Platonic system, and the associated perspective on
gender. In particular, they follow closely the second and fourth claims. The second claim is
that which aligns literature with irrational non-theory. Tilghman speaks of an accepted genre
of nonsense literature as work which has 'made-up words, silly situations, and unlikely
juxtapositions'51. Tilghman warns us that the view that he has in mind 'however, is rather
different' (p. 257). The difference is made by the author's transformative effect upon the
genre, or, specifically the way in which
Marcel Ayme is exploiting - deliberately - exactly the same kind of nonsense that
Wittgenstein believes is the very stuff of philosophical theory (p. 260).
This is consistent with the fourth Platonic claim, that literature may be manipulated by the
philosopher, in order to gain status. By becoming philosophical in this way, nonsense
literature acquires both seriousness and utility. Sexist associations of women with the
irrational are well documented, and it is easy to see how Tilghman's theory preserves a value
system which is translatable into gender terms, and so shares the cultural assumptions of
gender relations in and as the relationship between philosophy and literature. Typically, that
which is associated with men may be taken seriously, and that which is associated with
women may be trivialized, until, that is, it is brought into contact with a male philosophy.
Similarly, Smith and Miller focus on science fiction, arguing that its speculative nature
makes this literature inherently philosophical, by which they mean that it is open to
manipulation by philosophers. Smith and Miller also express their view of the relationship
between philosophy and literature in terms of how the one is put to use by the other; 'science
Maurice Blanchot, as translated in Tzvetan Todorov's article, 'The Origin of Genres', New Literary History, 8:1 (1976), 159-
170 (pp. 159-160).
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fiction' they say, 'is the handmaid of philosophy'.52 This remark not only participates in the
explicit genderization of the relationship between philosophy and literature, but also invokes
cultural assumptions about male and female relationships; in particular, that the male
dominates the passive female.
As a result, both Smith and Miller, and Tilghman, may be said to rely on the romantic notion
of the philosopher artist. Both of the genres, nonsense and science fiction literature, are
traditionally male dominated genres, which is reflected in the fact that the subjects of their
analyses are predominantly, and in Tilghman's case, exclusively, male. The suggestion is
that male writers, like Socrates, have the freedom to be a philosopher artist, acting on and
using as a tool, a notion of a female literature.
Once these flaws in analysis are exposed, however, I think that the generic approach may still
be useful. The reasons for my thinking this may be traced back to Aristotle's defence of the
philosophical status of literature. Aristotle offers a contrast between history and literature;
the difference lies in the fact that one speaks of events which have occurred, the other of
the sort of events which could occur. It is for this reason that poetry is both more
philosophical and more serious than history, since poetry speaks more of universals,
history of particulars.53
It is the specificity of history which makes it unphilosophical, as opposed to the potential
universality of literature. There are difficulties with this view. In particular, it falls foul of
the criticism of reductivism I made of the literary absolute's identification of literature as
essentially philosophical. In addition, the references to universality introduce myriad
difficulties, many of which I will explore in the next chapter on autography. However, there
is an important advantage in the notion of extended application to theories of literature as
philosophical. Aristotle regards the philosophical element of fiction to be that it discusses
specificities in order to refer to generalities. In other words, fiction is philosophical because
its conceptions are in principle universalizable. I want to make use of this notion
structurally; to suggest, in specifying philosophical literary texts, that all fiction texts may
have the potential to be viewed in this way.
Another key advantage of employing a structure of genre to demonstrate the possibility of
literature being philosophical is that it continues the theme of highlighting structures which
51 B. R. Tilghman, 'Literature, Philosophy and Nonsense', British Journal ofAesthetics, 30:3 (1990), 256-265 (p. 256).
Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
52 Nicholas D. Smith and Fred Miller, 'Introduction: The Philosophical Appeal of Science Fiction', in Philosophers Look at
Science Fiction, ed. by Nicholas D. Smith (Chicago, OH: Nelson Hall, 1982), pp. 1-19 (p. 4).
53
Stephen Halliwell, The Poetics ofAristotle (London: Duckworth, 1987), p. 41.
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determine the conditions of the debate. Just as Plato's value system set a hidden agenda for
consideration of the question as to how literature can be philosophical, so the system of genre
criticism may be said to inscribe a similar agenda. And just as the structures which delineate
the relationship between literature and philosophy may be deconstructed, so generic
prescriptions can be profitably exposed and explored in an attempt to address the question.
Generic criticism, then, has much to offer in terms of structural and thematic contributions to
my argument.
Problems which theorists in this section have had in dealing with the ancient quarrel between
philosophy and literature, or even in trying to conceive of such a relationship at all, may be
located in their - usually unacknowledged - position within the traditions ofWestern
philosophy. Plato's position is a paradigm example of the dichotomous view of the
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relationship between philosophy and literature, the former of which is thought to be more
valuable than the latter. I have tried to look at different ways in which this assumption that
philosophy must be positive, and literature negative, has been perpetuated by philosophers
and literary critics, in their proposed answers to the question of how literature might be
philosophical.
This is incumbent upon the issue of the power relations between philosophy and literature.
For those in the literary world, literature is philosophical to the extent that it has something to
say about the world in which we live. This view presents a view of literature as aspiring to,
and managing to be successful insofar as it does, relate itself to philosophy. When theorists
go further, it is still in terms of the literature being read by a philosopher; being acted upon
by philosophers, and having philosophical status conferred on it. Thus most of the
theoretical standpoints considered in this section have accepted and perpetuated the Platonic
position which sees literature as less valuable than philosophy.
At the same time, Plato's value system sets up certain gender associations which have been
echoed explicitly, in for example, the work of Smith and Miller, but also implicitly, in most
of the other texts I have discussed. And so, I propose that writing and reading novels as
philosophical might work as a feminist strategy. Furthermore, I think that this way of
analysing the relationship between philosophy and literature may be the most effective so far.
This is because feminist analyses are peculiarly aware of power relationships of the kind
which I believe to be active and as yet largely unnoticed in any combination of philosophy
and literature. As a result, it is the analysis of structures which will govern my approach to
the question of how it is that literature can be philosophical.
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B. Feminism
Feminists often speak of traditions in the academy, in terms of how those traditions exclude
and alienate women. Indeed, "traditional" is often conceived in opposition to "feminist" in
academic works. Philosophy and literature have both been seen as having patriarchal
traditions. Yet the place of feminist criticism in the two disciplines is very different. In this
section I want to expose those differences by looking at the significance of feminist thought
and theory for philosophy, and the significance of feminist thought and theory for literature.
I will generally adopt the position that, whilst mainstream philosophy is still intent on
alienating women and their thinking, literary traditions have been to a large extent
successfully subverted by women writers. This latter claim will allow me to assert a positive
notion of tradition for feminism. Both of these assertions will have fundamental
consequences for the structure and aims of my thesis.
1. AND PHILOSOPHY
In this section I will refer briefly to the ways in which philosophy excludes women,
concentrating on how feminists might deal with such exclusion. I will conclude with the
claim that feminisms can make unique and positive contributions to mainstream philosophy,
and that feminists can make this contribution by finding a way of engaging with the
traditional issues of philosophy without compromising their own perspective.
Philosophy is often considered of all academic disciplines the most hostile to feminism. As
Margaret Whitford says;
It is often argued [...] that philosophy is founded on the exclusion of women.54
This is because philosophy may be identified as distinct from all that is associated with
femaleness; for example, with the mind as opposed to the body, with culture as opposed to
nature, and with reason as opposed to emotion. Crucially, the misogynistic prejudice of
many seminal philosophers has led them to argue that philosophy is about a kind of thinking
and way of knowing that women simply cannot attain.55 How are feminists to respond to
54
Margaret Whitford, 'The Feminist Philosopher: A Contradiction In Terms?', Women: A Cultural Review, 3:2 (1992), 111-120
(p. Ill, author's italics).
55 For a wide ranging history of the misogynistic philosophical heritage which feminists face together with a useful selection of
commentary by feminist philosophers see Martha Lee Osborne, Woman In Western Thought (New York: Random House, 1979).
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this? One reaction might be to see philosophy as inextricable from its misogynist
foundations, and indeed, some feminists have positioned themselves as feminists in
opposition to the philosophical.56
Even those feminist theorists who do not place philosophy as a specific target may assume
that feminism consists in the denial of philosophy. I take Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson
to provide a paradigmatic statement of this position in their essay 'Social Criticism Without
Philosophy'. In this article, they assume firstly that the legitimate aims of feminism and
postmodernism coincide with the attempt to escape from the confines of philosophy, and
secondly that the important issues to examine involve which ways the two approaches can
come together to more successfully achieve this common aim. Problems in both areas are
cited in terms of a failure to expel philosophy. I focus here upon the claims made on behalf
of feminism;
in many cases feminist critics continue tacitly to rely on the sorts of philosophical
underpinnings which their own commitments, like those of the postmodernists, ought in
principle to rule out.57
Philosophy is viewed pejoratively as something which infects feminism with patriarchal
foundations. Like Daly, Fraser and Nicholson identify philosophy with its traditions, often
throughout the article taking the word to be synonymous with 'foundationalism and
essentialism' (p. 20), and ignoring the possibility that there might be a variety of philosophy
worth wanting.58
I do not see good reasons for these feminist critics' identification of the discipline with its
traditional past. If patriarchy operates by perpetuating misogynistic social codes, then
feminists must work to expose those codes and produce new ones. Leaving the prejudicial
social codes in place is not, I believe, a viable option for feminists. Feminists can engage
with philosophy to rewrite it.
For Fraser and Nicholson, philosophy is not something which can be rewritten in this way; it
is a fixed notion, defined in opposition to both feminism and postmodernism. The suggestion
that philosophy is a fixed notion which, as feminists/ postmodernists we 'ought in principle
56 See for example Mary Daly, GynJ Ecology: The Metaethics ofRadical Feminism (London: Women's Press, 1979). For a
critique of Daly's and other similar positions see Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives On Difference and
Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 86-89.
57
Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and
Postmodernism', in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. by Linda J. Nicholson (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 19-38 (p. 20).
Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
58
My argument here is similar to that of Linda Alcoff in defence of a particular interpretation of metaphysics, in her article
'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis In Feminist Theory', Signs: Journal of Women In Culture
and Society, 13:3 (1988), 405-436 (pp. 428-429).
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to rule out' is, as Michele le Doeuff points out in another context, unrealistic, since 'whether
we like it or not, we are within philosophy'.59 An absolute rejection of philosophy is in this
sense, untenable. Moreover, to assume that it is, is to erect a binary opposition of philosophy
and not-philosophy. Such dichotomous thinking is a problem for feminists.
Dichotomous conceptual frameworks have been used by many misogynistic thinkers to
exclude women from the fields of worship, knowledge and action; they thus have a tradition
of patriarchal collaboration. Dichotomies work by close definition and exclusion. They
define by limitation, and crucially, the understanding which they offer about concepts
consists in this limitation. So, under a dualistic understanding of mind and body, for
example, body would be defined in most important senses in terms of what mind was not.
Practitioners of dichotomous frameworks have often been felt - by feminists - to needlessly
exclude that which they see as other.
My suggestion here is that feminists who want to define philosophy negatively participate in
the dualist methodology, shutting philosophical ideas and descriptions off to themselves,
seeing this as a declaration of independence. Unfortunately, their reversal of the original
dichotomy which valorizes philosophy and relegates that which is not philosophy is not
accepted by the rest of the academic world, which still exists content in a patriarchal state,
where women and their views are invisible. In this way feminists may effectively exclude
themselves, allowing philosophers to continue to construct the world in ways which are
ignorant of women's perspectives. Paradoxically, they collude with the patriarchal
stereotype which says that women are incapable of the kind of intellectual thought which is
called philosophy. This collusion operates in the same way as the philosophical dismissal of
literature which happens as a result of gestures of conciliation.
I suggest that abandoning dichotomous thinking is of crucial importance for feminists in
philosophy. In this way they will be able to fully explore relationships between things, as
well as - and often at the same time as - the things themselves. By incorporating this sense of
the power of fluidity I indicate a recognition of recent work in poststructuralist feminism,
which indicates that the abandonment of the binary oppositions which make up dichotomous
systems offers a path towards a new writing particularly associated with feminist movement
in literature.60 Indeed, some such critics often seem to suggest that this recognition of fluidity
59 Michele le Doeuff, 'Women and Philosophy', Radical Philosophy, 17 (1977), 2-11 (p. 2).
60 See for example Helene Cixous, 'Sorties', trans, by Ann Liddle, in New French Feminisms: An Anthology, ed. by Elaine
Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (London: Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 90-98.
45
is a more natural position for women.61 I avoid such essentialist proposals by arguing that
feminists can usefully but consciously adopt it as policy. Further, this policy makes the
feminist perspective in philosophy most appropriate for an examination of the relationship
between philosophy and literature, since it begins with a premise that is fundamentally
critical of Plato's dichotomous value system.
Not all feminists have responded to the philosophical tradition by wanting to exclude
themselves from it; rather they have chosen to engage with philosophy. Again, this is a
massive area of study, and I cannot possibly hope to outline all aspects of it. Rather, I want
to draw a rough sketch of ways in which feminists have structured their engagement, and the
effect which this has on my proposed answer to the question of how literature can be
philosophical.
The liberal feminist position in philosophy has been fairly consistent with the aim behind
Mary Wollstonecraft's reference to Rousseau's social and political philosophy, which she
says she wants to 'extend [...] to women'.62 Liberal feminists take it upon themselves to add
women on to the history of philosophy; extending and applying ideas that are already in play,
but which tend only to have been applied to men. This works for example in the way that
Janet Radcliffe Richards writes an extension of Rawls' theory of social and political
philosophy.63 In this way, liberal feminists seek accommodation within the mainstream of
philosophy.
The problem with this attitude is that it retains the biases of the misogynist philosophical
tradition, and so even when this tradition is "applied" to women, it can only result in them
being seen as inadequate persons, the inadequacy lying in their not being men. For liberal
feminists, women can easily involve themselves in the male world of philosophy, so long as
they adopt male structures and discourse in that world. I regard this as a parallel argument to
that which sees the potential for literature to be philosophical only insofar as it denies its
status as literature; the latter is allowed to become, temporarily and conditionally, honorary
philosophy, just as liberal feminists seem to seek to be regarded as honorary males. As such,
they will be allowed to play the game of philosophy, so long as they agree to follow the rules.
61 See for example Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans, by Catherine Porter (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1985).
62
Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 103.
63 Janet Radcliffe Richards, The Sceptical Feminist: A Philosophical Enquiry (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982).
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I argued that there was little point in regarding literature in this way. One way of expressing
this is to say that literary works can never succeed in wearing the mantle of traditional
philosophical tracts as well as it has been worn by traditional philosophical tracts themselves.
Similarly, I see the accommodating feminism of liberalism as futile because women can
never be as good at being men as men are. Both symbols of futility have their roots in the
failure to challenge the structures of mainstream philosophy, and this is a failure which this
thesis seeks to redress.
There is a more specific problem with the accommodation theory of feminism. As Joanna
Hodge has pointed out, it insists that women de-sex themselves in order to practice
philosophy, on the understanding that male philosophers have always done this.64 And yet of
course this latter is not true; it is merely a myth of patriarchal philosophy that male centred
philosophy is objective and neutral. It is only when readers who do not fit its perspective -
for example, women - speak out that the mendacity of the myth is exposed.
This critique of traditional philosophy is important, and although much remains to be done, a
great deal of excellent work has highlighted the failures of canonical philosophers to address
women's issues and include women's lives. The significance of this process lies in its
allowing feminists to deconstruct systems of thought which have been powerfully restrictive,
having been accepted without question, or even acknowledgement. I have tried to show that
the description of the relationship between philosophy and literature in Plato's Republic has
had this kind of effect on those writers who have tried to describe it anew. Yet I do not think
that the solution is to ignore this text; and this is why I have sought to expose and interrogate
it. But once this is done, what next? Redressing the balance, and reclaiming literature's
ability to be philosophical will not be simple or straightforward task.
As Genevieve Lloyd has pointed out in the case of Reason,65 there are some fundamental
structures in philosophy which may seem objective but in fact incorporate bias. As feminist
philosophy develops, the struggle becomes less concerned with showing women's absence in
the history of philosophy, and more about how we are to express "our side of the story" in
and on our own terms. So although I accept neither the separatist nor the liberal position, I
do suggest that it may be appropriate for feminist philosophers to develop a self conscious
methodology for the production of a feminist philosophy which engages with the tradition.
64 See Joanna Hodge, 'Subject, Body, and the Exclusion ofWomen From Philosophy', in Feminist Perspectives In Philosophy,
ed. by Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (London: MacMillan, 1988), pp. 152-168.
65 Genevieve Lloyd, The Man ofReason: "Male" and "Female" In Western Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1982).
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Indeed, there may be some methodological approaches which feminist philosophy has
already engendered. One is related to the emphasis on the position a philosophy comes from;
a focus on the voice of the speaker, which transpires as a result of recognizing the
unacknowledged prejudice of many traditional philosophers and their works. This may
suggest that feminist philosophy by and large has nothing to gain by claiming neutrality for
itself, as for example Sandra Harding seems to risk with her notion of 'strong objectivity'.66
Strong objectivity in this sense makes patriarchal claims for feminism, arguing that
recognizing and redressing misogyny in philosophy can lead to a "successor science" which
is finally and truly objective.
My suggestion is rather that feminists can expose the position of others and at the same time
acknowledge their own position. In addition, feminists can beware of the danger of labelling
their analyses a truthful solution to the problems raised by patriarchy, as Harding tends to. It
is not part of a feminist agenda to believe that we have finally got it right. This argument is
not to be dismissed as extreme relativism might be, by a self reflexive criticism, because it is
not itself a final answer. It is rather a call for perspectivism67 and collectivism, a suggestion
that feminists look at how themselves and others might see things, where the one who looks
is always implicated. In this way feminist philosophy may attempt to bring the philosophical
mainstream closer to the world of literature, by looking at philosophical proposals in terms of
the question "who is speaking?".68 The recognition of the significance of this question will
count as an important sense in which philosophy may learn from the novel. Chapter Two in
particular will focus upon this situating of voice in order to produce an inclusive
philosophical practice.
Another way in which feminists can engage productively with philosophy, as I have already
indicated, is by struggling to break free of dichotomous thinking. Rejecting the compulsion
of either/ or alternatives which delimit and restrict answers in terms of necessity, will form
the theme of Chapter Three, which will rather value possibility and contingency.
Together these two approaches effect a critique of the patriarchal tradition of philosophy as
unphilosophical; as a way of approaching problems which limits and inhibits thought. As a
66 See Sandra Harding, ' " Strong Objectivity" and Socially Situated Knowledge', in Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?:
Thinking From Women's Lives (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), pp. 138-163.
67 I use this phrase in the sense and spirit in which it is commended by Ellen Messer-Davidow in her article 'The Philosophical
Bases of Feminist Literary Criticisms', New Literary History, 19:1 (1987), 65-103 (p. 89).
68 In this feminism may be said to offer a distinct Foucauldian flavour. See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge,
trans, by A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972), pp. 50-55.
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result, feminist philosophers may encourage philosophers to constantly rethink their method
and purpose. This inevitably involves a new appreciation of the methods and purposes of
others, and of other ways of writing. One significant method which may be introduced by
feminists is the principle of demonstration of philosophical notions, which dissolves
pedagogical associations of traditional philosophical teaching. This idea will provide the
conceptual scaffold for Chapter Four.
This represents an indication of the ways in which the traditional - philosophy - might be said
to be in a position to learn from the new - feminism. In this light, the innovative steps
towards literature and literary concerns seem even more commensurate with feminist
philosophical methodology. Situating a voice involves, for example, examining the method
of narration of ideas. Discussing possibilities is a freedom which literature enjoys to a
greater extent that traditional philosophy. And finally, in Wittgensteinian terms, fiction is in
a position to show notions which cannot be simply told.
So, in spite of the hostility of the tradition of philosophy towards feminism, this latter has
much to offer it. By engaging with the philosophical tradition, feminists can change it in
ways which do not threaten the philosophical enterprise, nor undermine its purpose. Rather,
they affirm the significance of philosophy, and its potential for development and change, and
for different kinds of realization. In addition, the methodology which feminism proposes to
philosophy makes it an appropriate partner to assist a further engagement with literature.
The next difficulty is where to place the axis of philosophical interpretation. I have chosen
throughout this thesis to concentrate upon epistemological questions, for three main reasons.
First of all, it has proved most challenging for philosophers in the mainstream to be
persuaded that the construction and critique of theories of knowledge can benefit from the
contribution of different perspectives like feminism or literature. Both of these elements
function as stumbling blocks for traditional epistemology, challenging and problematizing
almost every assumption which the philosophers in this field make. Secondly, I wish to
overcome the Rorty/ Plato thesis that my attitude towards epistemological issues determines
my attitude towards literature. Rather, I will maintain the conviction that literature may
present its own epistemologically relevant arguments, either in response to questions posed
by traditional philosophers, or in response to philosophical hypotheses which they
themselves frame. Thirdly, the structural features which I adopt through the thesis, namely
perspectivism, possibility, and presentation, indicate the influence in particular of feminist
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epistemology, which has in recent years sought to emphasize the significance for their field
of the consideration of these notions in philosophical terms.59
One of the consequences of my adopting this focus upon knowers and knowing is that the
relevant textual analysis may be weighted towards humanist concerns. In addition, given that
I read Plato's understanding of poetry quite specifically as narrative fiction, it might seem
appropriate to focus my interpretative interests upon the tradition of "what happens in the
story". In combination, these two factors seems to indicate, and perhaps even justify, a
textual analysis which confines itself to the concerns of character and plot. Indeed, some
philosophers suggest that such aspects exhaust the interesting features of literature for
philosophers. Peter Lamarque, for example, identifies a 'humanistic' response to literature
whose
core idea is that works of literature, through the medium of fiction, can serve the end of
advancing, helping to develop and understand, exhibiting through their themes and
vision, matters of general, perhaps universal human interest.70
This may be contrasted with the 'antihumanist position' of much contemporary literary
theory (p. 5), which disqualifies itself from philosophical interpretation because it is isolated
and self-referential. Unlike the interpretations dominated by humanist concerns, such a
position is trapped within the text, unable to see outside it. Such a perspective can, it would
seem, be avoided by the adoption of an interpretative agenda which places the focus firmly
upon the characters of fiction, what happens to those characters, and what the combination of
these features successfully communicates to the 'universal human interest'.
Lamarque's position here seems to suggest an approach to the question of how it is possible
for literature to be philosophical which begins by examining what the two have in common.
His attitude, which he contrasts with that of Plato, is that literature can be philosophy's
helpmate, assisting him towards his goals. Unfortunately, this approach is in danger of
seeking ways in which literature may be assimilated to philosophy. The question thus
becomes, how can literature be made to share the focus and concerns of philosophy as we
know it? This reactionary translation of the question into a way of making literature safe and
manageable for philosophers is not commensurate with my plans in this thesis. Moreover,
there may be a number of ways of challenging such a translation.
69 See for example Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge: Thinking From Women's Lives for the significance of
perspectivism for feminist epistemology; Jane Duran, Toward a Feminist Epistemology (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
1991); for a feminist epistemological shift of the focus from impossibility to possibility in theories of knowledge; and Lorraine
Code, What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the Construction ofKnowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991)
for a discussion of the way in which models of instantiation, in particular, examples of knowledge acquisition which adopt the
model "S knows that P", pose particular problems for feminist epistemological critiques.
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One way of successfully critiquing such a suggestion is by focusing upon the way in which
ideas are presented in traditional philosophy, and arguing that the written status of
philosophy has a significant bearing upon the ideas which are to be read in such texts. This
is the project of Derridean deconstruction in texts like 'White Mythologies'.71 Derrida
argues in this essay that the relationship between philosophy and metaphorical language is of
crucial significance. Although typically singled out for vilification by traditional philosophy,
Derrida takes it upon himself to demonstrate the implications of the proposal of a character in
Anatole France's The Garden ofEpicurus. It is asserted in this text that
"any expression of an abstract idea can only be by analogy. [...] the very metaphysicians
who think to escape the world of appearances are constrained to live perpetually in
allegory. A sorry lot of poets, they dim the colours of the ancient fables, and are
themselves but gatherers of fables. They produce white mythology" (p. 213).
For Derrida, the fact that metaphor is both anathema to and indispensable for philosophical
writing is a constant source of fascination, and in this article he explores what he takes to be
philosophical expressions of the tension between the two factors. In this way, Derrida offers
a valuable response to those philosophers who would take forms of writing to be a study
which is by definition distinct from philosophy. However, Derrida's approach might also be
seen as a mirror image of Lamarque's. Where Lamarque tries to assimilate literature to
philosophy, analytic philosophers might argue that Derrida is trying to assimilate philosophy
to literature. I am of the opinion that Derrida's writing is more sophisticated than this, and
deserves greater consideration by analytic philosophers. In addition, I share Derrida's view
that a consideration of the bearing which literature has upon philosophy must involve a
reassessment of the canon of philosophy itself. Nevertheless, I think that a successful
approach to the question of how literature might be philosophical which engages analytic
philosophers, as I aim to do, must take the concerns of analytic philosophers seriously, and
endeavour to address those concerns by expressing exactly and precisely the values which
70 For example, Peter Lamarque's Fictional Points of View contains a critique and assimilation of this humanistic response; see
Chapter Eight, 'Tragedy and Moral Value', pp. 135-149 (p. 3).
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literature might hold for philosophy, rather than simply making such concerns part of my
critique. In addition, I wish to specifically avoid the possibility of being accused by either
literature or philosophy of having an assimilationist agenda.
As a result, it is my intention to examine my texts carefully and without the prior exclusion of
any particular aspect of literary or philosophical value. In other words, I see no good reasons
for the exclusion of the consideration of aspects of literature other than character and plot. I
do not make a point of specifically searching for such features, because this would be a way
of imposing my pre-conceived notions of how philosophy may be applied to literature. In
other words, I would be perpetuating the problematic notion of philosophy as the master
discipline. It is part of my determination that this perpetuation should not take place in this
thesis that there will be no exclusive formula or agenda for textual analysis. Figurative
language, then, and the way in which positions are presented in the novels, will form part of
my textual analysis in this novel, where they fit into the broader structural context of my
argument. But such considerations will not require the exclusion of aspects of textual
analysis which may fall under the categories of "plot and character".72
I have tried to show in this section that the attitude of much analytic philosophers towards
feminists and the possibilities of feminist contributions to philosophy is greatly lacking.
However, I have also indicated that the way in which problems which feminist possibilities
seem to present for traditional analytic philosophy might be taken to suggest potential
approaches to the question of the relationship between philosophy and literature, and a study
which addresses one of the issues might usefully address the other.
71
Jacques Derrida, 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, in Margins ofPhilosophy, trans, by Alan Bass
(Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 207-271.
72 So for example, I seek to explore the philosophical implications of perceptual metaphor in the first chapter, but 1 also
incorporate into this analysis an exploration of the contribution which such metaphors make to the characters of the protagonists
(see esp. pp. 105-116).
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In the next section on feminism and literature, I will show that literature has been more
welcoming to feminist perspectives than philosophy, and so explore the ways in which
developments in feminist literary theory might assist my project.
2. AND LITERATURE
In the cultural map I have drawn so far, literature and women are thrown together as the
negative counterparts of philosophy and men. Moreover, it is part of this dualistic
conception that, whilst philosophy can utilize literature, and men can utilize women, the
negative concepts are confined within their own otherness. In addition, under the terms of
Plato's system, literature and femaleness are identified, and so limit one another. In this
section I want to argue that the positioning of these two elements in this traditional
ideological structure has led to severe problems for the relationship between literature and
feminism. Nevertheless, I will further argue that with the exposition and rejection of the
derogatory traditional model, the connection can be a source for creative investigation of the
core issues of both disciplines. I will conclude with an indication of how the combination of
women and literature can be used for liberating rather than restrictive purposes. In this sense,
I will offer a deliberate collusion with the Platonic claims, in the hope that this might
problematize the entire value system.
In accepting its place in the map that I have outlined, literature risks adopting its own internal
dualisms. In other words, if literature is to be looked down on by philosophers, then some
types of literature seek to duplicate this pattern, valuing themselves over others in turn.
Poetry, for example, is often thought to be the literary form par excellence, and the novel, its
negation. In this sense the poetic becomes to the fictional what the philosophical is to the
53
literary. A fairly typical expression of this adherence to a dichotomous value system is the
assertion by the poet Joseph Brodsky that compared with other literary forms
verse writing is an extraordinary accelerator of conscience, of thinking, of
comprehending the universe.73
The superiority of the form is regarded as guaranteeing this apparently philosophical
propensity.74 I understand this attitude to be an expression of the position that once accepted,
there is no escape from the dichotomous value judgements; items always have to be valued,
even locally, at the expense of something else. This aspect of a materialist economy has, I
suggest, been evident throughout the traditions of which I speak.
And in this economic system, the novel forms the underclass. One reason for this is its
connection as a form with women. Most novelists were and are women, and in a patriarchal
world anything associated with women tends to acquire a negative value. This in part
explains why one strategy of feminism in the eighteenth century was to dissociate itself from
literature, which for rationalists, represents the unthinking world of emotions and sensuality.
For this reason, Mary Wollstonecraft includes fiction in a list of the controlling features of
patriarchy;
Novels, music, poetry, and gallantry, all tend to make women the creatures of sensation,
and their character is thus formed in the mould of folly during the time they are
acquiring accomplishments, the only improvement they are excited, by their station in
society, to acquire.75
ForWollstonecraft, women are allowed access to fiction only because it keeps them
submissive and weak. One of my arguments in this thesis will be precisely the opposite.
However, Wollstonecraft insists that the form of fiction functions as a tool of control, and so
ought to be rejected by feminists.
73 See Joseph Brodsky, 'Nobel Lecture, 1987', trans, by Barry Rubin, in Brodsky's Poetics and Aesthetics, ed. by Lev Loseff
and Valentina Polukhina (London: MacMillan, 1990), pp. 1-11 (p. 11).
74 This is commensurate with Heidegger's notion that L[a]ll art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as
such, essentially poetry'. Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans, by Albert
Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 15-87 (p. 72, author's italics).
75 Wollstonecraft, p. 152.
In the terms of the tradition I have outlined, Wollstonecraft sees the segregation of women
and fiction as a feminist task. However, like Plato the literary artist philosopher,
Wollstonecraft has a less than simple relationship to her ideas, since she herself wrote novels.
Together with her expressed beliefs on the negative influence of fiction on women's lives,
this may be interpreted as justification of a biological determinism; a suggestion that,
however much they may wish it, women cannot escape their connections with literature. In
other words, the text of Wollstonecraft's life and the testament of her opinions reveal that
women are limited in ways they simply cannot do anything about. In the case ofMary
Wollstonecraft's feminism, it seems that biography is destiny.
This leaves us in the unfortunate and aporetic position of having women regarded as a
problem for feminism as well as for literature. And yet feminism has a much more
established history in literature departments then in others. Although feminist criticism
began in this discipline as it did in philosophy by critiquing its masculinist history, and
exposing the ways in which women were mistreated or ignored by the male practitioners of
the discipline, feminists very quickly established a history of female literature. The feminist
critics Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar have played an pivotal role in this erection of a
tradition of women's writing.75
In particular, in contrast to academic philosophy and other theoretical writing, the novel in
English is a genre of the arts which has arguably come to be dominated by women, in terms
of both consumption and production. It is a vital form for women artists, as fiction was
probably the first art historically in which they received adequate attention and even critical
acclaim, as women. As Rosalind Miles notes;
76 See especially The Norton Anthology ofLiterature By Women: The Traditions In English , 2nd edn., ed. by Sandra M. Gilbert
and Susan Gubar (New York: Norton & Company, 1996).
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women and the novel have been particularly important to one another, as the novel has
been the only literary form in which women have participated in numbers enough to
make their presence felt.77
I accept Miles's thesis that the novel
has been the preferred form for women writers almost since women began to write, and
it has been the chosen medium through which in recent years women have investigated
and published those aspects of their lives as sexual beings that have not previously been
acknowledged by art or society, (p. 2)
Moreover, recent feminist critics have tended to see the novel positively as a genre which
women have claimed as their own. This is viewed as significant in economic terms, enabling
women to improve their earning power; for example, Elaine Showalter has said that in the
second half of the eighteenth-century;
The copyright sale of even a mediocre novel by an unknown author was likely to equal
the yearly wage of a governess.78
For women to dominate a literary genre is also aesthetically significant, for it means not only
that issues relevant to their lives enter into the arena of public debate, at least at some level,
but also that women authors can shape their own methods of narration, devise their own
techniques of expression, develop their own form language, and so on. I suggest, therefore,
that to allow philosophical interpretations of the novel form can be a way of understanding
women to be discussing philosophical notions in and on their own terms.
However, the novel has not been easily won as a 'female form'. Gaye Tuchman, for
example, with the help of Nina Fortin, identifies a 'period of redefinition', in the early
history of the novel, where the genre was reconceptualized by 'men of letters', that it might
retain an elite status.79 Tuchman argues that in this way male authors invaded and took
control of the genre. Women's writing could be tolerated once more as acceptable and
appropriate behaviour, since the way in which they wrote was considered separate from the
male world of serious thinking. So, despite inhabiting a tradition which they helped to
77 Rosalind Miles, The Female Form: Women Writers and the Conquest of the Novel (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987),
p. 2. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
8 Elaine Showalter, A Literature of Their Own (London: Virago, 1982), p. 48.
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define, the goalposts were changed, and women writers found themselves in the position of
having to challenge that tradition.
In the same way, the erection of a tradition of women's writing has not proved
uncontroversial. If Gilbert and Gubar can be lauded for their reclamation of women writers'
role in the traditions of literatures in English, they may also be criticized for their dogmatic,
blinkered approach which is, at worst, guilty of essentializing women's literature, and
valorizing continuity.80 I have sympathy with such a critique, not because I do not think that
there was not a time when Gilbert and Gubar's methods were both a necessary and effective
part of a feminist agenda, but rather because I think it is important to defend a tradition in
feminist literary criticism of perpetually undermining traditions. I regard this to be a way of
bringing activism to literary theory. In addition, the significance of genre as a cite of
resistance is widely acknowledged, as Linda Hutcheon's confident remark that 'of course, the
categories of genre are regularly challenged these days' reveals.81
So, the process of challenging and revising the novel in its myriad forms may be regarded as
a creative opportunity for women writers. Genre revision in particular seem to offer a range
of ways in which structural challenges to patriarchal literary modes might be articulated.82
As a result, I choose it as a way of demonstrating the possibility of learning from the novel.
Another reason for my choice of the division of genres is that I may thus retain the important
representative feature of this work. In other words, I hope that what I demonstrate
specifically in relation to one novel, will have wider application throughout an identifiable
genre. This will enable me to contribute theory through practice. At the same time, it is
79
Gay Tuchman with Nina E. Fortin, Edging Women Out: Victorian Novelists, Publishers and Social Change (London:
Routledge, 1989), p. 8, author's italics.
80 For an argument to this effect see Gail Godwin, 'One Woman Leads To Another', New York Times Book Review, 28 April
1985, pp. 13-14.
81 Linda Hutcheon, The Poetics ofPostmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 60.
82 See for example Anne Cranny-Francis's 'Introduction' to Feminist Fiction: Feminist Uses of Generic Fiction (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1990), pp. 1-28.
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inevitable that my desire to practise close textual analysis leads to a certain lack of
representation. Although the texts I will discuss do cross boundaries of class and sexuality,
none fall outwith the category of Anglo-American authors. The lack of racial difference is a
problem which concerns me, but seems insurmountable in the face of limitations of space; I
cannot include everything I would wish. Attempts to represent have their negative aspects as
well as their positive ones.
The genres I have chosen might all be described as genres of popular fiction, more at home in
the best seller lists than in university libraries; two of the books I look at have been made into
films, one has been made into a television production, and all of them have been commercial
publishing successes. In addition, I hope to show that all of these texts have important
academic application, particularly in that perhaps least catholic of academic considerations,
the philosophical. In this sense I am attempting to reclaim the popular as more than mere
entertainment, as well as reclaiming the philosophical for the popular. In the next section I
hope to make my aims even clearer, by attempting to define my concepts, and answering that
crucial question which in its significance unites the concerns of literary critics, feminist
theorists and philosophers; what is the point?
C. What Does It Mean To Be A Feminist Philosophical Novel?
Having rejected numerous ways in which other theorists have attempted to draw together
feminisms, literature and philosophy, in the negative tradition of analytic philosophy, I now
feel the need to provide a specific reconceptualizing of their association. In this section,
therefore, I am going to explain what I think it means to be a feminist philosophical novel, in
two separate senses. The first will examine the pragmatics of this meaning, or how this
interdisciplinarity works, in terms of an attempt to define the basic elements, and a proposal
for how the three might work together, in spite of but also because of, what I have argued
against in the rest of this chapter.
The second section will involve an analysis of what it means to be a feminist philosophical
novel in terms of what the consequences might be. In other words, what it means for me to
be arguing this in the first place. This section will account for my motivations and ambitions
in writing this thesis. It is the culmination of my theoretical chapter, and will be followed by
its words being put into practice in a series of test cases, which will hopefully fulfil my task
of showing what it means to be a feminist philosophical novel.
1. DEFINING TERMS
In order to find out how feminist philosophical novels work, I will begin by attempting to
define each of my terms. And yet there is a problem here. Edmund Burke points out that
when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing nature within the bounds of our
own notions.83
Definitions are notoriously problematic, and I am aware that they in some sense work against
certain principles with which I have aligned myself, for example, the rejection of general
limitations imposed prior to specific examinations. But in order for each element to become
a useful part of my triumvirate, I want to make some effort to represent their meaning, so that
there may be some sort of general understanding as to what I am trying to bring together. So,
the limitation effect occurs only in terms of this thesis; when I say "this is what philosophy
is", I mean that this is what I want to be understood to be referring to when I use the word
"philosophy" in the course of this piece of work. I do not mean to render inadmissible the
83 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origins ofOur Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, ed. by J. T. Boulton
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 12.
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definitions of others, and my aim in definition will be to develop those notions of feminism,
literature and philosophy with which readers are already conversant. Once my reluctance to
define has been registered, I will not be ignoring the problems introduced by these issues. In
fact, in some senses, I will be keen to highlight the paradoxes of each definition. In addition,
I will to some extent undermine my own project here, since a definition seeks to distinguish
some issues from others, and yet I will conclude with a most suitable definition being one
which unites all three elements.
Feminism is becoming increasingly difficult to define, and indeed feminists themselves are
becoming increasingly reluctant to pin themselves down in such a way. To describe
themselves as having a particular, collective aim is thought not only to be false, but also to be
at odds with the concept and ideals of feminism. Feminism may nevertheless be described as
a belief system which reads the world of the past and the present as essentially characterized
in terms of patriarchal traditions. It seeks to interrogate these traditions, which it takes to be
a way in which patriarchal systems of thought are perpetuated without justification, in the
interests of the patriarchy.
There are two problems apparent in this conception. First, how to reconcile the definition of
feminism as opposing patriarchy given that feminism is inherently opposed to dichotomous
structures. The answer to this problem may lie in resisting the idea that feminism is simply
"anything that is not patriarchal". Secondly, there is a problem of how to reconcile the
notion that traditions are always a problem for feminism, with the urge to construct and insist
upon feminist traditions, for example of the novel, or even revised conceptions of novelistic
genres. A useful response to this problem may lie in my notion of the essential contingency
of traditions for feminism.
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Philosophy has myriad interpretations. Colloquially, to be philosophical about something is
to intellectualize it, to abstract oneself from the situation and regard it objectively. However,
as with many terms taken into general usage, this fails to capture the full sense in which the
term philosophy might be used. It is true that philosophy concerns abstracting oneself in
terms of a pause, which enables one to reflect. The subjects of philosophy are those things
with which we are often engaged; philosophers ask us to stop doing them in order that we
might examine what it is we are doing. But this is not strictly true, as the pause is not
necessary, and might possibly be prohibitive to the philosophical task. Preferable is a certain
self consciousness which would allow me to examine what I am doing as I do it. For
example, it would be unwise for me to stop breathing in order that I might examine my
respiratory processes; intellectualizing in this sense would be unhelpful and incidentally
fatal. The notion of distancing in the colloquial conception is misleading, then, because it
suggests that to philosophize is to retreat from real life in order to think about it.
This is where the idea of philosophers inhabiting the ivory tower may be said to originate. In
recent years, many branches of philosophy have resisted this, spawning interests which make
deliberate moves towards the real world; practical or applied philosophy is now an important
part of the discipline as a whole. Moreover, it draws attention to the fact that philosophy is
about our lives, and as such is inseparable from the real world. Any distance is taken
paradoxically in order to move closer to the subject; to focus our attention on that subject,
considering it anew. I will focus further upon this conception of philosophy in Chapter
Three, which concerns Utopian fiction.
There seems here to be a conceptual connection between philosophy and feminism. Both
apparently offer a way of looking at a world, and aspects of that world, to which people
appear to have grown accustomed. They question our assumptions that the way things are is
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the way they must be, and highlight alternatives which may work better at explaining the
world for us.
Finally, a very simple meaning of literature may refer to a piece of writing in which the way
in which it has been written is taken as being as significant, if not more so, than what it is
about. Literature is a kind of writing which calls attention to the kind of writing it is. This
definition does not introduce paradoxes, in the way that my definitions of feminism and
philosophy did, but it does seem to be less than specific. In fact, both feminism and
philosophy might coherently be defined in precisely the same way. The cooperative theme
returns. Perhaps I should conclude with an absolutely collective definition.
Feminism, philosophy and literature all constitute incitements to read, and this is the way in
which I shall be thinking of them throughout this thesis. This pins down, I think, the
fundamental concerns of each discipline for the purposes of my thesis. Differences of where
how or upon whom this incitement takes place are up for debate, as are the different rates of
success in the project of incitement. This proposition provides the ideological connection
between the three notions, and forms a significant part of the answer to the question of how
the possibility of a feminist philosophical novel works; by bringing together the core
concerns of the disciplines, and understanding them together.
2. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
In part, the question of consequences is an anticipation of the question "what is the point?".
Why am I writing this thesis and what do I hope to achieve in it? Most obviously, my wish is
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to demonstrate that it is possible for both literature and feminism to contribute to philosophy
in ways which will have an effect upon each discipline.
In terms of interdisciplinarity, this may be expressed in terms of a discussion of the ways in
which much of our conceptual and ideological work is structured by divisions. Boundaries
are drawn in order to demonstrate clearly where one thing ends and another thing begins.
But as Edmund Burke suggests, boundaries are not neutral tools, and critical thinking must be
applied to the way in which divisions affect those things which they divide. In order for this
thesis to make sense, I have to write in terms of certain marked off areas. Yet I hope at the
same time to make these markings a subject for discussion. In this sense, my aim in this
thesis is to divide in order to unite. Distinctions are made in order that thought may be given
to the validity and grounding of those very distinctions.
One clear aim of the thesis, then, is to investigate the possibilities of interdisciplinary work,
through the notion of an incitement to read. I hope to show that if such a study is carried out
without giving extra weight to one side, then all disciplines involved can learn. In other
words, interdisciplinary work does not represent a temporary sojourn into another field, from
which writers and readers may withdraw unaffected when their task is complete. It is a
natural consequence of centuries of departmental separatism in universities that much
interdisciplinary work privileges one intellectual arena over another. This academic
imperialism often leads to the marginalization of some perspectives, which are regarded as
secondary and peripheral. So, whilst it appears that borders are being stretched, in fact all
that happens is the temporary and conditional admission of, for example, a feminist
perspective into the traditional field of science, which remains largely unaffected.
If this is progress, it is very limited. In order to produce a study which both breaks
boundaries and expands frontiers, I am resisting the privileging of one field over another.
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Feminism, literature and philosophy will be equal perspectives on this work, since I believe
this will be the only way to achieve a balanced result, and indeed, to successfully 'expand the
frontiers of the politics of reading'.84 This expansion may be effected by philosophical
analyses of literature which retain literature's own particular perspective.
In this way, the practice of expanding frontiers can be conceptually radical, affecting more
than one area at the same time. Novels can be seen as philosophical, not in spite but because
of their position as literature, and so lead philosophers to develop their notion of what counts
as philosophy and why, not just by erecting more border patrols to defend their methods, but
rather by recognizing and working with potentially new and exciting media, which may
introduce new practices and options for conceptual thinking.
Interdisciplinarity between feminism, literature and philosophy rests, I have said, upon
incitements to read. The reconceptualizations of genre that I offer in the following chapters
will represent a development of this incitement to read. In other words, I will locate my
understanding of each genre at an intersection of feminism, literature and philosophy. In this
way I hope to demonstrate that it is possible for literature to be philosophical, and for
feminists to write philosophy. In addition, the process of working through the notions of
feminism, literature and philosophy, in my analysis, will show that all three, as disciplines,
can leam from the novel.
SJ
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Three Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism', in "Race", Writing, and Difference, ed.




What a discovery that would be - a system that did not shut out.
Virginia Woolf1
I begin my demonstration of the possibility of learning from a novel with a meditation on the
philosophical which may be found within the genre of autobiographical fiction. This chapter
will focus on the way in which the self is presented philosophically in fiction, and consist of an
analysis of some philosophical issues which may be found in such philosophical presentations
of the self. Under the epistemological schema of this work, it will examine specifically the
knower's awareness of he/r self, by which I mean specifically he/r struggle to achieve,
understand and express, the subject position which s/he occupies.
My thesis in this chapter, that literary autobiographies can work as feminist philosophical, is a
fundamentally inclusive one, in accordance with Woolf s wishes. In this sense it contrasts with
much western philosophy concerning the self, and contemporary autobiographical theory, both
of which I will describe as exclusive. I begin with an examination of this exclusivity, which I
will suggest can only fully be understood in terms of the hostile relationships between
feminism, philosophy and literature. The negativity involved in the understanding of
autobiographies as feminist philosophical will then be turned around to ground my positive
demonstration of feminist philosophical autobiographies, where I will examine two novels,
Jeanette Winterson's Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, and Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar, thus
suggesting their representative potential as feminist philosophical fiction. It is my intention
that the theme of inclusivity will prove crucial to all aspects of such interpretations.
1 Moments ofBeing: Unpublished Autobiographical Writings, ed. by Jeanne Schulkind (London: Sussex University Press, 1976),
p. 19.
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A. Limiting and Conditioning Autobiographies
The patriarchal forms of literature and philosophy have both insisted that the writing of the self
is a project which falls outside - usually beneath - their consideration. Moreover, the lines
drawn in exclusion have often incorporated an anti-feminist perspective. When I have outlined
the collusion involved between literary criticism and philosophy in this anti-feminist rejection
of autobiography, I will look briefly at some significant attempts to salvage the genre, in
apparently anti-feminist and feminist forms. I will characterize these efforts to reclaim
autobiography as similarly exclusionary.
1. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND THE LITERARY
Anyway autobiography is easy like it or not autobiography is easy for anyone.2
As a schoolchild, I, along with many others, was taught to produce basic narratives under such
titles as "what I did at the weekend". This served to provide valuable lessons in self esteem,
suggesting that others wanted to be told what I did. It seemed that my story mattered. Telling
one's past in this way represents a first stage in learning to write creatively. The assumed level
of textual objectivity - that I know and can most accurately describe my experience - makes the
task manageable. So manageable, in fact, that it requires little or no creative skill, and can be
practised by children. In this sense, writing one's own story is easy for anyone.
This is an very crude outline of what autobiography consists in. And yet the conception of
autobiography as both artless and immature plays a crucial part in its being rejected by literary
2 Gertrude Stein, Everybody's Autobiography (London: Heinemann, 1938), p. xi.
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critics. A common criticism of new literature is that it is too much a story of the author's life;
too confessional, too personal, and not creative. Antony Beevor reflects this mood when he
remarks of Keri Hulme's Booker Prize winning novel The Bone People that
the power of this remarkable book is greatly diminished when the story turns into a
fairy-tale of the Me Decade.3
From this it follows that insofar as a work is autobiographical, its value and status as literature
may be called into question (or here, shifts from being a 'remarkable book' to a mere 'fairy¬
tale'), and candidates for literature may be criticized for being autobiographical per se.
Literature, as artistic creation, is opposed to the autobiographical, which is 'easy for anyone'.
Through the patriarchal lens, the interpretation of autobiographies as artless and immature
forms of writing immediately leads to their association with women. In this sense, difficulties
which theorists have with the genre of autobiography are expressed in terms of a
characterization of autobiographies as girlish. This characterization works in two ways, both
of which serve to constrict and devalue women's writing. Firstly, it has left an interpretative
limit on texts written by women as, as Ruth Parkin-Gounelas notes;
[a] 11 female writing has traditionally been decoded as autobiographical, as a literal
rendering of the life of the author.4
Under such a schema, women's writing always counts as life reports, and never as art.
Secondly, the supposed ease of autobiographical writing becomes, again when viewed through
the patriarchal lens, a critique of women writers which says they are only capable of producing
such texts, which once more fail as artistic creation, or literature, and may instead be
condemned as mere autobiography. The thesis that women's lives taint their texts may be said
to be insidious in criticism. The problem is not anything about the life of the writer in
particular, but merely the idea of a life being evident in the work at all. It is critics'
3
Antony Beevor, 'Review of The Bone People by Keri Hulme', Times Literary Supplement, 25 October 1985, p. 1202.
4 Ruth Parkin-Gounelas, Fictions of the Female Self: Charlotte Bronte, Olive Schreiner, Katherine Mansfield (London:
MacMillan, 1980), p. 5.
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embarrassment at being confronted with signs of life in literary art which engenders hostility to
autobiographical texts. For example, the authors of a recent book on Sylvia Plath insist that
[a]ll her writing is autobiographical; she can never escape from the subject of her own
impressions, her own miseries, tempers and nightmares.5
The ambiguity evident in this remark is revealing. The criticism appears to be directed at the
topics and themes of Plath's work, which are thought to be consistent in their limitation.
However, the use of the word 'subject' suggests that it is a confinement to the self for which
Plath is being criticized. The problem with Sylvia Plath, it seems, is that she cannot escape
from herself. Such critics seem uncomfortable with the idea that literary artworks may be
produced by someone who is human and writes from the perspective of this humanity. The fact
that she is a woman may increase this feeling of discomfort for those writing within the
confines of patriarchal structures.
Similarly, Joanna Russ notes the frequent use of the term "confessional" to disparage women's
texts,6 and also, interestingly, the use of the term "writer" to disparage women's lives. An
example of this latter may be found in Rousseau's remarking that
a female wit is a scourge to her husband, her children, her servants, to everybody [...]
she is very rightly a butt for criticism.7
Contemporary criticism still considers the life of a writing woman to be an appropriate target
for critics, and this is another reason why explicitly autobiographical texts by women are often
dismissed. Put simply, if women's lives in patriarchy are ignored and dismissed, then the
writings of those lives do not stand much chance of gaining respect. Conversely, a successful
revaluation of women's autobiographical texts would seem to have clear benefits from a
feminist point of view. Brodzki and Schenck, for example, begin their project with the
assertion that
5 Gordon Ciaridge, Ruth Pryor and Gwen Watkins, Sounds From the Bell Jar: Ten Psychotic Authors (London: MacMillan, 1990),
p. 207.
6 Joanna Russ, How to Suppress Women's Writing (London: Women's Press, 1984), pp. 29-30.
7
Quoted in Russ, p. 31.
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[a]utobiography localizes the very program of much feminist theory - the reclaiming of
the feminist subject.8
However, reclaiming a subject in the terms of an autobiography seems to fall foul of two
contemporary theoretical principles; that of the death of the subject, and that of the death of the
author. Moreover, since this double funeral is of two ideas which are often said to be
irredeemably phallocentric, there are clear implications for feminist theory. Let me explain.
The first of these ideas is a staple of post-Lacanian theory, specifically involving the thesis that
there can be no access to the self; and consequently no expression or true representation of the
self. This position has clear implications for the genre of autobiography, since it insists that, as
Marc Eli Blanchard puts it, 'the subject is not and can never be a part of the discourse he
utters'.9 Ihab Hassan agrees that the genre of autobiography is 'impossible', and further labels
it 'deadly'.10 For much contemporary criticism, a work which is defined by its task of self
expression does not even deserve to be called art, because it involves an unacknowledged,
mistaken, and even dangerous assumption that the selfmay be presented in any coherent form
at all."
Paul de Man has discussed this autobiography problem in an interesting way in his article
'Autobiography as De-Facement'. De Man specifically excludes the epistemological questions
which are touched by autobiography in an aside;
The interest of autobiography [...] is not that it reveals reliable self-knowledge - it does
not - but that it demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of closure and of
totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into being) of all textual systems made
up of tropological substitutions.12
8 Bella Brodzki and Celeste Schenck, 'Introduction' to their edited collection Life/Lines: Theorizing Women's Autobiography
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 1-15 (p. 2).
g
Marc Eli Blanchard, 'The Critique of Autobiography', Comparative Literature, 34:2 (1982), 97-115 (p. 97).
10 Ihab Hassan, 'Parabiography: The Varieties of Critical Experience', in The Postmodern Turn: Essays In Postmodern Theory and
Culture (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1987), pp. 147-166 (p. 147).
11 An interesting exception to this theoretical commonplace is Gabriele Schwab's Subjects Without Selves: Transitional Texts In
Modern Fiction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), which attempts to read contemporary literature for evidence of
'literary subjectivity'. Nevertheless, this notion is determined at least in part by a rejection of 'philosophical notions of subjectivity'
(p. ix).
12 Paul de Man, 'Autobiography as De-Facement', Modern Language Notes, 94:5 (1979), 919-930 (p. 922). Subsequent page
references will be given in the text.
69
In this way, the genre, or rather situation, of autobiography is shown to be acutely paradoxical;
it presents itself as writing which involves discussions of self knowledge, and in that very
presentation, reveals that such discussions are impossible. This explains why there is a sense
in which all writing is autobiographical, and at the same time a sense in which no writing can
be autobiographical. This apparently liberating thesis serves to abolish any generic
understanding of autobiographies. For if classification as autobiography is fundamentally
arbitrary, applicable both always and never, then no space is created for comparison between
texts, and autobiography loses its force as a critical approach.13
At the same time, de Man's negative hermeneutics14 excludes the philosophical from
autobiography on two different levels. Autobiography, he insists, cannot speak to the theme of
self knowledge. In addition, the reading effects, or, in my terms, arguments, of
autobiographical texts are characterized as monolithic; they must necessarily present the case
for the death of the subject. This is itself a totalizing thesis, and as such will not fit with my
understanding of the philosophical as incitement to read. Yet for de Man, it is the only
possibility for autobiographical texts. Despite criticizing the 'confining' (p. 919) and
'stubborn' (p. 922) attitudes of other critics towards this genre, de Man produces an
absolutism of his own.15
De Man assumes that all discussion on self knowledge is grounded by the erroneous premise
that self knowledge is strictly reliable and has revelatory possibilities, and so that the language
of autobiography is aporetic because it aspires to the 'specular' (p. 922). This recalls the
assumptions behind the setting of my homework on weekend activities. Yet for de Man,
" I allow that there is always some element of the arbitrary in genre classifications, but would like to retain the notion that there must
be some general agreement as to the kinds of texts which will count as participating in any given genre, in order for there to be any
meaningful discussion about which texts may be included and which not. In this sense I might say that genre classification is not
fundamentally but incidentally arbitrary.
1 I use this term quite specifically to mean reading a text in order to find out what it is not.
15 This dogmatic tendency of de Man's article is also noted by Bernard Harrison, who suspects that de Man is offering conclusions
about 'what the stance of autobiography [...] must be'. See Bernard Harrison, 'Rhetoric and the Self', in Inconvenient Fictions:
Literature and the Limits ofTheory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 188-218 (p. 206, author's italics).
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autobiographies are not artless in the way that childhood narratives are. This may be explained
in terms of the way in which fiction is an integral yet unquantifiable element of autobiography.
That fiction and autobiography have an undecideable relationship is an idea which, for de Man,
is 'uncomfortable' and 'not [...] sound' (p. 921). In this de Man's position seems at odds with
the celebration of undecidability which often characterizes deconstruction. However, de Man
also argues that deconstruction can discover 'interest' (p. 922) in autobiographical texts by
focusing upon the doubleness of a text's both resisting and insisting upon specularity.
Part of de Man's deconstructive agenda is a contempt for the logocentrism ofWestern
metaphysics, in its assumption that utterances correspond directly to states of consciousness.
Any analysis of autobiography seems to risk perpetuating this myth. For de Man, this explains
why the tropes of autobiography must demonstrate their own inadequacy.
If the death of the subject in literary theory renders the genre of autobiography problematic,
then the death of the author underlines this difficulty. Barthes and Foucault have famously
urged that critics recognize the stultifying effect which reference to an author of a text has upon
interpretation, since it risks positing the author as originator of textual meaning and
significance, and so producing exclusive interpretations.16 The influence of these positions has
led literary theorists to balk at, or even avoid altogether, the idea of a kind of writing which
seems to concern itself with the identity not merely of a self but specifically of the author.
De Man offers a reading of Wordsworth which constitutes an attempt to make the case for the
death of the author, by showing that any attempt to refer to a unifying principle beyond the text
is foiled by other aspects of the text. On this, as on other matters, de Man's thesis contains
16 See Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', in Image-Music-Text, trans, by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), pp. 142-
148; and Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', trans, by Josue V. Harari, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives In Post-Structural
Criticism, ed. by Josue V. Harari (London: Methuen, 1980), pp. 141-160.
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aporetic features of its own. So, despite denying autobiography's generic status (p. 921), de
Man offers a way of understanding autobiographies as a set of texts, in terms of the textual
analysis of an 'exemplary' one, Wordsworth's Essays Upon Epitaphs (p. 924). Moreover, this
analysis is presented through appeals to interpretative solidarity. References to a familiarity
with Wordsworth's ceuvre ground de Man's familiar interpretation, which consists of casual,
prompting references and a premise of agreement;
One thinks of such famous passages in The Prelude as the hymn to the new-born child
in Book II ("Blest the infant babe...") that tells how "the first/ Poetic spirit of our
human life" manifests itself. A condition of mutual exchange and dialogue is first
established, then interrupted without warning [...] Or one thinks of the drowned man
in Book VII. (p. 924)
In this way de Man makes explicit the 'mutual exchange' between Wordsworth's texts; a
dialogue between the text in front of one, and the connections which one makes through one's
idea of the author, with other texts. In addition, there is said to be a set of autobiographical
information which has a history of familiarity and application;
As is well known, it is this episode which furnishes, in an earlier variant, the textual
evidence for the assumption that these figures [...] are figures of Wordsworth's own
poetic self. (p. 924)
That de Man allows himself to tell readers how they read Wordsworth's texts in this way seems
to me to have a crucial bearing upon the subject in question. And yet for the author of this
article, the description of a common critical background, or, in Stanley Fish's terms, an
'interpretive community'17 of Wordsworth readers, for whom the life of the poet is 'well
known', offers a path away from the concerns of the essay. In other words, having been
established, this condition of mutual exchange and dialogue is now interrupted, with an
autobiographical warning, as de Man tells himself
[t]his takes us of course, beyond the scope of this paper; I must limit myself to
suggesting the relevance of the Essays Upon Epitaphs for the larger question of
autobiographical discourse of self-restoration, (pp. 224-225)
17 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980).
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Because it contains such autobiographical moments, de Man's thesis is not so straightforward
as might at first be supposed.
The combined critical execution of the author and the subject suggests that any appeal to the
notion of artefactuality is limiting, and therefore to be resisted. Instead, all texts must be
analysed in New Critical isolation, that is, in terms of inherent patterns and structures within
the text, rather than with appeals to something outside it. This response necessitates the
abandonment of the concept of autobiography, since it accepts that the ideas which might help
to distinguish the genre have been successfully assassinated in such a way as to render the
genre theoretically indefensible.
I have two main problems with this response. The first becomes clear with a comparison of the
suggestion that readers ignore the concept of the author with an idea that texts should be
approached under laboratory conditions. By urging that readers escape the critical constraint
of restitution to an author, this view commends a position of transcendence which is untenable.
This difficulty becomes even more acute in the case of autobiography, because
autobiographical texts are presented in the very terms of a frame of reference to the author
which may not easily be erased, even with sustained effort.
My second difficulty with the response is that it employs a restriction upon reading which is the
reverse side of the coin to that restriction it attempts to redress. In other words, although it is
true that biographical criticism imposes a limitation upon interpretation, in the sense that
attempts to read the text become attempts to find out, in a peculiarly phallogocentric way, what
the author meant; a diametrically opposing view, which says that beliefs which the reader has
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about the author can never form part of a legitimate interpretation, is just as restrictive. In this
sense, the response is fundamentally confined within and by its own theoretical status.18
Nevertheless, the theory still holds sway, and has left autobiography in a position of exclusion,
to be retained only, it would seem, as a term of abuse for the texts produced by women writers.
Moreover, the race to reject autobiography has become bound up with a rejection of
philosophy. Although this latter is explicitly a rejection of an impossible phallogocentric
philosophy, other, more interesting forms of philosophy are discarded along with it. As a
result, the suggestion that the extent to which texts are autobiographical is the extent to which
they cannot attain the status of literature, is pervasive, patriarchal and problematic.
The dominant trend in analytic philosophy can be shown to treat the genre in a remarkably
similar way. De Man's assertion that reliable self knowledge may not be produced in
autobiographies could be seen as a suggestion that it can be represented elsewhere, for example
in those 'textual systems' which are not 'made up of tropological situations' (p. 922). In this it
is possible to identify a correspondence with analytic philosophers, whose argument is that it is
their job to demonstrate reliable self knowledge.
2. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL
The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes
and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly,
dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge - knowledge as
impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain.19
18 Sean Burke similarly argues that death of the author criticism demonstrates the limits of theory, in his The Death and Return of
the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992).
19 Bertrand Russell, The Problems ofPhilosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 93, author's italics.
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The notion that autobiography is easy suggests that the task of the autobiographer is to focus
on the immediate, the obvious, the surface. The simplicity of the task necessitates an elision of
difficult or specifically philosophical questions. Fitted into a traditional framework, Stein's
commenting that it is easy for anyone to write an autobiography may be seen to endorse a strict
division between autobiography and philosophy. Russell's remark clearly supports this
distinction. For him, philosophy's very task is to separate itself from those "passions" or
"impurities" which will distort and cloud our philosophical vision. Traditional philosophers in
this way may exclude autobiography as a kind of writing which epitomizes particularity; it
focuses on one person, telling only their story, where philosophy ought to speak universally, to
tell everyone's. So, even if philosophical texts and autobiographical texts discuss the same
issues, the two are not to be compared because where the former are enlightening, the latter are
self indulgent.20
The problems with this view may become clearer by looking at an example. In the first volume
of her autobiography, Janet Frame describes the uncertainty of moving from adolescence to
adulthood, and wondering what she might do with her life;
I asked myself that old question which haunted me as a child. Why was the world, why
was the world? And where was my place?21
In the Meditations, Descartes is similarly troubled by the meaning of the world and his position
in it;
At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking
at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set
purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it [...] But in thinking over this I remind
myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions.22
The suggestion that the former remark is not philosophical, whilst the latter is, seems odd.
Both writer's projects are written in the first person, both concern such staples of philosophical
20 There are two significant exceptions to this general rule, in the form of the Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau, which are
generally accepted as canonical. I do not mean to dismiss these two texts, but neither do 1 consider their existence to undermine my
argument. Patriarchy has always admitted of exception disruptions of the pattern, so long as they occur on its terms.
21 Janet Frame, To the Is-Land: An Autobiography (London: Women's Press, 1984), p. 236, author's italics.
22 Rene Descartes, Meditations On First Philosophy: In Focus, ed. by Stanley Tweyman (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 47.
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inquiry as existence and the meaning of life, and both might be said to stimulate consideration
of such ideas in those who read their words.
Yet a philosopher might argue that the questions raised by Descartes in relation to
understanding the world and his place in it are philosophical because they lead to universal
considerations on the mind body problem, or the problem of defining consciousness, where
Frame's counts as a specific, and therefore trivial, case of pondering. His use of I is merely
exemplary, or a means to an end, where her use of the first person is fundamental. Where
Frame merely delineates her experience, Descartes demonstrates how everyone experiences the
world and his place in it.
This argument is flawed in many ways. One problem is that ignoring Descartes' use of the
first person can lead directly to misinterpretations of his ideas. Elizabeth Anscombe notes for
example that
Saul Kripke has tried to reinstate Descartes' argument for his dualism. But he neglects
its essentially first-person character, making it an argument about the non-identity of
Descartes with his own body.23
For Anscombe, it is a mistake automatically to exclude the autobiographical from
philosophical consideration since the autobiographical may be relevant to the philosophy.
Here, Kripke ought to have translated the considerations of the Meditations to his own
perspective, in order for it to have the force which might make its argument effective. Perhaps
then, it is this force, which constructs knowers as 'infinitely replicable',24 which makes
Descartes philosophical and Frame not-philosophical. Descartes' philosophy is presented in
such a way as to demand identical results for the meditations of any sane rational person. His
ponderings may be applied universally in a way in which Frame's may not.
23 Elizabeth Anscombe, 'The First Person' in Self-Knowledge, ed. by Quassim Cassam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.
140-159 (p. 140).
24 I take this phrase from Lorraine Code, Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 166.
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Anscombe may be happy with this distinction, yet the way in which philosophers have
traditionally insisted on universalizing ideas has also attracted a great deal of criticism from
feminists. This criticism may be said to fall into two categories. First of all feminists argue
that traditionally, philosophers have mistakenly assumed that their perspective counted as
universal and therefore objective. In fact, historically, philosophical objectivity can often be
exposed as a white heterosexual male subjectivity which does not satisfy the standard of
objectivity required by philosophy. Specifically, the so called universality of Cartesian
meditations, their supposed capacity for infinite replicability, turns out to be nothing of the
kind.25 This is how the false assertion of universality leads to exclusivity. If I say I speak for
everyone, where in fact I only speak for everyone like me, I exclude those who are not like me.
Secondly, given that objectivity has proved to be an obstacle to understanding in philosophical
history, some feminists have moved from this recognition to questioning whether in fact
objectivity is a desirable goal for philosophers. Feminist philosophers have suggested that
there may be at least some philosophical issues which require the participation of perspective;
where the acknowledgement of a position from which the philosopher speaks, must be taken
into account if progress in the question is to occur.26
If this is the case, then philosophical issues connected with self knowledge could be prime
candidates for such participation. Indeed, I suggest that the attempt to understand and express
my awareness of the kind of thing I am requires some kind of subjective contribution. This is
not an original observation. Thomas Nagel has noticed the problematic absence of the first
person in most works on the philosophy of mind, in his essay 'What is it Like to be a Bat?',
23 The metaphysical atomism proposed by Descartes has been roundly deconstructed and found wanting by feminist philosophers.
See for example Naomi Scheman, 'Though This Be Method, Yet There Is Madness In It: Paranoia and Liberal Epistemology', in A
Mind ofOne's Own: Feminist Essays On Reason and Subjectivity, ed. by Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993), pp. 145-170 (pp. 151-156).
26 See for example Nancy C. M. Hartsock, 'The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground For a Specifically Feminist Historical
Materialism', in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of
Science, ed. by Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dortrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing, 1983), pp. 283-310.
77
and concludes that unless philosophers try to grapple with the question of the nature of
subjective experience, they are 'sidestepping' the issue.27 Nagel, it may be assumed, sees an
advantage in recognizing the autobiographical element of philosophy.
Yet this is not the case. Nagel insists that the self need not appear in a text which purports to
examine the self. There is nothing of Thomas Nagel to be found in the text of 'What is it Like
to be a Bat?'. Rather, he insists that analyses of the self with a view to discovering what
makes me me, are analyses of a 'type' (p. 171, author's italics). It is for this reason that Nagel
believes that the problem of the self is analogous in difficulty to the straggle to find out what it
would be like to have the experiences of a being completely unlike us. I think that Nagel is
simply mistaken in this. Whether or not I am able to say what it is like to be a bat has no
bearing whatsoever on my ability to say what it is like to be me. Nagel's analysis itself
sidesteps the issue of subjective experience, because he deliberately avoids speaking for
himself.
If questions involving the self do require some autobiographical input, then the assumption that
the specificity of Frame's remarks disqualifies them from being philosophical is clearly
erroneous. On the contrary, Frame's willingness to speak for herself retains a significance lost
by (Anscombe's) Descartes in his straggle for speak for everyone. The fact that
autobiographical writing does not present itself as universalizable prevents it from retaining the
problematic claims to generality, and thus exclusivity, two notions which have plagued
traditional philosophical writing. Just as the false assertion of universality has paradoxically
exclusive effects, so the acknowledgement and delineation of a subject position can lead to
inclusivity, as readers are offered the space to apply the ideas presented to themselves. The
presentation of an individual perspective in autobiographies offers an opportunity for the
11 Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 165-180
(p. 180). Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
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exploration of philosophical questions from a perspective which is often ignored by traditional
philosophers; questions associated with the person who takes up the position to be analysed,
but in a form which allows for the participation of others.
Another connected problem with the interpretation which valorizes Descartes' use of the first
person and imposes limits on Frame's is that there is nothing about either text which
necessitates their being read in any particular way. So Descartes' text might easily be read as
a personal narrative of exploration, revealing psychoanalytic facts about the philosopher
himself,28 and Frame's autobiography might be read as exemplary, revealing to the reader a
way of looking at the world and he/r place in it. This ability of the reader to take philosophical
meaning from a text which is outwith a given structure of philosophical discourse is a crucial
proposal of my thesis. In the context of this chapter on autobiography, this emphasis on an
active reader will serve as a defence against the charge of autobiographical writing as singular
and unrepresentative, and furthermore, help to present the case for inclusivity.
Like the literary rejection of autobiography which I examined earlier, the insistence that
autobiography is a form of writing which can have nothing to do with philosophy incorporates
a gender bias. It is no coincidence, I suggest, that Janet Frame is female and Rene Descartes is
male. Specifically, I now want to propose that suggestions that autobiographies are
unphilosophical and girlish do not constitute two separate claims, but that in fact the two
judgements are related in close and interesting ways. Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist novel,
Nausea, genderizes autobiographical writing in precisely the same moment as it rejects it as
unphilosophical activity. Roquentin, the novel's protagonist, decides to stop noting the "trivia"
28 See Jonathan Ree, Philosophical Tales: An Essay on Philosophy and Literature (London: Methuen, 1987), pp. 11-24, and
Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness:(Literature/Philosophy/ Psychoanalysis), trans, by Martha Noel Evans and the author
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 35-55, for respectively, autobiographical and psychoanalytic approaches to the
Meditations.
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of his life, and concentrate philosophically on his essence. This decision involves the
introductory claim that
I'm going to give up writing down my impressions, like a little girl, in a nice new
notebook.29
In the context of the novel, readers may interpret this in two ways. Perhaps this is what
Roquentin does, and the following "diary-entries" represent a rejection of the girlish
impressions, and concentration on the manly contemplation on being. On the other hand, the
following novel may be just this writing, which the protagonist has not been able to resist
completing, and the statement above is merely part of Roquentin's despair; his wish to
trivialize his thoughts. Under either interpretation, the genre of autobiography is seen first of
all as being unphilosophical, and secondly, as being associated with a specifically female
immaturity.
The inseparability of the claims first, that autobiographies are women's texts, and second, that
they are in opposition to that which is philosophical, is efficiently demonstrated in an exchange
between Hypo and Miriam in Dorothy Richardson's Pilgrimage-,
'Women ought to be good novelists. But they write best about their own experiences.
Love-affairs and so forth. They lack creative imagination.'
'Ah, imagination. Lies.'
Try a novel of ideas. Philosophical. There's George Eliot.'
'Writes like a man.'
'Just so.'30
The text executes a development of the Platonic value system I outlined in Chapter One, by
positing men and philosophy on one side and women and autobiography on the other of a
binary opposition. Here the opposition is made explicit, which offers a better idea of how such
assumptions work. Hypo assumes that his analysis is descriptive, that he can talk collectively
about women, what women ought to do and what they in fact do. In his argument, women
function as a unified homogenous totality, admitting of neither diversity within the group nor of
29 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans, by Robert Baldick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p. 11.
30
Dorothy Richardson, Pilgrimage IV (London: Virago, 1979), p. 240.
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variation in the position of individuals over time. And yet, '[tjhere's George Eliot'. The
acknowledgement of an exception to Hypo's rule does not affect his argument, because Eliot is
said to make the leap across from autobiography to philosophy by becoming a man both
nominally and textually. As a result, although Miriam rejects Eliot as a model for her writing,
the grounds on which she does so fail to serve as an objection to Hypo because they simply
confirm the opposition within which he operates. It is precisely because Eliot '[wjrites like a
man' that Miriam should follow her in the attempt to write something of importance; something
'[philosophical'.
Attempts to exclude the autobiographical from the philosophical and vice versa characterize
the work of literary critics and philosophers, I have suggested. In the next section I will
examine how attempts to revalue autobiographies have failed to break this pattern of exclusion.
3. RECLAIMING AUTOBIOGRAPHIES
An influential theorist of autobiographies in the twentieth-century is Georges Gusdorf, who
seeks to reclaim the texts of autobiography as historically and culturally specific artefacts,
where the cult of the individual, here perpetuated by the individual, reigns supreme. Gusdorf
takes the plethora of autobiographies in Western society since the Renaissance as indicative of
intellectual progress; men have overcome the 'anguish' which they experience when first they
confront the self, to arrive at a stage where they can celebrate their separateness and their
uniqueness.31 An autobiography counts as such a celebration. It is an individual's story of
his own success.
31
Georges Gusdorf, 'Conditions and Limits of Autobiography', trans, by James Olney, in Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and
Critical, ed. by James Olney (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 28-48 (p. 34). Subsequent page references will
be given in the text.
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The emphasis on and importance of the individual serves to connect this literary genre with
philosophy, as Gusdorf recognizes, quoting Nietzsche's remark that
every great philosophy has been the confession of its maker, as it were his involuntary
and unconscious autobiography. (Gusdorf, p. 46)
Autobiographies, then, are about the great heroes and heroisms of the Western history of ideas.
They are written to express an individual's self knowledge;
The author, who is at the same time the hero of the tale, wants to elucidate his past in
order to draw out the structure of his being in time. And this secret structure is for him
the implicit condition of all possible knowledge in every order whatsoever, (p. 45)
Yet this expression is not to be confused with truth, since it reveals its hero 'not as he was, not
as he is, but as he believes and wishes himself to be and have been' (p. 45). So far, this looks
promising as a strategy for noting the philosophical - and fictional - aspects of autobiographies.
These stories of achievement are, however, limited to 'Western man' (p. 29). Other cultures
are considered imaginatively incapable of autobiography, trapped in the earlier stages of
anxiety with regard to individuality. For example;
[t]he wisdom of India considers personality an evil illusion and seeks salvation in
depersonalization, (p. 30)
Non-westerners are not the only groups who cannot satisfy the conditions of autobiography.
Within a Western society, any peoples who are not at the centre of a social structure cannot be
said to represent themselves in autobiographical form, because they do not participate in the
success of which the autobiography is fundamentally an account;
It is obvious that autobiography is not possible in a cultural landscape where
consciousness of self does not, properly speaking, exist, (p. 30)
Since writing one's life must fall into the category of a success story, women's lives in
patriarchy 'obviousfly]' may not be included as potentially autobiographical. In order to
defend autobiography as 'a solidly established literary genre' (p. 28), Gusdorf felt he had to
place limits on those selves and lives which may be expressed in the genre. If, when
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autobiography was easy, it was assigned to women, then when it is taken seriously, when it is
regarded as philosophical, it must be reclaimed for men.
In other words, for Gusdorf, the revaluing of the genre of autobiography involves the
reinscription of a male philosophical centre, which asserts its primacy in Western society, and
recalls Plato's offering of positive roles to a masculinized philosophy, and negative roles to a
feminized other. Just as Plato sees philosophy as a kind of writing under threat from the
pretenders of literature, Gusdorf sees the genre of autobiography as a kind of writing under
threat from outsiders, who can neither participate in the society which autobiography
celebrates, nor aspire to its subjects.32
Gusdorf s reclamation of autobiography has been analysed at great length by feminists.33
Although his theory seems decidedly anti-feminist, perhaps even misogynistic, it would be
possible to interpret it in such a way as to make it agree with the category of a negative
feminism, which argues that patriarchy is so conceptually pervasive that it renders women
incapable of writing autobiographies which don't ape men's autobiographies. The feminist
critic Shoshana Felman, for example, appears to agree with Gusdorf's analysis, insisting that
'none of us, as women, has as yet, precisely, an autobiography' ,34
Felman's reference to 'the problematic of autobiography for women' (p. 15) is, I would
suggest, also Gusdorfian. Other feminist critics, whilst taking issue with Gusdorf, often choose
to respond in his terms. A common response has been that which suggests that Gusdorf
12 For an even more explicitly neo-Platonic interpretation of autobiographies as philosophical, see James Olney, Metaphors ofSelf:
The Meaning ofAutobiography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972). Olney describes what happens in autobiographies
in the following way; 'one of the many in the heretofore meaningless created universe becomes, in the formal projection of
cosmography-and-autobiography, the creative One of his own coherent, richly meaningful, intensely organized, altogether self-
oriented universe' (p. 8).
33 For an analysis of the preponderance of feminist critiques which focus on Gusdorf, see Jeanne Costello, 'Taking the "Woman" Out
of Women's Autobiography: The Perils and Potentials of Theorizing Female Subjectivities', Diacritics, 21:2-3 (1991), 123-134 (p.
131).
34 Shoshana Felman, What Does A Woman Want?: Reading and Sexual Difference (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993), p. 14, author's italics. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
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describes a type of writing with which women are not concerned. This is commensurate with
the predominantly postmodernist feminist view that feminist projects are threatened by the
concentration on autobiographical texts.35 Another more positive response chooses to talk
about a kind of autobiography which women can be said to write. Patricia Meyer Spacks, for
example, talks about 'the high tradition of spiritual autobiography', of which there is a separate
'female version'.36 The texts which Spacks discusses in this article are characterized as 'self-
effacing', a way in which women writers engage in 'self-denial' (p. 132). Shari Benstock and
Susan Stanford Friedman amongst others have pointed out, contra Gusdorf, that there are
other types of autobiographies, associated with women writers, which rather than focusing on
the presentation of complete selves, seek to question the notion of selfhood.37
These feminist critiques of Gusdorf have clearly been influenced by de Man. They echo and
applaud the latter's critique of a notion of autobiography which invokes the myth of the self
existing holistically, separately, and uniquely. This much, I think, is useful, and I accept their
arguments against such a myth. However, I have also indicated some problems which I found
with de Man's thesis; for example, I suggested that his insisting that autobiography asserts the
death of the subject places a requirement on autobiographical writing which precludes any
understanding of philosophical content. In accepting this particular argument feminist critics
may be understood to have added to de Man's thesis the gender associations proposed by
Gusdorf, and thus reverted to a Platonic conception of philosophy which excludes women. As
a result, even when feminist critics argue against Gusdorf, they may finally share his putative
proposal of a literary essentialism, thus proposing that in a patriarchal society men write novels
of the former sort, satisfying Gusdorf s theory of philosophical autobiography, and women
35 See for example Luce Irigaray, 'Any Theory of the "Subject" Has Always Been Appropriated By the "Masculine"', in Speculum
of the Other Woman, trans, by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 133-146.
36 Patricia Meyer Spacks, 'Selves In Hiding', in Women's Autobiography: Essays in Criticism, ed. by Estelle C. Jelinek
(Bloomington, 1A: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 112-132(131). Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
37 See Shari Benstock, 'Authorizing the Autobiographical', in her edited collection The Private Self: Theory and Practice of
Women's Autobiographical Writings (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 10-33; and Susan Stanford Friedman, 'Women's
Autobiographical Selves: Theory and Practice', in the same volume, pp. 34-62.
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write autobiographies as de Man envisions them; non-philosophical, and asserting the death of
the subject.
Taken literally, this analysis reverts back to biographical criticism, and the notion that the text
can be made to mean with reference back to the power or powerlessness of the real life of the
author.38 One alternative is a pragmatic approach, which might posit the sex of an author as
an interpretative strategy; as for example one of Kamuf s 'critical levers with which to displace
the imponderable weight of patriarchy'(p. 298). Yet such a strategy has its own restrictions, for
example in suggesting that autobiographies may undergo a simple interpretative test,
anticipated by Miriam in Pilgrimage, based upon whether the autobiographer 'writes like a
man', or a woman. Such an interpretive strategy also assumes a predetermined sex category of
writing. In other words, it assumes that there is already something that it is to write like a
woman. I posit instead that the very flexibility of sex categories, presumed by Kamuf, exposes
the fact that they may not be employed in this way; that we do not yet know how or what
women may write.39 Further, I suggest that even understood pragmatically, compliance with
these categories is largely uninteresting, and that interpretation might more usefully focus upon
analysis of those features which the use of sex labels attempts to reduce to essential
characteristics of writing by women.
I conclude from this that there are other ways of salvaging autobiographical theory than
confining oneself or even merely responding to, Gusdorf's terms, which are not only dependent
on the problematics of the metaphysics of presence, as exposed by de Man, but also, as I have
shown, upon their grounding in the Platonic association of men with philosophy at the centre,
38
My attitude to this is similar to that of Peggy Kamuf, when she accuses Spacks' critical arguments elsewhere of 'biological
determinism.' See Peggy Kamuf, 'Writing Like aWoman', in Women and Language In Literature and Society, ed. by Sally
McConnell-Ginet, Ruth Borker, and Nelly Furman (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 284-299 (p. 285). Subsequent page references
will be given in the text.
39 See Diane Elam and Robyn Wiegman, 'Contingencies', in their edited collection Feminism Beside Itself (New York, Routledge,
1995), pp. 1-8, for an evocation of this feminist perspective.
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relegating women to the unphilosophical margins. By accepting his terms, these feminist critics
not only confine their feminism to the negative, but also share Gusdorf's restrictive conception
of autobiography, and of philosophical novels.
So, Gusdorf s attempt to reclaim autobiographies, and those theorists who have responded to
him, have proved successfully anti-feminist, revealing an unacknowledged correspondence
between critics that women are confined to the non-philosophical margins, where men control
the philosophical centre. If the options are presented as dichotomous, if autobiographers are
divided into whether they present an egoistic universal subject, or a fragmented personalized
subject, and if, in addition, these alternatives become sexed, then autobiographical theory has
once again become limited and conditioned.
In this section I have argued that the focus on the individual, particularly if that individual is a
woman, has proved to be a problem for literary critics, for whom autobiographies were thereby
artless, and that it has proved to be a problem for philosophers, for whom autobiographies
were thereby thoughtless. I examined these objections and found them to be prejudicial and
unnecessary, concluding that there is no reason in principle why I should not value
autobiographical writing, either from the point of view of literary criticism, or from that of
philosophy. In particular I argued that texts within the genre, in order to be philosophical, need
not perpetuate the myth of the metaphysics of presence. I now wish to go further, and suggest
that there reasons why I should value autobiographical writing; that there are philosophical
advantages in doing so. This claim radically rejects the position previously assigned to
autobiography, by claiming that which is often regarded as problematic about the genre as an
advantage to my interpretation. This involves moving on from the negative assertions about
the impossibility of particular versions of the self, and instead building upon the conviction that
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there are some useful notions which individuals might disclose about their own subject position
in the writing which I will hereafter refer to as autography.
B. Autography Is Feminist and Philosophical
In the search for Woolf's 'system that does not shut out', or more specifically, a way of
describing the genre of autobiography that is consistent with the notions of feminism and
philosophy as incitement to read, I have looked to those systems which do shut out, in order to
find the weak spots in their barriers. I have hinted at these weak spots in different contexts
throughout, and now hope to draw them together, and walk through the wall.
My argument here is that there are interesting questions to be asked about what it is to occupy
a particular subject position, and that these questions should not be left exclusively to
traditional philosophers. Specifically, I claim that the reliable expression of self knowledge
consists in no more and no less than my effective descriptions of how I see myself, that
feminists have an interest in retaining this conception of reliable self knowledge, and that the
genre with which I am here concerned constitutes the most appropriate place to understand this
concept.
I have three ways of describing this genre in such a way as to collectively justify these claims.
The first involves removing the notion of life writing from consideration, the second values the
specificity of self writings, and the third emphasizes the role of the reader in showing the
capacity for the genre to be both feminist and philosophical.
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1. EXTRACTING THE BIO
I want to begin by rejecting the notion of autobiographies as life stories or reports; writing
which may be characterized as artless and immature, valorizing experience, and participating
in phallogocentrism. Autographies may not be said to offer an accurate biography of the
author, but rather to tell a story of the self. An acknowledgement of the fictional status of
autography involves an understanding of the author fundamentally as a character, on behalf of
whom the autographical makes no ontological claims. As a result, evaluation by standards of
realism, or lack of it, is out of place. It is difficult to see what an ontological mistake in this
context would be. Like the statement "I do not exist", responses to autobiography which say
"this incident did not happen to you like this" just do not make sense. The person who offers
them does not understand the terms in which s/he is speaking.
This does not mean, however, that the author of an autobiography counts as the originator and
guarantor of the meaning of he/r text. Rather s/he may be understood as a textual projection of
the autobiography. In other words, the attempt of the writer of an autography to describe
he/rself is not to be confused with an attempt to de-scribe he/rself. In this sense the notion of
autobiography usefully invokes that of intertextuality, establishing itself as an intertext, in the
Barthesian sense of that word, emphasizing 'the impossibility of living outside the infinite
text'.40 An autography is thus understood as a site of textual fusion, where the author
contributes he/rself as one of its intertexts. In other words, this genre can be thought of as one
where, crucially, 'the subject returns, not as illusion, but as fiction' (Barthes, Pleasure, p. 62,
author's italics).
40 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans, by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 36. Subsequent page
references will be given in the text.
In order to emphasize these points I will henceforth utilize the term autograph, leaving out the
notion of life-writing in order to concentrate on the notion of the self.41 The term autograph
may be used as a remainder term for similar reasons, and as such it describes merely what is
left when the "bio" is discarded. However, I think that the term has an independent
significance. To lend my autograph to something is to record my perspective. It serves as a
reminder in the future that I was there in the past and witnessed something then, to be
remembered now. It is the indication left by my hand of me, there and then, to you, here and
now. In this way autographical texts may be said to disrupt the distinction between presence
and absence.42
The use of the term autograph also signals the notion of a commitment.43 The commitment of
autography is reflexive, in the sense that the autography declares a commitment to the writing
of the self, but also entails a commitment to the reader. That such a commitment is ethical is
signalled by Sean Burke, who argues that
the signatory act installs the ethical within the graphic, making an ethics of reading
and of writing possible.44
And yet the commitment is also epistemological, since it offers a personal investment, in the
form of a speaking subject's point of view. Derrida provides an illustration of this,
appropriately enough in his essay 'The Ends ofMan';
Let me be permitted to speak in my own name here [...] When I was invited to this
meeting, my hesitation could end only when I was assured that I could bear witness
here, now, to my agreement, and to a certain point my solidarity with those, in this
country, who were fighting against what was then their country's official policy in
certain parts of the world, notably in Vietnam.45
41 For a history of the term autography, see H. Porter Abbott, 'Autobiography, Autography, Fiction: Groundwork for a Taxonomy of
Textual Categories', New Literary History, 19:3 (1988), 597-615 (p. 615).
42 See Jacques Derrida, 'Signature Event Context', in Margins ofPhilosophy, trans, by Alan Bass (Sussex: Flarvester Press, 1982),
pp. 307-330.
43 See Jacques Derrida, 'Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name', trans, by Avital Ronell, in
The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, ed. by Christie V. McDonald (New York: Schocken Books,
1985), ppi 1-38 (esp. pp. 14-15).
44 Sean Burke, 'The Ethics of Signature', in Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern, a Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1995), pp. 285-291 (p. 290).
43
Jacques Derrida, 'The Ends ofMan', in Margins ofPhilosophy, pp. 109-136 (p. 113).
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As a remark offered during the course of the lecture in New York in October 1968, this works
as an admirable defence of academic freedom of speech, and a significant rejoinder to those
who argue that deconstruction is apolitical and uncommitted. Yet the remark also has a
significance as part of a published article, written by someone who wishes to 'bear witness
here, now' to a position defined in terms of support for the position of some readers. Derrida
commits himself primarily to 'my agreement' with anti-government protesters, and thus
inscribes himself as a political intertext, in the midst of this article on 'The Ends ofMan', an
essay which is only written because it was possible to include this bearing witness, this
'speak[ing] in my own name'.
This autographical moment in Derrida's text demonstrates the principle defended by my notion
of the autograph; offering one's self in a text as a commitment to a position with which readers
may, if they wish, and for as long as they wish, identify. The interesting questions about
Derrida's remark are not the sort that ask "would the historical figure Jacques Derrida really
have refused to give this lecture if he hadn't been allowed to offer support for US peace
movements?" or "was there really a danger that Derrida would have been prevented from
saying such things?", but rather the sort that asks "how do the additional texts - historical,
political, and autographical - introduced here contribute to our reading of this article?".46 It is
in this way that the genre of autography avoids the trap of logocentrism. I suggest that an
awareness - without paranoia - of the trap posed by the myth of the metaphysics of presence
facilitates a break away from the naive conception of writing of the self as a mere report.
Moreover, once it is accepted that ideas are always already mediated, autography as a form
which admits its own position and perspective, and crucially, makes no ontological claims
about what is really 'here' and 'now', can operate as a highly sophisticated presentation of
46 This is not to deny that I might be interested to know the answers to the former types of question, just as I might want to know what
kind of shirts the speakers on the panel wore.
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ideas concerning the story of the self, allowing me to speak in my own name, and thus offer
information from my perspective about my perspective.
2. AUTOGRAPHICAL SITUATIONS
One of de Man's criticisms of the genre is the individuality of the texts which are labelled
autobiographical. He says;
[e]mpirically as well as theoretically, autobiography lends itself poorly to generic
definition; each specific instance seems to be an exception to the norm, (de Man,
'Autobiography', p. 920)
In the terms of my analysis, the fact that these texts differ should come as no surprise, since
they each constitute the attempt of a different self to describe he/rself. De Man's suggestion
comes down to the idea that difference - of selves - makes the genre impossible to characterize.
In fact I suggest that the opposite is the case; it is precisely the diversity of selves which is
elemental for the genre. Far from undermining the norm, difference may be said to usefully
pick out a significant feature of the intertextuality of autography. At the same time, the
diversity of selves makes possible the philosophical contributions of autography.
Because the autography is essentially a first person narrative, it represents and purports to
represent only one voice. As such, autographies make no immediate claims to the general or
the universal, but rather emphasize the direct relationship which the text has with one person.
This is, then, a committed intertext, trusted by the reader and invested in by the author. The
notion of the commitment of autography, grafted on to a distrust of phallogocentric narratives,
suggests that the most truthful way to tell the self is to offer it as a story.
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Donna Haraway has presented convincing arguments for the power of 'situated knowledge[s]\
which are accountable and responsible in a way which distinguishes them from purportedly
omniscient positions.47 In an argument which recalls Russell's demand that philosophers strive
to see 'as God sees' as a paradigm instance of this position, Haraway rejects claims of
theoretical omniscience as 'an illusion, a god trick' (p. 582). Instead she promotes the idea of
pictures of the world [which] should not be allegories of infinite mobility and
interchangeability, but of elaborate specificity and difference, (p. 583)
Yet Haraway's article left me wondering what it would mean to present a situated knowledge.
Since relativism is dismissed (p. 584), it is clearly not simply a case of adding the qualifier "it
is true for me that..." to knowledge items. A possible answer comes in the text at an
autographical moment when Haraway writes of how the problem came to her;
These are lessons that I learned in part walking with my dogs and wondering how the
world looks without a fovea and very few retinal cells for color vision but with a huge
neural processing and sensory area for smells, (p. 583)
This sentence, and the possibility of its serving as demonstrative of the ideas presented in the
article, suggests a way in which knowledge may be embodied. Autography, I would suggest,
counts as a paradigm example of a situated knowledge, which is responsible and embodied.
Again, autography may be thought of as committed writing.
The notion of a situated and particular voice has philosophical significance, because it offers a
unique reading and voicing of oneself. Yet there is a danger here. Sartre for example suggests
that all writing contains the body of the writer in this way, and that this serves to separate the
writer from the significance of his art. When a writer reads he/r own work, Sartre laments that
the writer meets everywhere only his knowledge, his will, his plans, in short, himself
[...] If he re-reads himself, it is already too late.48
47 Donna J. Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question In Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist
Studies, 14:3 (1988), 575-599 (p. 575). Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
48 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Why Write?' in What Is Literature?, trans, by Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen & Co., 1950), pp. 26-48
(p. 29, author's italics).
For Sartre, writing represents a double sacrifice on behalf of the author, whose self is given
over to a text which he cannot read. In this way literary writing is seen as crucially
disembodied; as an escape from responsibility, where inscriptions of selfhood in texts can be
noted - albeit traumatically - only by the author. Sartre's grammar shows how this escape
from responsibility allows its author to ignore the notion that other readers might be different
from him. The emphatic male pronouns reveal the extent to which a masculinist perspective
views the subjectivity of a text as restrictive, whilst at the same time excluding female subjects.
Sartre inscribes himself into this writing on how an author cannot read a text he has written,
and yet insists that this writing is not part of him; that here he is speaking for all authors.
I have shown how Descartes' pretensions to universality paradoxically leads to exclusivity.
Sartre's comments also enact a related paradox in connection with the myth of textual self
presence. The graphic embodiment which he describes invokes this myth in the context of a
claim to universality. The result is aporetic; an assertion of self become text, and a
simultaneous denial of self; a refusal to take responsibility. Sartre, here, provides an
illustration of (and argument for) de Man's thesis that the notion of autobiography as a genre
ought to be abandoned.
I want to distinguish this from the stance which I take on autographies, which is closer to the
kind of writing described by Adrienne Rich here;
it's also possible to abstract "the" body. When I write "the body, " I see nothing in
particular. To write "my body" plunges me into lived experience, particularity [...] To
say "the body" lifts me away from what has given me a primary perspective. To say
"my body" reduces the temptation to grandiose assertions.49
Sartre's remarks fall into the category of "the body", and as such are a source of lamentation,
not only for he who writes the body, but also for those who have that writing's universalism
w
Adrienne Rich, 'Notes Towards a Politics of Location', in Blood Bread and Poetry: Selected Essays 1979-1985 (London:
Virago, 1987), pp. 210-231 (p. 215).
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thrust upon them. Feminism's incitement to read as I construe it in this chapter will instead
value the autographical text as the assertion of "my body". Because it constitutes the site
where the autographical act is performed, the text represents the specific individual who writes,
whose being is enacted and created with the words on the page. This element of creation is a
crucial aspect of autography, since, as Rich points out, lived experience is not simply reported;
rather it is the act of writing in a particular way which 'plunges' me into self representation.
For women writers to place themselves at the forefront of their texts, for them to write
autographies, is a feminist philosophical act, where they take up the opportunity to take control
of themselves, their lives and their bodies communicated through and as texts. Autography,
then, is an empowering medium; rather than restricting authors whose texts are placed within
the genre, it allows them to assert and crucially, confront themselves on the page. Unlike
Sartre, they must take responsibility for the self which is read in an autography as an intertext.
3. THE ROLE OF THE READER
The reader plays a significant role not only for my understanding of autography, but also for
my purpose of showing how it is that literature may be philosophical. This aspect of my
argument is best expressed through a suggestion of what may happen when an autography is
read.
It is part of my understanding of autography that the reader recognizes he/r self in the text.
This may be contrasted with the assumed detachment of much twentieth-century criticism.
Frances Murphy Zauhar, for example, says that
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[m]ainstream Literary Criticism has [...] reinforced the convention that the "good"
reader remains detached from the reading, unaffected.'0
Thus the reader, like the author, is not to let he/rself get too close to the text. In other words,
contemporary literary criticism retains an obsession with interpretation which is objective and
impersonal. On this view, any attempt to understand one's self in a literary text seems faintly
ridiculous. Yet this is what I want to suggest that the reader of autography may do. The
autographical text, through its dramatization of a self, offers a connective potential to the
reader; there are spaces in the text within which the reader is invited to inscribe he/r self. If
this process works, if the text succeeds in connecting, the reader reads he/r self there.
Paraphrasing Rich, to read "my body" plunges me into lived experience, and particularity. In
this way autography calls into question the way in which reading is understood, and enacts the
learning which I propose may happen in the course of that reading process.
I argued to the effect that the author was necessarily a character in he/r autography, and
suggest now that the reader is also a character involved in an autography. The self invention
which occurs in autography is enacted as much by the reader as it is by the author. Reading an
autography involves a mutual projection of discursive experience. This means that both
characters have their basis in empirical reality. However, this is not to say that either may be
supposed to have existed in the way in which they are presented or understood. The notion of
projection makes this clear, since it emphasizes the fact that both the reader and the author are
constructions from the text, constructions effected by the text. So autography describes a
communication process between two characters, the reader and the author, as intertexts, and
through an intertext which may thus be described as autographical. As a result, the character
of the autographical subject, for example, may be regarded as coming into being upon each
reading of the text, and the reader may learn new things about he/rself at each reading moment.
Frances Murphy Zauhar, 'Creative Voices: Women Reading and Women's Writing', in The Intimate Critique: Autobiographical
Literary Criticism, ed. by Diane P. Freedman, Olivia Frey and Frances Murphy Zauhar (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1993), pp. 103-116 (p. 106).
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This learning is characterized by Jane Marcus as a way in which the reader of autography
'participates, re/signing herself from the author's signature'.51 Again, this can be seen as a
way in which the commitment signalled by the autograph is not an imposition upon, but rather
an invitation to the reader. For my purposes, this captures the force of the philosophical
implications of autography, since it indicates the development of the notion of argument which
occurs as a generic effect. Part of the success of an argument about subject positions depends
upon the way in which it is read, which thus becomes part of the argument.
In other words, it is as a result of the fact that autographies present themselves as the story of
an individual that they require the reader's active application of he/r experience to that
projected from the text. In this sense autographies may fulfil and demonstrate my requirement
of philosophy as an incitement to read, here reading of oneself in a text. This activity of the
reader has a political aspect because it rejects the notion that the reader passively accepts
writings with which s/he is confronted. At the same time the incitement to read of autography
is fundamentally inclusive, because the involvement of the reader as intertext is part of the
philosophical argument of the genre.
In this way autographies are offered a philosophical significance not in spite of but because of
their generic description. It is a significance which figures as a response to the problem of the
philosopher's failure to engage themselves and their readers as subjects. In the next section, I
will demonstrate these points in relation to Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar and Jeanette
Winterson's Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (hereafter, Oranges).
51 Jane Marcus, 'Invincible Mediocrity: The Private Selves of Public Women', in The Private Self, ed. by Shari Benstock, pp. 114-
146 (p. 116).
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C. Feminist Philosophical Autographs
Understanding this self in the text as philosophical expression offers a starting point for an
examination of the genre's significance as both feminist and philosophical. I will now proceed
to examine the two novels I have chosen as representative of the genre in terms of certain
philosophical questions concerning the subject, described with the aid of metaphors
traditionally associated with the theme of self knowledge; sight, voice, and mind. These are
two texts whose autobiographical status is frequently called into question, or qualified as semi-
autobiographical. I regard them as paradigm examples of autography as I have described it.
In addition, I will argue that The Bell Jar contributes a narrative response to Gusdorf's theory
of philosophical autobiography, by exposing the problems Esther faces when she attempts to
construct herself in the way she thinks tradition demands that she should.
1. (EN)VISIONING THE SUBJECT
Perception is often regarded by philosophers as the first thing to be demonstrated to new
students that knowledge is not.52 In addition, some feminist philosophers have argued that
visual metaphors in philosophy are irredeemably phallocentric.53 And yet I have already hinted
at the significance of vision for a specifically feminist motivated, situated knowledge. This is a
proposal apparent in both The Bell Jar and Oranges. I would like to begin this analysis,
therefore, by examining the role of the particular perceptual faculty of sight, in self knowledge,
as presented in the two novels under consideration.
52 In this they follow the classical example of Plato's Theaetetus, which will be discussed at length in Chapter Four.
53 See Evelyn Fox Keller and Christine R. Brontkowski, 'The Mind's Eye', in Feminism and Science, ed. by Evelyn Fox Keller and
Helen Longino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 187-202.
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Near the beginning of The Bell Jar, Plath's protagonist, Esther, signals the importance of sight
to her learning, by confessing to a penchant for voyeurism. She says;
I liked looking on at other people in crucial situations. If there was a road accident or
a street fight or a baby pickled in a laboratory jar for me to look at, I'd stop and look so
hard I never forgot it.
I certainly learned a lot of things I never would have learned otherwise this way, and
even when they surprised me or made me sick I never let on, but pretended that's the
way I knew things were all the time.54
Esther presents herself here in opposition to 'other people', from whose pain she can derive
pleasure. This much is consistent with Gusdorf and Olney's requirement that writers of
autobiography posit themselves as separate from, and even in opposition to, the rest of the
world. But the llik[ing]' of the first line quickly becomes a repression of negative reactions.
As a result, her witnessing of events is self-consciously passive; she has striven to have no
response to others' sufferings. And this is presented as the way in which she learns; this is how
Esther finds out how 'things were'.
Winterson's protagonist in Oranges is established from the beginning as the object rather than
the subject, of vision. Jeanette's mother takes Pastor Finch's advice - 'Parents, watch your
children' - very seriously.55 Jeanette shares a bedroom with her parents, and finds that the
outside lavatory is 'the only place to go' (p. 16) to get away from her mother's gaze. As a
child, Jeanette is not to be trusted out of the sight of those who would act as her guardians, who
will tell her all they think she needs to know about "how things are".
I suggest that the protagonists of these autographical novels learn from looking at themselves, a
process which will involve converting, in Esther's case, sado-masochistic voyeurism, and in
Jeanette's case, passive objectification, into self knowledge. The first move will present the
painful process of switching around the gaze. In both novels readers are made aware of the
54
Sylvia Plath, The Bell Jar (London: Faber and Faber, 1985), pp. 13-14. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
3:1 Jeanette Winterson, Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (London: Vintage, 1991), p. 12. Subsequent page references will be given in
the text.
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difficulties faced by both protagonists in their initial attempts to observe themselves. I will deal
with this in reference to the image of mirrors, that place which purports to offer the opportunity
to see ourselves as other see us.
It is a generic commonplace to remark that the autographical text shows a mirror to the self. In
this mirror, as in all mirrors, I seem to see myself as others see me, and myself as I see others.
I am doubled, and this doubling involves alienation - "that can't be me!" - but also gratification
and confirmation - "It is me!". The doubling also facilitates doubting -1 can misidentify
myself in a mirror. My "I" can fail to refer in a mirror. This is interesting because it is
generally supposed that use of the first person pronoun is immune to reference failure.56 This
means that even if I make a mistake, for example if I say "I am a courgette", I still refer to
myself. Yet for the purposes of the collaboration between author and reader which constitutes
the fictional act, I may use the word "I" and not refer to myself. Wittgenstein and others see
the image of a mirror as introducing a problem whereby use of the first person pronoun may
not be accounted for in terms of immunity to reference failure.57 But the position of the author
of autography adds a new dimension to this image. Since the mirror of the autography is one
ofmy own construction, I am in control of this reference failure. And the notion of voluntary
reference failure, newly possible in autography, introduces the paradoxical possibility of self
discovery through an escape from the self.
I will try to demonstrate my point in relation to The Bell Jar.5i Sylvia Plath uses specific
imagery to tackle the philosophical problems connected with the self. In The Bell Jar, the
image of the mirror is a philosophical device used to throw a different light upon the self. It
76 See for example P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay In Prescriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1964).
57 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies For the "Philosophical Investigations" (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1958), p. 67.
58
Many critics in recent years have objected to autobiographical criticism being applied to The Bell Jar. See for example Sheryl L.
Meyering, 'Review of The Bell Jar - A Novel of the Fifties by Linda Wagner-Martin', American Literature, 65:2 (1993), 381-382.
However, I am using this term not as an accusation, but rather as a self-conscious generic description. My seeing the text as
autobiographical fiction has no bearing on my evaluation of the novel per se, nor does it entail any ontological claims about the real
life experiences of Plath at the time of the events in her life which correspond to the events in the text.
99
plays a part in the process of self discovery. It is initially employed to figure a separation of
the protagonist not from other people, but from herself; an attempt on Esther's part to see
herself as others see her, and as she sees others; not as subject, but as object. So, for example,
when the doors of the lift in the Amazon Hotel close on her at the end of an evening, she
noticed a big, smudgy-eyed Chinese woman staring idiotically into my face. It was
only me, of course, (p. 19)
The urge to distinction and separation from others has led to a further separation from herself
as an object in the world. The invocation of race, in terms of a vision of herself which Esther
rejects, recalls Gusdorf's cultural exclusion. In order to see herself in this autography, Esther
must reject all aspects of otherness. So here, she is repulsed by this appearance, and cannot
bring herself to identify with the body which she sees. The split which she experiences is not
one between herself and the rest of the world, but rather one between herself as subject and
herself as object. The protagonist is not failing to see herself as subject; she is something to
whom a face belongs. Neither is she failing to see herself as object. She is, however, failing to
see these aspects as one. Here readers are confronted with a dramatization of the inadequacy
of Gusdorf s theory of autobiography as a simple presentation of a unified self.
It is this alienation from her own appearance which is to be the first step in Esther's process of
self discovery. On realizing that 'it was me, of course', Esther attempts to convince herself,
through the reader, that this subject, which can speak of 'my face', and this object, which looks
like a 'big, smudgy-eyed Chinese woman', are one. In traditional philosophical terms, Esther
might be said to be experiencing a dualistic crisis. Once outside the elevator, she is moved to
remark that 'There wasn't a soul in the hall' (p. 19). No soul, just this body which Esther fails
to recognize as her own. Confirmation of this failure comes a few pages later, with the partial
echo 'There was nobody in the hall' (p. 24). Esther is trying to learn about herself as she
learns about other people, but discovers her insight into her self is different. Her attempt to
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count her self among the items in the world results in her losing sight of herself. Yet 'of
course', intellectually she knows that this person in the mirror must be her.
At this point of crisis, the only thing for Esther to hold on to is the incarnation of herself which
is this autography; this telling of her story. This is what enables her to remind herself of
herself - in the context of her telling of her story to us. To confide in the reader that '[i]t was
me of course' is to reinstate herself as the subject of the story; for us, object of the story. She
is convincing herself that she is, and in doing this, she becomes. Throughout this work, readers
will find themselves reading of Esther's trauma, whilst holding in their hands the light at the
end of the tunnel; the autographical proof that the protagonist will live to write another day.
Such a reading is only made possible by the integrity of the tale. It is in this sense that The
Bell Jar breaks free of Gusdorf's limits and conditions for autobiographical writing; and also
that Esther's character defies de Man's conception of the genre; for it is the attempt to conform
to the restrictive tradition which causes problems of identity, and the writing of her self which
will overcome this problem.
First, however, Esther persists in the investigation into her mirror image, where the
objectification process goes too far. She goes back to another mirror, only to find that things
have grown worse;
The mirror over my bureau seemed slightly warped and much too silver. The face in it
looked like the reflection in a ball of dentist's mercury, (p. 20)
Here the conditions of reflection are focused upon, and objectification is complete. However,
for Esther, seeing oneself as an item in the world is now a negative pursuit; it has made her
unrecognizable. It spurs her on to search for herself as subject, by having a bath, since 'I never
feel so much myself as when I'm in a hot bath'. Here she can 'meditate' (p. 21), allowing the
collection of experiences which made her look like the face in the mirror to dissolve. It is as if
finding the self requires the letting go of the layers of actions which have come to define her.
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She wants to see herself and be seen independently of these things. After this process, she 'felt
pure and sweet as a new baby' (p. 22). From here she can begin her experiences, and thus her
self identification, afresh.
Later in the novel Esther speaks explicitly of the belief that experiences etch themselves on the
body of the subject, again in terms of the mirror image. She begins by offering an analysis of
binary categories of the kind of people there are, 'Catholics and Protestants or Republicans and
Democrats or white men and black men or even men and women' (p. 85). As Esther comes to
see herself as one of these people, and thus having to opt for one side or the other, she rejects
this picture in favour of a developmental one, where people are defined by what they take from
the experiences they have had. So, speculating on her hoped for loss of virginity to Constantin,
the simultaneous translator, she refers to the imagined effects of her long dreamt of trip to
Europe;
I thought [...] I'd come home, and if I looked closely into the mirror I'd be able to
make out a little white Alp at the back of my eye. Now I thought that if I looked into
the mirror tomorrow I'd see a doll-size Constantin sitting in my eye and smiling out at
me. (pp. 85-86)
Convinced that critical events will add themselves onto her being, will mark her as having
something that she was previously without, Esther cites the place she expects to see these
symbols in her eyes, as if nothing that happens after she has been marked by foreign travel or
having sex, will ever look the same again.
The idea of the subject in process is emphasized by the reflective tone of the passage, which
presents the notion as one which she 'thought' at that moment in her life. In this way the text
allows for a shifting of understanding as to how the self is developmentally constructed, at the
same time as it stresses the significance of where the knowledge comes from.
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This is to be contrasted with another earlier conception, this time of learning as acquisition,
where knowledge is presented as something which has been 'collected' (p. 53). Instead of this
simplistic conception, Esther has now begun to involve herself in the game of learning, such
that she regards herself as having been visibly affected by the things which she finds out, in
ways which will influence her subsequent experience.
Where in The Bell Jar, readers are presented with an adult going through the process of self
discovery, in Oranges the protagonist tells of her childhood and adolescent search for her self.
The character Jeanette, unlike Esther, does not choose the mirror as an introspective tool. Her
mirror is forced upon her. Her mirror is her mother.
The Jeanette at the beginning of the novel is her mother's creation. In a curious echo of
Frankenstein, it is conscious effort on the part of her mother which has brought her to where,
when, who she is;
My mother [...] dreamed a dream and sustained it in daylight. She would get a child,
train it, build it, dedicate it to the Lord. (p. 10)
Jeanette is to become what her mother failed to be; a missionary. This mirror, then, is double
sided, with Jeanette urged to follow an example of forthrighteousness and piety set by her
mother, and her mother seeing a life develop as she would have wished hers to progress. Her
mother wants to live again, and is doing so through Jeanette; Jeanette will leam from her
mother's life.
The 'Genesis' of the first chapter is the story of the creation; Jeanette is a self created; defined
by her adoptive mother as her own 'vision' (p. 10). The mirror, far from being an introspective
strategy, has absolute control. When I am placed in front of a mirror, I cannot escape from my
image. At the beginning of Jeanette's story, her dependence on the mother mirror is so great
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that when the mirror refuses to respond, the subject might as well give up; 'she [...] ignored me
for so long that I went back to bed' (p. 16).
The example which Jeanette's mother strives to be to her daughter affects everything they see.
When evil is in danger of invading their house, in the form of a radio programme about snails,
Jeanette's mother is horrified that her daughter might be about to experience something which
does not fall under her control;
My mother shrieked.
"Did you hear that?" she demanded [...] "The family life of snails, it's an
Abomination, it's like saying we come from monkeys." (p. 21)
The question urged by Jeanette's mother refers not only to whether or not Jeanette heard the
announcement of the offending programme, but also to whether or not she understood correctly
the significance of the utterance. In case the child did not hear the correct interpretation, in
case she did not hear 'that [...] it's like saying we come from monkeys', her mother
immediately supplies the way in which she has seen the programme, and the way in which she
expects and requires Jeanette to see it. When Jeanette rejects her mother's interpretation,
insisting that ' "it's not like that at all" ', her mother returns to her role as exemplary mirror,
ensuring that Jeanette watches her as she 'fixed her gaze on the picture of the Lord hung about
the oven' (p.22).
The fear of losing control is crucial at this point in the story, because this incident occurs on
the night before Jeanette has to start school, a place her mother has kept her from for as long as
possible because of her view of it as a 'Breeding Ground' (p. 16). Despite her mother's using
this phrase as a warning, for Jeanette it signifies excitement and mystery, and this independent
interpretation seems to promise a place where Jeanette will learn to be something other than the
vision of her mother. And yet this does not happen; the forced identification has been so strong
and effective than Jeanette sees no other way of being at school than of the image she has been
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given; a missionary. After threatening the other primary school children with stories of hell
and damnation, she is isolated and lonely, and becomes confirmed in her role;
It was obvious where I belonged. Ten more years and I could go to missionary school.
(p. 42)
The separation from others becomes part of her identity, one which she shares with her mother;
My mother didn't have many friends either. People didn't understand the way she
thought; neither did I, but I loved her because she always knew exactly why things
happened, (p. 42)
Although Jeanette still fails to see things in precisely the way in which her mother sees them,
she trusts her mother's vision, and is prepared to adopt it as her own. In this way her identity
is totally inscribed on her mother's terms, through her mother's eyes.
Jeanette's struggle to understand the kind of subject position she occupies clearly differs from
Esther's, because where Esther seeks harmony between her understanding of herself as subject
and her understanding of herself as object, Jeanette seeks self knowledge through identification
with her mother's vision of her. Esther strives to objectify herself in order to better see the kind
of thing that she is, and she does this by focusing on the conditions of perception. Jeanette
seeks herself as subject in the identity that her mother has created as an alternative future for
her (the mother's) self, and she does this by focusing on that identity, and making it her own.
Yet when Jeanette does succeed in acquiring her own vision; when she does manage to see for
herself, it will be neither on nor in her mother's terms. She notices activity on the margins, to
which her mother is oblivious. This is conveyed comically in the early scene at church, where
Pastor Finch's sermonizing on the spiritual weakness of women and children is accompanied
by table thumping so emphatic that it
catapulted a cheese sandwich into the collection bag; I saw it happen, but I was so
distracted I forgot to tell anyone. They found it in there the week after, (pp. 11-12)
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Jeanette is capable of seeing beyond the blinkers which her mother has placed upon her. This
is emphasized further when Jeanette, having been warned about 'Unnatural Passions' (p. 16),
sees Melanie, who will become her first lover, working on a fish stall in the market;
Week after week I went back there, just to watch.
Then one week she wasn't there any more.
There was nothing I could do but stare and stare at the whelks, (p. 80)
Melanie begins to attend church services, and in this sense to see the world as Jeanette and her
mother see it. Yet it is through her relationship with Melanie that Jeanette will come to realize
that she does not share her mother's vision. After the illicit affair is discovered, Jeanette
purged and Melanie sent away, she begins to think about remarks her mother makes which she
used to accept without question;
now I wasn't so easy [...] I used to imagine we saw things the same, but all the time we
were on different planets, (p. 112)
This remark reveals that an awareness of the difference of vision has changed her as a person,
specifically has made her more difficult. This recognition allows Jeanette to open her eyes even
more. Jeanette's considerations of other possibilities in the novel may be represented by her
watching another family through their sitting-room window (p. 131). The recognition that
there are other ways of living enables Jeanette to choose her own vision, a world away from
that of her mother's.
The independence of vision is stressed here, and the escape from her mother's way of seeing
and thus knowing enables Jeanette to attain a freedom of identity. Yet Jeanette has difficulty
understanding the differences of others visions. When she meets Melanie, some years after
their relationship is over, Jeanette is horrified at Melanie's inability to see her lover in the way
she had when they were close;
she seemed to have forgotten everything. It made me want to [...] pull off all my
clothes in the middle of the street and yell, "Remember this body?", (p. 166)
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In this way Jeanette's understanding of herself, coming about through an expansion of vision,
is contrasted with Melanie's closing off possibilities of vision, in order to make sense of her
self. But it is not merely a case of Melanie having chosen a different way of seeing the past. In
fact, Melanie's renouncing her experience with Jeanette is shown to rob her of her personhood.
When Jeanette accidentally meets Melanie, years after their affair, she sees her as non-human,
first animal (p. 121), then worse; ' [I]f she had been serene to the point of bovine before, she
was now almost vegetable' (p. 166).
Melanie's lack of personhood may be related to the fact that where Jeanette has freed herself
from the illusion of the mirror as a way of seeing herself, and acknowledged her own role in
constructing herself through life choices, Melanie thinks that she sees things just as they are,
and mocks other possibilities;
she laughed and said that we probably saw what had happened very differently
anyway...She laughed again, and said that the way I saw it would make a good story,
her vision was just the history, the nothing-at-all facts, (p. 166)
Jeanette's "finding" herself, then, involves not only rejecting the mirror example and gaze of
her mother which has been foisted upon her, but also rejecting the principle of mirror visions as
illusory. The significance of Jeanette's ability to 'make a good story' is one which I will
explore in due course.
The mirror image, then, plays an important part in each of the protagonists' explorations of self
knowledge, and their attempts to find a subject position for themselves. Moreover, it reveals a
potential in fiction for complexity with regard to this familiar image. The self examination it
offers proves to be, for both Esther and Jeanette, enlightening not for any answers that it might
provide, but rather for the way in which subjects can come to see themselves independently of
an image which has been constructed of themselves. The traditional deployment of the mirror
as an image which allows philosophers to ask "what if..." is not as helpful, because it ignores
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ways in which the recognitions of and identifications with mirror images themselves affect our
self knowledge. It is in this sense that philosophers lack the commitment of autographical
writers. Autography, by combining commitment and specificity, employs the mirror image in a
way which naturalizes its implications, but does not attempt to say that this is how it must be
for everyone.
2. LISTENING TO THE SUBJECT
Language has been thought to be a definitive human trait. Along with rationality, it is what
differentiates us from other species. Part of what it is to be a person is to be able to use
language, and Popper and Eccles even suggest that 'only a human being capable of speech can
reflect upon himself ,59 Indeed, defenders of the genre of autobiography often emphasize the
importance of language in self description. For example, autobiographical theorist Elizabeth
Bmss has made interesting use of the philosophy of language, particularly Searle's notion of
speech acts, to argue that the autobiographical act is fundamentally discursive.60 Paul John
Eakin similarly relates autobiographies to essentialist notions of a philosophy of speech by
asserting that 'autobiographical discourse seems to be integral to personality', and even that in
certain cases 'the autobiographical act functions symbolically as a second acquisition of
language'.61 Sidonie Smith also invokes a notion of 'talking back' to describe women writers
of autobiography.62 So one way in which philosophy has been applied, both explicitly and
implicitly, to the theory of autobiography concerns the philosophy of language. Yet there is a
risk of limitation here, in three specific senses.
59 Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 144.
60 Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation ofa Literary Genre (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
University Press, 1976)
61 Paul John Eakin, Fictions In Autobiography: Studies In the Art ofSelf-Invention (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1985), pp. 236-237.
bl See Sidonie Smith, 'Who's Talking/ Who's Talking Back?: The Subject of Personal Narrative', Signs: Journal ofWomen in
Culture and Society, 18:2 (1993), 392-407.
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Firstly, the essentialist argument here may be reformulated to suggest that people are
recognized and valued on the basis of their ability to be heard, problematically for women,
who, in a patriarchal society, are assigned a role of silence. Smith's notion of talking back
assigns to women an aberrant position which only makes sense as a response to patriarchal
discourse. Secondly, to adopt a tradition which conceives the writing subject as the speaker
and the reader as the hearer is to discount my arguments concerning the active reader. Thirdly,
the application of speech act theory in particular to autographical texts suggests that these texts
bring together speech and writing in presence, thus instigating the eternal return to the
metaphysics of presence. The attempt to resurrect the myth of the metaphysics of presence in
order to claim philosophical status for a literary genre is doubly mistaken, for not only is the
myth philosophically flawed, but the valuing of writing as literature itself demonstrates this
flaw.
In order to overcome such a system of limitation, this overly simple model may be rejected in
favour of the incitement to read of feminist philosophical novels. I claim for autography a
radical space which represents the self in modes of communication other than speaking. In the
two autographical texts I have chosen, the idea of the self is sought and indicated in a wider
sense of communication, which includes symbols of artificial communication, and the operation
of the discourse of silence. These are ways of communicating with, not only the world, but
also oneself.
In The Bell Jar, the success or failure of Esther to communicate with other people has been
analysed at length. It has been argued that Esther's failure to connect, or have any meaningful
relationship on any level with any other character in the book comes about as a result of her
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active submission to the role traditionally ascribed to women in patriarchy.63 It is true that
Esther experiences increasing alienation from the other characters in her life, and that this is
something which she often orchestrates. Yet I propose that this happens as a result of her
attempts to conform to the traditional pattern of autobiographical writing. Often her distancing
serves paradoxically as an attempt to get closer to others. She finds that the methods which
others use to connect do not work for her at all. An example of this occurs when she visits
Buddy's room. He has attempted a connection by suggesting that they examine each other
naked. Esther, however, likens this to the humiliation of having the 'Posture Picture' taken for
college files. Instead she
began to comb my hair down over my face so Buddy couldn't see it. Suddenly I said,
"Have you ever had an affair with anyone, Buddy?", (pp. 71-2)
Since revealing her body has not appealed as a way to connect, she will try hiding it. This
enables her to ask intimate questions in a new attempt to get closer to Buddy. Unfortunately,
this also leads her to discover Buddy's hypocritical nature; she has connected, only to find that
it is a connection she does not want. I have already suggested that a major part of Esther's
melancholy arises from her failure to connect not with other people, but with herself. And I
feel that when she does fail to connect with others, this is due to her own loss of a sense of self.
In Esther's case, the self and other distinction is blurred as a result of her alienation from her
own, particularly physical, self. As I have indicated, Esther repeatedly speaks of her mirror
image as if it were other. Similarly, by combing her hair over her face, Esther tries to confront
herself in isolation, and finds herself increasingly alienated from her own body. This alienation
is also imaginatively presented in terms of the artificiality of communication.
An important example is the use of the telephone, particularly in chapter ten. Telephoning to
cancel her summer housesharing arrangements, Esther notes that '[m]y voice sounded strange
and hollow in my ears' (p. 124). From here on in, the voice is not part of her. Conversations
63 See for example Diane S. Bonds, 'The Separative Self In Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar', Women's Studies, 18:1 (1990), 49-63.
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are reported in the third person, where 'the hollow voice' speaks (p. 124), and Esther listens to
'the zombie voice leave a message' (p. 125). In colloquial terms, Esther has moved into
autopilot, resisting any personal involvement with the outside world, including her active self.
This trope might be seen as a technique for survival. The autopilot metaphor is useful here,
since it implies a self-conscious and temporary shift to a specific type of coping mechanism,
which is expected to be discarded in the near future. And in the near future, as the reader is
aware, Esther will be able to write this autography, taking control by naming her pain.
In this section, Esther envisages parts of herself from which she is alienated as external from
herself, in order to understand herself better. A similar process happens in Oranges, where
Jeanette, in experiencing a crisis of identity, sees an orange demon. The church hierarchy has
warned Jeanette that she has fallen prey to "Unnatural Passions" as a result of being possessed
by demons. Jeanette begins to think this through;
I knew that demons entered wherever there was weak point. If I had a demon my weak
point was Melanie, but she was beautiful and good and had loved me.
Can love really belong to the demon? (pp. 105-6)
This blurring of the line between what counts as good and what bad is confusing, but Jeanette
is able to make her own judgement upon that which the church are trying to destroy;
If they want to get at my demon they'll have to get at me [...]
If I let them take away my demons, I'll have to give up what I've found, (p. 106)
Here Jeanette moves directly from an assertion of her sexuality as part of herself, to a
recognition of her own power to keep or give up that part of herself. As Jeanette begins to
acknowledge and support her demon, it literally appears, asking to be understood as a
'different, and difficult' part of her (p. 106). They then have a discussion with regard to her
options as to whether or not she should be exorcised of this difference and difficulty. This may
be understood as a particularly poignant case of Jeanette listening to herself, and
simultaneously, creating herself.
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The traditional conception of speech indicating personhood can only have a monolithic view of
silence, regarding it as self effacing and self denying.64 In both of the texts which I have
chosen to examine, silence is figured in a far more complex way.
Both Jeanette and Esther experience moments when they are isolated from the sounds of the
rest of the world. In Oranges, for example, Jeanette tells the story of how she once
went deaf for three months with my adenoids: [...] I was lying in bed one night,
thinking about the glory of the Lord, when it struck me that life had gone very quiet.
(p. 22)
The silence lasts for three months because Jeanette's oblivion is interpreted unreasonably as
religious piety. It shouldn't surprise us at this stage to learn that Jeanette and her mirror
mother respond in the same way;
I had assumed myself to be in a state of rapture, not uncommon in our church, and
later I discovered my mother had assumed the same. (p. 23)
The suggestion that Jeanette's symptoms are a common occurrence 'in our church' might be
seen as an attempt to present the assumption of Jeanette and her mirror mother as reasonable.
Yet the other church members seem surprised, concerned, and even, in the case of Miss
Jewsbury, horrified at the notion that Jeanette's temporary disability may be taken as the
Lord's work (p. 23; p. 25). Here Jeanette and her mother are sharing a narrow perspective,
and so emphasizing Jeanette's dependence on her mother. Because the story is told from the
point of view of Jeanette as she was then, the conviction of interpretation in her mother's vision
is presented, but the alternative view, of Miss Jewsbury and the others, is there for the reader to
pick up on. In other words, the reader is offered a freedom to understand both Jeanette and her
story independently and creatively.
The passive silence of the outside world is translated by Jeanette's mother into an active
conspiracy of silence towards her daughter. All communication is denied to her, as her mother
M See for example Eakin's examination of Maxine Hong Kingston's autobiography The Woman Warrior (Eakin, pp. 255-275).
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spreads the word that she is not to be spoken to in her 'state of rapture'. Now, not only is
Jeanette unable to speak for herself, even in her mother's voice, but also no one will even speak
to her. For Jeanette, silence is reflective, invoking once more the mirror image.
The silence experienced by Jeanette is described as most distressing at the time. Perhaps the
most distressing thing is that it shatters two illusions of Jeanette's life; firstly that her mother
has the answer to everything, and secondly that the church is a bedrock of certainty. Having
found these notions to be mistaken, Jeanette responds positively with the assertion that 'I had to
find out for myself (p. 24). The experience of silence then, enforces isolation, but it is an
isolation which enables Jeanette to look into and from herself for explanations, allowing her to
break free from the easy certainty within which she had been heretofore confined. Refusing
such certainty goes on to become the theme of Jeanette's self, demonstrated in a later scene
when her mother tries to prevent Jeanette from hearing something which she does not want her
to hear, by
rushing to put her hands over my ears.
"Get off," I yelled. [...]
I bit my mother's hand. "Let go ofmy ears, I can hear it too. (p. 52)
Jeanette is beginning to resist the way in which the world is selectively exposed to her through
her mother.
In contrast with Jeanette's extended period of sound deprivation, Esther's experience of silence
in The Bell Jar lasts only a moment. Yet it is also a crucial moment in the protagonist's search
for a subject position. The positioning of the moment itself seems significant, as it is placed
immediately after Esther's attempts to look at and for herself in the elevator mirror, and
immediately before her experience with the dressing table mirror. Sandwiched between these
two mirror moments, it appears as an alternative method of introspection, a specific case of
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listening to oneself. In her hotel room, Esther is 'furious' that 'they had the windows fixed so
you couldn't really open them and lean out'. Instead,
standing at the left side of the window and laying my cheek to the woodwork [...] 1
could see the moving red and white lights along the drive and the lights of the bridges
whose names I didn't know. (pp. 19-20)
Listening without hearing, watching without knowing, Esther begins to focus on these failures
as ones of her own making.
The silence depressed me. It wasn't the silence of silence. It was my own silence.
I knew perfectly well the cars were making a noise, and the people in them [...] were
making a noise, [...] but I couldn't hear a thing. The city hung in my window, flat as a
poster, glittering and blinking, but it might just as well not have been there at all, for
all the good it did me. (p. 20)
This is the effect of the bell jar, whose captive is aware of the goings on outside it, but can do
nothing to access it. This silence indicates Esther's lack of a social being, her failure to
connect with the world around her, as recommended by Gusdorf. And yet, the fact that this is
revealed in writing would also appear to be significant exception to such a failure. An
autography represents the ideal opportunity to speak of silence because it can offer two levels
of discourse. This is clearly demonstrated in The Bell Jar, where Esther finds herself unable to
enter some kinds of autographical discourse, yet is able to describe this inability to the reader;
the story continues to be told. There is discourse at the level of narration, and discourse which
may be described as being at the level of the text. In the first case, the reader is offered a
picture of how Esther felt at a point in the past. In the second, s/he is made aware of the
construction of this past brought about by the desire to tell it as a story. The simultaneous
presence of these two voices in The Bell Jar means that Esther can speak of silence, and of her
feelings about it; for example that it 'depressed' her. The use of the past tense here confirms
the momentary nature of the occasion, and so paradoxically indicates a future (or for the
narrator, present) moment when silence will be recognized as something positive.
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This silence, then, will become a way for Esther to understand her self. Jeanette's silence can
also work in this way. For example, after the visit from the orange demon, Jeanette makes the
decision to continue her life as a lesbian, and also to continue her membership of the
homophobic church in which she was brought up. The former must remain a silent part of her
life, in order that she may get what she wants from both. Indeed, for some time she negotiates
the balance quite successfully; as May says, '[sjhe's lost none of her gifts, has she?' (p. 112).
The important point here is that Jeanette makes the choice of strategic silence, which contrasts
with her earlier absolute silence which signified illness, and lack of control, and which had an
isolating effect. Now Jeanette is able to decide who to tell herself to, as for example at the end
of the novel when she returns to her hometown and realizes that Betty 'didn't know who I was,
and I didn't want to talk about it' (p. 164). Here the discourse of silence is not self effacing,
nor a simple marking of trauma to be overcome by the speaking subject. Rather it signifies a
stance adopted in order to achieve a desired subject position. It is a creative discursive strategy
of self knowledge.
3. THINKING (FOR) MYSELF
This section does not represent a return to the metaphysical atomism of the cogito, since Esther
has already progressed beyond dualistic thought in self definition, and Jeanette's story begins
with a definition of herself in someone else's terms. It does, however, represent an indication
that the content of my thoughts goes some way towards establishing the kind of subject position
which I occupy.
In the case of The Bell Jar, I will attempt to demonstrate this in connection with the topic of
last section, since I am interested in those moments where the text separates what the
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protagonist thinks from what she says she thinks. An interesting example occurs during the
Ladies Day dinner, when Betsy asks Esther why she did not appear at the day's event. Esther
tells her
"I wanted to go to the fur show, but Jay Cee called up and made me come into the
office." That wasn't quite true about wanting to go to the show, but I tried to convince
myself now that it was true. (p. 30)
Reeling back to the phone call from Jay Cee, Esther recalls her response, in order to give Betsy
a full account;
I said meekly, "I thought I was going to the fur show". Of course I hadn't thought any
such thing, but I couldn't figure out what else to say.
"I told her I thought I was going to the fur show," I said to Betsy. "But she told me to
come into the office [...]"
[...] I felt a bit awkward about the tears, but they were real enough, (p. 32)
The repetition of the phrase 'I thought I was going to the fur show' initially suggests some
continuation of the thoughts and motivations of the protagonist both during the telephone
conversation, and at dinner. That this continuum is a construct is clear from the three separate
meanings which the phrase includes here; one, as it is 'meekly' spoken to Jay Cee as a token
"something to say"; another, as told to Betsy, accompanied by tears, as a sincere wish negated
by Jay Cee's demand that she work instead; and yet another, as told to the reader. This final
option suggests the possibility that the knowledge of the switch which Esther is able to make
reveals her capacity to invent herself in the terms of the past, but according to the needs of the
present.
One way of defining oneself socially is in the process of naming. What I am called
distinguishes me as an individual, and makes myself and others aware of me as that individual.
There is interesting play on names in both of the given novels. As autography, neither texts
simply assume the name of the author. This is a warning sign from the beginning that nothing
will be quite straightforward or simple here. In The Bell Jar, the protagonist does not offer her
name in the narrative until page twelve, when, asked by a date, she replies,
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"My name's Elly Higginbottom," I said. [...] After that I felt safer. I didn't want
anything I said or did that night to be associated with me and my real name. (p. 12)
Her immediate confidence to the reader that this is not her real name serves to distinguish two
states. I have already indicated that there are two levels of discourse, one at narrative and one
at textual level. Here there are also two selves; a retrospective self and an active one. These
are also separated by time, in the sense that one is living the story, and the other is telling the
lived story.
When Esther writes her autography, Plath's autographical act is projected further, with the
author's decision that
My heroine would be myself, only in disguise. She would be called Elaine. Elaine. I
counted the letters on my fingers. There were six letters in Esther, too. It seemed a
lucky thing, (pp. 126-127)
This code of disguise might be seen as no coincidence, but rather a very carefully designed
connection. The close examination of the words of the novel reveal their importance for the
protagonist, but also leave the reader counting the letters in "Sylvia", and pondering further
connections.65
So much for Esther's name. But what of naming others? She says 'I collected men with
interesting names' (p. 53). This may represent her conscious attempt to manipulate men, if
only in her imagination. This attitude offers an insight into Esther's protectiveness of her own
name. Other people knowing your name gives them power over you; and ironically hands them
the opportunity to ignore your status as individual, and instead lump you together with others,
as an item to be amassed. It is also something which separates Esther's present self from her
past self. Collecting would seem to be an ongoing activity. Speaking of oneself having
'collected' in the past seems to position such activity in terms of a phase or a fad; almost as if
63 Such a connection was also apparent in the first version of The Bell Jar, which Plath published under the pseudonym Victoria
Lucas in 1962, and whose protagonist was called Virginia. See Plath's final typescript prior to publication, p. 129. The reduction
from eight letter names to six letter names in the 1963 edition facilitates an extension of the chain of autographical connection to
Plath, who came out as the author in this version.
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she has failed and given up in her token effort to have some control over men. In Oranges, the
author offers her first name, but readers are given no clue as to the latter. When Winterson
adapted the novel for television, the protagonist's name is changed to Jess, but still any sign of
a surname is omitted. This might be seen as a reference to Jeanette's adoption. Jeanette has no
family name because she feels as if she has no family. Yet it is also a defensive strategy,
revealed by the story of Winnet, who refuses to tell the magician her name because like Esther
in The Bell Jar, she knows that this information will give him power over her (pp. 138-9).
Remaining anonymous also allows Jeanette, like Frankenstein's creature, to be independent of
atavistic ties, free to define and create herself.
Jeanette's mother is given neither first name nor surname in the novel, but rather is referred to
as 'my mother', a reference which contributes to Jeanette's anonymity, whilst allowing the
daughter, the writer and intertext Jeanette, to remain in control of the narrative. The mother is
also shown to create for herself two nicknames, 'the Jesus Belle' (p. 35), as she says she was
called by the clientele of public houses while she attempted to convert them to the faith, and
'Kindly Light' (p. 171), her CB handle or codename. This emphasizes the significance of
stories in the text, but also serves to subjugate the mother's stories to Jeanette's, since the
mother character is now primarily defined in the terms of the story told by Jeanette. It is
perhaps appropriate that Jeanette should be refusing to see this woman as an individual except
in relation to Jeanette herself, thus reversing the relationship they had at the time of the events
of the autography. And yet this has the unfortunate result of Jeanette asserting her own
individuality at the expense of another's.
Another example of this use of names to make an autographical point occurs in the dedication
of the novel, which reads 'TO PHILLIPA BREWSTER WHO WAS THE BEGINNING' (p.
[v]). Understanding the text as an autography facilitates the consideration of this remark as
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more than mere formal baggage of publication. One possible reading is of this as a reference to
an historical correspondent to the character in the novel called Melanie, Jeanette's first lover,
who regrets their affair and, the reader is given to understand, wishes to forget all about it.
This creates another story for the reader of Oranges; like counting the letters in Plath's first
name, s/he can speculate on the possible motives and effects of such a dedication.
Throughout The Bell Jar Esther creates a series of fictional selves in order to ease her
interaction with the outside world. Her alter ego, Elly Higginbottom is eventually made into a
rounded character as an orphan from Chicago, and other stereotypes are invoked which work
against the reader's understanding of Esther. For example, after discovering Buddy's sexual
history, she rejects thoughts of loving and marrying him and decides to look for a casual
partner of her own. When she realizes that one man on whom she has set her sights is not
interested, she displaces rejection by writing to tell him that 'I was unfortunately about to
marry a childhood sweetheart' (p. 83). Esther's autographical story of 'Elaine' marks the
move to another stage in the process of self invention.
These attempts at self fabrication function in the text as bids on the part of the protagonist to
control what she is known as. This becomes most clear at those moments in the text where she
presents her self to the sailor and the doctor, both of whom she is meeting for the first time, and
both of whom seek not to know her as an individual, but rather to fit her into the function of a
straightforwardly sexual or medical object. This connection is drawn in the text as the episode
with the sailor is followed immediately by the doctor's voice asking ' "Well, Esther, how do
you feel this week?" ' (p. 142).
This juxtaposition emphasizes the privileged role of the reader. Esther allows the two men to
believe that they have an acute understanding of her, and in so doing, retains her own sense of
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her self. The reader is allowed insight into all of these exchanges, without being offered any
promises - as Esther says, '[i]f you expect nothing from somebody you are never disappointed'
(p. 62) - and yet whilst it would be going too far to say that readers as a result understand
Esther's subject position, certainly it seems to be the case that we are offered a more full and
complex context for the experiences she describes.
The capacity for creative self awareness also may be said to have feminist motivations; 'I
couldn't stand the idea of a woman having to have a single pure life' (p. 85). Esther rejects the
pictures of her future self which are offered literally by Mrs. Willlard (p. 87), and imaginitively
by Constantin (p. 88). Ultimately, this rejection is indicated by the text itself. Having decided
to write a novel, she concludes '[tjhat would fix a lot of people' (p.126). In this way Esther
emphasizes the radical power in showing her capacity to invent and express her self, rather
than simply accepting images offered of a Gusdorfian 'single pure life'. That the desire for self
invention may be realized by producing a text represents an exciting prospect, and accordingly
Esther insists that 'I wanted to dictate my own thrilling letters' (p. 79).
So in The Bell Jar, an expression of Esther's self is achieved paradoxically though deception,
and the struggle to present herself as something which she is not. Predictably, in Oranges, the
world is presented by Jeanette's mother's teaching from scripture and seed packet, and by her
telling of stories. Their regular walks together follow a predictable pattern culminating in her
mother's storytelling. Jeanette, readers are told, was always placed in the role of listener, and
the stories were instructive, invariably
about a brave person who had despised the fruits of the flesh and worked for the Lord
instead, (p. 7)
Jeanette's mother has made of her life such a story, and so autographical stories are included as
part of the teaching. But the teaching is selective, and to fill in the gaps Jeanette begins to read
the pages in the Bible which her mother glosses over (p. 41), and to ask about the picture of a
woman in the album of her mother's past lovers (p. 36). A more earth-shattering moment
comes when Jeanette finds out that the story of Jane Eyre which her mother has read to her is a
distortion of Charlotte Bronte's novel;
I found out, that dreadful day in a back corner of library, that Jane doesn't marry St
John at all, that she goes back to Mr Rochester, (p. 73)
This is all the more worrying, because Jane's story of her life was to count as an example for
Jeanette to apply herself. Her mother's distorted version of the story has Jane marrying and
becoming a missionary, fulfilling the two types of womanhood which she wishes to see in her
daughter. Jeanette finds out that the story - her story - is not what she had been told it was, and
compares this to her discovery of her adoption papers, revealing that the story of where she has
come from was as (un)fixed as the story of where she is going (p. 73).
Jeanette is to tell her own stories. She will find her self initially by following the example of
her mirror mother, and then by rejecting it, and instead embracing the pleasures of the flesh.
She begins, then, by telling the reader that one of her mother's story-telling techniques was to
'start to tell me a story and then go on to something else in the middle' (p. 16), and shortly after
proceeds to do exactly this with her own story, making the Proustian move from a pyjama top
which hurts her ears to the story of her adenoid related illness (pp. 22-23). Thus Jeanette's
storytelling begins by following a familiar pattern whereby '[m]y mother sang the tune, and I
put in the harmonies' (p. 51).
In order to move on from this restrictive duet, Jeanette must learn to read for herself.
Ironically, this is something which her mother's teachings have encouraged. Jeanette is taught
by her mother that an objective truth is to be made specially available to her. Although this
tmth is presented initially in terms of her mother's stories, Jeanette is made aware that the
purpose of this teaching is that she may herself 'interpret the signs and wonders that the
unbeliever might never understand' (p. 17). Jeanette's is the medium's role, making the tmth
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clearer to others. A expression of Jeanette's confidence in her interpretations is evident when
at primary school she tells her teacher '[j]ust because you can't tell what it is, doesn't mean it's
not what it is' (p. 43). The power of her mind is similarly emphasized by Elsie, who proposes
another notion, that of a liberating radical freedom;
"If you think about something for long enough," she explained, "more than likely, that
thing will happen." She tapped her head. "It's all in the mind." (p. 30)
Elsie unwittingly helps Jeanette to value herself, that she might start to recognize her own part
in the world. She will see that the truth lies within herself, as both actor and agent. Jeanette
realizes that she must make sense of the world, and that she needs to do this for herself, not for
others. In this way truth is revealed not as a relative notion, but rather as a subjective notion.
For although Jeanette is to learn that truth is not absolute, she will also see that it is not
dependent on context; in this sense, truth is dependent on the individual to make it true. Or, as
the fairy story at the end of the 'Leviticus' chapter demonstrates, 'perfection is not to be found,
but to be fashioned' (p. 63).
In Oranges the struggle of the protagonist to communicate truth is demonstrated through her
slowly acquiring the ability to tell her own stories. That Jeanette moves beyond her mother's
restrictive storytelling strategies is indicated in the text by the appearance of the daughter's
own narratives. The possibility of constructing such narratives is offered for the first time at
school, that place from where her mother wanted to keep her, as Jeanette is asked to write an
essay entitled ' "What I Did in my Summer Holidays" ' (p. 37). Similarly, at the church
nativity, Jeanette is excited at the prospect of playing the narrator (p. 40). Perhaps the most
significant demonstration of Jeanette's role as storyteller occurs in the construction of Oranges
itself, as fantastic fairy tales are woven into the basic autographical narrative to represent this
new voice. These stories can be used to make sense of the life events which appear in the basic
narrative. For example, the tale of the princess who takes the place of the wise woman as
village counsellor follows the description of Jeanette's relationship with her mother. Jeanette's
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time at school is her first experience of a perspective other than that of her mother and the
church. She finds that she can overcome confusion by fusing the two perspectives with a story;
the story of the Emperor Tetrahedron (p. 47-48). Towards the end of the novel, the stories also
begin to interact with Jeanette's story, for example with the story of the pebble, which she
carries around as a token of hope, and which Winnet is given by the magician to draw a
protective circle around herself (p. 139).
As a result, the two levels of discourse which were apparent in The Bell Jar are also to be
found in Oranges. The story of Jeanette as her mother's vision is related, but also disrupted by
stories which exist outside the mother mirror, created by Jeanette to make sense of her self
independently of her mother. Increasing in complexity and vision, and in their relationship to
the main narrative, these stories stand as evidence that Jeanette has fully absorbed and adopted
creatively, Elsie's belief in epistemological value of stories. Yet it is not to be assumed that
Elsie simply replaces Jeanette's mother in influence and identity - for even the belief is
expressed in Jeanette's own words; '[s]he said stories helped you to understand the world' (p.
29). It would seem from this that stories have also been instrumental in helping Jeanette to
understand the world, and that she is prepared to acknowledge where this message has come
from, whilst still attempting to make it her own. The protagonist eventually realizes that she
can make even more sense of everything she encounters by formulating a story of her self.
In both novels then, thought is represented as a tool which enables one to see a subject position,
but also facilitates the creation of a subject position. And the autograph is the story of a
simultaneous reading and writing of the self. In this way, both The Bell Jar and Oranges
demonstrate that the production of the autograph is part of what makes it philosophical.
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Conclusion
I have shown that the genre of autography has philosophical potential, and demonstrated this
through analysis of some of the philosophical issues connected with the self which I find in
Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar and Jeanette Winterson's Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit. I have
shown that part of the reason for my considering their qualities to be feminist philosophical is
because they present pictures of selves which are inclusive not as a result of attempting to
speak for everyone, but precisely by offering readers the freedom to identify if they wish with
that picture, and to reject it if not. This empowerment of the reader is an important and
significant contribution to be made to philosophy, and it can be learnt, I have argued, from the
novel perspectives of feminism and literature. The incitement to read is a strong one. In my
next chapter I will go on to examine the philosophical possibilities of feminist Utopian fiction,




It flashed through her like the suddenly apprehended solution of a problem [...] and for
the first time she saw the possibility of shifting the position from which she looked.
George Eliot1
This chapter on Utopian fiction will continue the pattern of finding philosophical potential in
the specific instances of the genre in order to demonstrate that such potential may be discovered
more generally. Once again, I will argue that the traditional conception of the genre is anti-
philosophical, and that feminist critics have perpetuated this conception in spite of, and often
because of, their take on the genre. I will attempt to reclaim the genre of Utopian fiction for the
purposes of a feminist philosophical interpretation, and in the process redefine it.
This chapter represents the second instalment ofmy philosophical story, which follows the
confession of self representation with an exploration of how to conceive otherness. In this
sense I offer an expanded and developed position on the notion of the other-worldliness of
Utopian novels. This development will focus here on the traditional analytic philosophical topic
of "the problem of other minds".2 The perspective of Utopian fiction may explore this, I will
argue, from a perspective of possibility which contrasts with the traditional skeptical starting
point of analytic philosophy. The philosophical possibilities of this genre will be outlined with
specific reference to Sally Miller Gearhart's The Wanderground: Stories of the Hill Women,
and Marge Piercy's Woman On the Edge of Time.
In recognition of the fact that these two texts constitute paradigm cases of the genre, I will refer
to them throughout as texts which any generic analysis must account for.
1
George Eliot, The Mill On the Floss, ed. by Gordon S. Haight (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 254.
2 For an Interesting introductory discussion of this problem see Paul Ziff, Alvin Plantinga and Sydney Shoemaker, 'Symposium: The
Other Minds Problem', Journal ofPhilosophy, 20:62 (1965), 575-589.
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A. Coming To Terms With Utopia
Unlike autobiography or detective fiction, Utopia is a genuinely interdisciplinary notion. It may
be examined in terms of the studies of anthropology, historiography, literature, political
science, sociology, all with equal viability. As a literary genre, however, Utopian writing has
been frequently dismissed, and habitually ignored. I will begin this section by examining such
a dismissal, before going on to look at the ways in which Utopias have been reclaimed by
literary theorists. I will argue that literary conceptions of Utopia have been problematically
dominated by the way in which connections to politics have been conceived by literary
theorists, and that such limited conceptions lead to difficulties in making philosophical
connections, as I understand them.
Utopian fiction is a sub-genre of science or speculative fiction. It might seem sensible,
therefore, to look to this parent genre for a definition of Utopias;
it/ to/pi/ as - situations of social perfection. Early science fiction featured many
Utopias [...] but they declined in number because the twentieth century became
grimmer and because a true Utopia lacks the dramatic tension necessary for
entertaining fiction.3
Here, Utopian fiction is pictured as a kind of poor relation - even under-developed early
ancestor - of science fiction literature. Its sister form, dystopian fiction, does not even merit a
mention in this otherwise valuable science fiction dictionary. In order to discuss Utopian
science fiction with any seriousness, as well as justifying it as, at the very least, 'entertaining
fiction', I will reject this negative, dismissive attitude to the genre - hereafter referred to as the
derisory definition. In particular, I begin by questioning the simplistic summary of Utopias in
literature as 'situations of social perfection', as well as the accusation that they 'lack [...]
dramatic tension' and so fail as literature. Furthermore, I will go on to argue that this
definition operates under two serious misconceptions about the genre. The first of these
" Science Fiction A to Z: A Dictionary of the Great S. F. Themes, ed. by Isaac Asimov, Martin H. Greenberg and Charles G. Waugh
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 557.
126
misconceptions is that Utopian novels have a close, necessary, and limiting relationship to an
identifiable or actual political climate. The second, that it is advisable, even possible, to seal
off the genre of Utopian fiction as a period piece. I will attempt to show that problems
associated with these misconceptions, specifically investments in the structure and logic of
binary oppositions, constitute significant barriers to a philosophical conception of the genre of
Utopian fiction.
1. PERFECTION WITHOUT TENSION
The notion that literary Utopias describe 'situations of social perfection' may be clarified with
reference back to the mythical origins of the genre. Utopia found its name in 1516, when
Thomas More published his text bearing that very title.4 More combined two Greek words; eu
topos, meaning good place, and ou topos, meaning no place. Taking More's text as a model,
the two senses may be combined by Utopian theorists to suggest an image of a place so good
that it could not possibly exist. Under this view, Utopias in fiction are completely insipid, and
represent some kind of impossible dream world. This is arguably the way in which the notion
of Utopia has entered popular discourse. It is a description of paradise, a dream which allows
for an escape from the mundane reality of our lives. This conception of Utopia in fiction
opposes ideality to reality, and so conforms to a highly traditional view of literature as a
description of that which is unreal.
An acceptance of the derisory definition's emphasis on Utopia as an ideal, unreal world allows
Ann Lane to say, in an introduction to Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Utopian novel Herland;
Most Utopias create worlds that are elevating but bland, a paradise without sparkle.5
4 Thomas More, Utopia, trans, by Paul Turner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965).
3 Ann J. Lane, 'Introduction' to Herland by Charlotte Perkins Gilman (London: Women's Press, 1979), pp. v-xxiii (p. xiii).
Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
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Here, the simplicity and banality of the texts which populate the genre is posited as something
from which this novel, if its artistry is to be defended, must be protected. Something which
Herland is to be valued for, apparently, is that it 'soars' above the genre (p. xiii).
One way of overcoming the simplistic view of the derisory definition that Utopias depict
situations of social perfection is to formalize the diversity of the texts which make up the genre.
For example, Lyman Tower Sargent has represented the complexity of Utopian fiction in terms
of four different categories of Utopia; eutopia, Utopia, dystopia, and Utopian satire.6 In a
classificatory sense, Sargent's structure may prove useful. Yet there are probably few works
which will fit one of these categories in any strict sense, and so they also involve simplification.
As Dingbo Wu has clearly shown, More's novel itself combines at least three of Sargent's
types.7 The separation of the genre into specific categories follows the reductionist logic of the
derisory definition, and so retains its restrictions.
A division which has seemed more straightforward, and so has been commonplace in criticism
is the distinction between Utopia and dystopia, where the former means simply "good place",
and the latter "bad place". Krishan Kumar's use of the terms Utopia and anti-utopia
demonstrates the overt invocation of binary oppositions, because it seems to define dystopia in
terms of whatever Utopia is not. Kumar begins by posing questions for himself which position
the two ideas in opposing comers of an other-worldly boxing ring;
just who are the angels and who the devils in the conflict between Utopia and anti-
utopia [?] [...] has [utopia] survived the battering of the anti-utopia?8
Later, the threat posed by anti-utopias is pictured in Freudian terms;
As nightmare to its dream, like a malevolent and grimacing doppelganger, anti-utopia
has stalked Utopia from the very beginning, (p. 99)
6
Lyman Tower Sargent, British andAmerican Utopian Literature, 1516-1985: An Annotated, Chronological Bibliography
(London: Garland, 1988).
7
Dingbo Wu, 'Understanding Utopian Literature', Extrapolation, 34:3 (1993), 230-244.
* Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia In Modern Times (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. ix. Subsequent page references will be
given in the text.
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The resulting genre can be entertainingly susceptible to changes of mind. That is, until the
black and white are drawn back to their respective corners once more;
[f]rom the late nineteenth-century onwards, the negative and positive poles of the old
satirical Utopia were pulled apart and assigned to separate genres or sub-genres.
(p. 125)
Kumar laments this development, but refuses to recognize that his own theorizing plays a
crucial part in such assignations. In addition, his version of the distinction between Utopia and
anti-utopia, like the derisory definition, employs the terminology of perfection. Where Utopia
may be said to be 'perfect, in the moral sense', its negative counterpart anti-utopia describes a
world which has been 'perfected, in the social sense' (p. 125, author's italics). This distinction
reveals the way in which the erection of binary oppositions is addictive, and suggests that
suspicions of neat categories are often well founded. For example, the difference between
social and moral is by no means a clear one, and Kumar's apparent assumption that a line may
be drawn between the two is philosophically naive. Similarly, the difference between a
situation's being perfect and its being perfected is an odd one. Presumably, it means that the
latter has been made perfect, where the former's perfection is a priori. This recalls for me St.
Augustine's distinction between the city of God, which is heavenly, and the city ofMan, which
must perforce be full of sin.9 In both cases the possibilities of human creation are given wholly
negative associations. Kumar extends this notion even further with a subsequent distinction
between the ideality of Utopia, and the 'tyranny of the idea' which characterizes anti-utopia (p.
125, author's italics).
At the same time, the division is one between stasis and process. The tenses of 'perfect' and
'perfected' here are informative; the latter is positioned in time, where the former exists outside
time. The effect becomes clearer with the distinction between the ideal, which exists
Augustine, The City ofGod, trans, by John Healey (London: Dent, 1931). See esp. book 2, chap. 7, where Augustine argues that
philosophy is dangerously hubristic insofar as those who take it seriously fail to recognize that the texts of philosophy 'bear no divine
authority', but rather are 'the inventions of man' (p. 54-55, author's italics).
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independently of people and society, and the idea, which symbolizes intellectual and, crucially,
philosophical development. Complicity with the derisory definition, then, allows Kumar to
posit Utopia transcendentally as a society which "just is", where the negativity of dystopia is
captured in the fact of its being constructed, in its very historicity.
Kumar's position on this unites his meaning with his method. For the very invocation of binary
oppositions, in imposing an automated selection of alternatives, prohibits the free creative and
imaginative thinking which I wish to locate as philosophical. The reasons for this prohibition
are suggested by Nancy Jay, who cites three logical principles upon which binary oppositions
are parasitic;
the Principle of Identity (if anything is A, it is A); the Principle of Contradiction
(nothing can be both A and Not A); and the Principle of the Excluded Middle
(anything, and everything, must be either A or Not-A).10
The necessities invoked by the two latter principles are not, I suggest, conducive to
philosophical thinking, because they effect a programme whereby options are static, determined
and confined, whilst the notions they attempt to describe are not. As a result of this disparity,
binary oppositions inevitably have 'distorting effects' (p. 49).
Some feminist theorists have located the danger of binary oppositions in the fact of their being
essentially evaluative; one side of the opposition must be good, and the other bad." As such,
Utopian theory may be said to exclude the feminist as well as the philosophical whenever it
assumes that Utopia is as good as dystopia is bad. Ironically, feminist critics of the genre
themselves take this risk when they succumb to the temptation to translate Utopia and anti-
utopia directly into feminist and anti-feminist, or to identify the difference between Utopian and
dystopian literature as one of diametrically opposing power relations, where the former are
1,1
Nancy Jay, 'Gender and Dichotomy', Feminist Studies, 7:1 (1981), 38-56 (p. 42). Subsequent page references will be given in
the text.
" See for example Helene Cixous, 'Sorties', trans, by Ann Liddle, in New French Feminisms: An Anthology, ed. by Elaine Marks
and Isabelle de Courtivron (London: Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 90-98.
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matriarchies, and the latter patriarchies. For example, a belief in the notion that Utopia and
dystopia are logical contradictories leads Elaine Hoffman Baruch to say that 'dystopia for men
may be Utopia for women and vice-versa .12
This version of dichotomous analysis poses a difficulty for Utopian theorists who wish to adopt
some version of the derisory definition as I have presented it, because it raises the issue of
relativity with regard to perfection. Or, as Robert Nozick's individualist agenda allows him
confidently (and perhaps accurately) to assert; 'the best of all possible worlds for me will not
be that for you'.13 Those who have been suspicious of Utopian thinking have often pointed to
its totalitarian tendencies in writers who have created ideal worlds founded on hierarchies, and
so designed only for the few, yet dependent on the services of the many.14 The apparent
paternalism of a genre which seems to insist upon saying "this is what is good for you" poses a
serious problem for feminist critics concerned with women writers of a type of fiction which
has been male-dominated for much of its history. I contend that a simple reversal of power
relationships depicted in Utopian fiction does not constitute a solution to this problem, because
it perpetuates the structure of binary oppositions.15 As a result, the way in which the derisory
definition reduces political complexities to simple alternatives is politically problematic even,
perhaps especially, when it is adopted by feminist critics. This latter displays a tendency to
convert binarism to separatism, and so conform to the restrictions of all three Principles
outlined by Jay, without explicitly citing them.
The separatist approach undermines the genre's own aims of possibility. The bleak suggestion
harboured specifically by Baruch's distinction is that men and women are ideologically
12 Elaine Hoffman Baruch, 'Visions of Utopia: Introduction', in Women In Search ofUtopia: Mavericks and Mythmakers, ed. by
Ruby Rohrlich and Elaine Hoffman Baruch (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), pp. 203-208 (p. 203, author's italics).
" Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, [1975]), p. 298.
14 See for example K. R. Popper's critique of Plato's Republic in the first volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols.
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), which bears the volume title The Spell ofPlato.
15 The reactionary nature of such a move is highlighted by Luce Irigaray who says that the attempt 'simply to reverse the order of
things' is always a mistake because 'even supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run, would revert to
sameness: to phallocratism', in This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 33.
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incompatible; their social interests and desires diametrically opposed to one another.
Significantly, this means that feminism has nothing to offer to men. Yet this is the view of the
patriarch; that the sexes are inevitably involved in a power struggle, where one must dominate
the other. Like Plato's banishment of literature from the world of philosophy in order to save
the latter from the threat of the former, this can only lead to a hopeless exclusion, which counts
as neither an ideological nor an artistic solution.
More specifically, there is a sense of hopelessness about the suggestion that women cannot
possibly live as equals with men, and so that any vision of a just society for women must
exclude them. It is a formula for despair, paradoxically produced by the very attempt to
envisage a situation of social perfection. As such, separatism fails to be Utopian as much as it
fails to be feminist, because Utopian ideas are fundamentally optimistic, and visionary. And so,
drawing together feminism and Utopia may involve insisting that feminist movements represent
a progression for men as well as women, and that the visions thus produced will benefit more
from a displacement, rather than a reinforcement, of binary oppositions such as transcendent
and historic, Utopia and dystopia, matriarchy and patriarchy, good and bad, and even male and
female.
As the derisory definition itself suggests, any strict division between Utopia and dystopia is also
aesthetically problematic. The blandness of perfection resists not just dramatic tension but also
aesthetic interest. One way I see towards overcoming this problem is to insist that Utopian
fiction includes dystopia and its opposite eutopia. The two latter terms may be used as
shorthand to refer to, respectively, the depiction of socio-political systems which are
comparatively negative, and the depiction of those which are comparatively positive, where the
comparison is a crucial part of the way in which each term is understood. In this way Utopia as
a genre may be separated from the associations of an absolute value laden interpretation.
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Hopefully, as a result of this separation, it will become impossible to speak, as the derisory
definition does, of a 'true Utopia'. This is a good thing because critical emphasis on a
simplistic, ideal eutopia, opposed to an equally simplistic dystopia, is, in political and aesthetic
terms, unreal, unhelpful, and undesirable.
The derisory definition fails to account for the two Utopian novels which I have chosen to focus
upon. Piercy's novel Woman On the Edge of Time (hereafter, WET) resists the origins of the
genre by separating out the two ideas, of good place and no place, which are embedded in
More's invented word. Here, existence is a good, and it is only when Connie is stuck between
the two worlds of present dystopia and future eutopia, in outopia, that she feels truly desperate;
For a long nauseated moment she blurred over and she was no place, lost, terrified.16
In spite of the fact that WET is usually considered a paradigm case of a Utopian novel, the
traditional depiction of the future good place, Mattapoisett, takes up less than a third of the
novel, with most of the work concerned with representations of what might be described as
typical dystopian worlds. Piercy's novel includes an alternative future to Mattapoisett; a
typical dystopian industrialized hierarchical society, set in New York City (pp. 287-301).
Moreover, the present is, for the protagonist, a kind of living hell. Connie's poverty-stricken
life outside the hospital, and then the misery of life as a prisoner inside, are fundamentally
dystopian.
Neither are the different worlds distinct. The novel plays with the supposed oppositions
between dystopia and eutopia throughout the novel. The transition to the Utopian world in
WET is effected, as suggested in the title, by the protagonist. The people in the future world
who contact Connie frequently urge her to bring about change from the dystopia of her present
to the eutopia of her future. Yet this incitement is most vague, and it is not only clear
16
Marge Piercy, Woman On the Edge of Time (London: Women's Press, 1980), p. 126. Subsequent page references will be given in
the text.
133
throughout that any decision to act must be made by Connie herself, but also that the decision
as to what to do is hers. Agency, then, is foregrounded, contrary to Kumar's Augustinian
prescriptions. Indeed, perfection may be said to be ultimately denied, as the ending of the novel
leaves Connie re-captured and returned to incarceration, with little hope of escape.
Furthermore, the future vision of Mattapoisett itself is not ideal in any simplistic sense. That
this place is not a 'situation of social perfection' is made clear from the fact that the society is
engaged in warfare. One of the principle characters, Jackrabbit, is even killed in battle (p.
306). Moreover, there is evidence of dissatisfaction among the inhabitants, and also of strong
ideological and political disagreement, in particular the argument concerning genetics between
the factions labelled the 'Shakers' and 'Mixers' (p. 226). Connie is particularly disappointed
that there are not enough resources to allow the inhabitants of Mattapoisett to drink coffee
every day (p. 195).
The Wanderground also resists the genre limitation exercise of the critics. As in WET, there
are no remedies for patriarchy here, but for different reasons. The world of Gearhart's novel is
quite distant from our own, and one world, the eutopian world of the Wanderground,
dominates. As in WET, the distinction between eutopia and dystopia is tested and challenged.
The Wanderground itself is introduced to the reader in terms of a mapped contrast with
'Dangerland',17 and also as the country it is contrasted with the city. However, throughout the
novel, the reader is made aware of the danger surrounding the hill women, from the city and
elsewhere. This awareness comes from mention of the danger within the Wanderground, but
also from episodes where the women tell how they plan escapes from the oppression of the city,
or where they are working on rotation in the city as spies from the Wanderground. Dystopian
elements are also present in the form of knowledge of the past, demonstrated in the Remember
17
Sally Miller Gearhart, The Wanderground: Stories of the Hill Women (New York: Alyson Publications, 1984), p. 1. Subsequent
page references will be given in the text.
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Rooms. In this way, as in WET, characters move between worlds. In addition, the danger
from the city leads to serious dissension in the country - particularly over issues of separatism,
for example (p. 171). So whilst the Wanderground, like Mattapoisett, has a fundamentally
eutopian atmosphere, it too offers evidence of social unrest and disagreement such that it may
not be described as a situation of social perfection. Both novels stress the fluidity of the bad
with the good, resisting the dialectical oppositions of value constructed by the derisory
definition.
It is in this sense that the genre may be rescued from the accusation of the derisory definition
that Utopian fiction 'lacks [...] dramatic tension'. Both of these novels may be said to construct
a eutopian vision in dialogue with a seemingly contrasting - and therefore dystopian - vision.
In other words, with a vision of otherness which is not delimited in terms of opposition, but
rather offers a multiplicity of worlds on a relational continuum. In practice, this means that
there may be elements of eutopia and dystopia in Utopian novels, but that there may be no
precise division between the two. As a result the accusation that these texts lack dramatic
tension is misplaced, and the genre may instead be described in terms of the way in which it
resists principles associated with binary oppositions, in particular the Principle of
Contradiction, and the Principle of the Excluded Middle.
The derisory definition's conception of Utopias as situations of social perfection which lack
dramatic tension is mistaken, since it does not, and, I hope I have suggested, cannot, account
for texts. I have argued in this section that the derisory definition leads to a view of Utopian
fiction as politically unrealistic, and aesthetically inadequate. In the next section, I will attempt
to outline the dangers of attempting to salvage the genre as politically realistic.
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2. HERMETIC PRAXIS
I contend here that the derisory definition implicitly harbours limitations even more damaging
than the two examined in the previous section. The first has critics seeing Utopian fiction as no
more and no less than political manifestos. Feminist critics in particular have presented this
interpretation of the genre as encapsulating its value for feminists. Secondly, I will argue that
critics have tended to accept and reiterate the stasis injected into the genre of Utopian fiction by
the derisory definition, in terms of the idea that Utopias are hermetically sealed in the past.
The derisory definition associates Utopias with a mood of hope in the writer's political context.
This is offered by the definition as a reason for the decline of Utopian fiction; that when hope
diminishes in the writer's lifetime, Utopias also become less possible. The reference to hope
invokes the Blochian notion of Utopia as Vor-Schein, or 'anticipatory illumination'.18 Yet for
Bloch, the possibility of such anticipation is not facilitated by a convivial political atmosphere.
Rather it is always present, and indeed may be said to allow for dissent from the dominant
political climate, because as an ideological concept, it is characterized by change. Bloch
reaches conversational consensus with Adorno on this point;
Bloch: I believe, Teddy, that we are certainly in agreement here: the essential function
of Utopia is a critique of what is present [...]
Adorno: Yes, at any rate, Utopia is essentially in the determined negation, in the
determined negation of that which merely is.19
In terms of the project of reclaiming the genre, this conception is more hopeful, since it means
that Utopias can continue not only in spite of but also because of the grim contexts in which
they are produced.
18 See Ernst Bloch, 'Art and Utopia', in The Utopian Function ofArt and Literature: Selected Essays, trans, by Jack Zipes and
Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 78-155 (esp. pp. 141-155).
19
'Something's Missing: A Discussion Between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing', in
Bloch, The Utopian Function ofArt and Literature, pp. 1-17 (p. 12).
In a similar spirit Tom Moylan heralds the return of 'a literary genre which seemed to have
gone out of business'.20 His aim is to revive Utopian fiction by seeing it as specifically
political. Moylan is so convinced by the political significance of Utopian fiction that he is able
to make the strong assertion that the genre's raison d'etre is
to stimulate in its readers a desire for a better life and to motivate that desire toward
action, (p. 35)
For Moylan, it is an understanding of Utopian fiction as motivating as well as motivated by, an
'oppositional politics' (p. 12), that may put it back in 'business'. It is in the use of the term
oppositional politics that Moylan's theory may be said to constitute a neo-Marxian
contradiction of the idea that Utopian fiction has declined as 'the twentieth century became
grimmer'. Rather he believes that writers of Utopian fiction use their novels to take issue with
contemporary political situations, to engage in Adomo's 'determined negation'. As such,
Moylan's is a revolutionary text in the field of Utopian criticism. However, as a premise of his
argument, Moylan still has to accept the implication of the derisory definition, which has it that
Utopian literature must bear a close, particular, and limiting relation to its contemporary
political climate. This is because for Moylan, the Utopian novel essentially provides a political
critique.
It is this characterization of the genre of Utopian fiction as fundamentally polemical which is
often seen as peculiarly appropriate for feminist writers. Moylan's study is concerned to re¬
read all Utopian fiction as political, but other feminist critics see this as a particular feature of
women's writing in the area. Sarah Lefanu, for example, contends that female authors have
actively politicized the entire field of science fiction writing. She presents the case that
there is some truth in what the critics say: women have brought politics into the
genre.21
211 Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination (New York: Methuen, 1986), p. 197.
Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
Sarah Lefanu, 'Sex, Sub-Atomic Particles and Sociology', in Where No Man Has Gone Before: Women and Science Fiction, ed.
by Lucie Armitt (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 178-185 (p. 180).
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Agreeing with the critics here is a dangerous move; the accusation that feminists seek to make
the non-political political is often used as an excuse for ignoring feminist arguments. Such
accusations seek to undermine feminist perspectives by arguing that they are reading too much
into things, or looking for problems where none exist. In this sense, the idea that the genre of
Utopian fiction was apolitical before feminists got their ideological hands on it works as a
patriarchal myth. I presume here that it is an inaccurate myth, that the genre always was
political, and that feminist politics stands out merely because it is a different politics.22
Lefanu is not the only feminist critic to make the connection between feminist science fiction
and polemic. Carol Pearson also offers a discussion of texts within the genre which, she
supposes, 'suggest political practice'.23 Such an emphasis places a significant burden upon the
author of Utopian fiction to provide a model or blueprint for political action, and in particular
implies a requirement for the author to include a description of the transformation from the
reader's actual political world to the Utopian state. It must tell readers what to do.
If feminist Utopian fiction may be seen as merely a blueprint or at best, a consciousness-raising
exercise, it follows that its value, and even its status, as literature may be questioned. That is,
insofar as a novel is Utopian, to that extent it cannot count as literature.24 This point is evident
in Krishan Kumar's conviction that
[o]n the whole, Utopias are not very distinguished for their aesthetic qualities as works
of literature, (Utopia and Anti-Utopia, p. ix)
and Toby Widdicombe's complaint that 'novelistic irrelevancies' confuse his analysis of
Utopian literature.25 With only slightly more subtlety, Lucy Freibert views Utopian novels
entirely in terms of political questions and answers supplied by the texts. If the answers do not
22 See for example Daphne Patai's effective exposure of the patriarchal politics of five classic texts of Utopian literature in 'Utopia for
Whom\Aphra, 5 (1974), 2-16.
23 Carol S. Pearson, 'Of Time and Revolution: Theories of Social Change In Contemporary Feminist Science Fiction', in Women In
Search of Utopia, ed. by Rohrlich and Baruch, pp. 260-268 (p. 267).
24 Readers will note a similarity between this argument and the argument which proposes a distinction between autobiography and
literature. See Chapter Two, p. 66.
25
Toby Widdicombe, 'Why Is There Barbed Wire Around Eutopia?', Extrapolation, 33:2(1992), 145-153 (p. 150).
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comply with Freibert's specified version of a feminist ideology, in terms of necessary and
sufficient criteria for the identification of 'truly feminist works', then the texts may be
dismissed as inadequate.26 Considered as political tracts, rather than literature, brilliant works
are deemed failures. For example, Freibert sums up her response to WET by saying that
'Piercy's answers are not totally satisfying' (p. 83).
Similarly, Lynn Williams argues that feminist Utopias follow a strict pattern which makes them
more polemic than aesthetic, and further, that the political solutions they offer are limited by
the 'universal' nature of this pattern. In terms of political commentary on the real world,
Williams concludes that '[fjeminist Utopias offer us only anarchy as a solution'.27
Answers to political questions and solutions to patriarchal problems are not usually sought in
art. Yet in some sense the connection between the art of feminist Utopias and politics is
perhaps a logical one. Feminists, after all, are dissatisfied with the world as it is (that is,
patriarchal), and writers of Utopian fiction in particular are often thought to be involved in the
dramatizing of other supposedly better worlds. Similarly, it may be said that authors of
feminist dystopian fiction sometimes engage in the imaging of extreme forms of patriarchy in
order to express their dissatisfaction with the present patriarchy. But to concentrate solely on
political interpretations of Utopian texts is to make several critical errors, based on
misconceptions about literature and feminism. I can highlight these errors with a syllogistic
analysis of the critical assumptions involved. The argument which grounds this type of critique
may be simplified in the following terms;
26
Lucy M. Freibert, 'World Views In Utopian Novels by Women', in Women and Utopia: Critical Interpretations, ed. by Marleen
Barr and Nicholas D. Smith (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 67-84 (p. 67). Subsequent page references will
be given in the text.
27
Lynn F. Williams, ' "Great Country for Men and Dogs, but Tough On Women and Mules": Sex and Status In Recent Science
Fiction Utopias', in Women Worldwalkers: New Dimensions ofScience Fiction and Fantasy, ed. by Jane B. Weedman (Lubbock,
TX: Texas Tech Press, 1985) pp. 223-235 (p. 233).
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Feminists share a certain vision of the world
Utopian novelists dramatically represent their preferred vision of the world
THEREFORE
Feminist Utopian fictions are to be examined as political manifestos
I suggest that this argument is neither valid nor sound; that the conclusion does not follow from
the premises, and that the premises are in any case false. A belief that the conclusion does
follow from the premises involves a view of art whereby the artefact represents a manifestation
of the artists' intentions. It is important to note that this mistake is not always conscious. Yet,
as my logical breakdown of their argument shows, critics such as Freibert and Williams are
guilty in aesthetic terms of committing the 'personal heresy'; of attributing the aims of the
author to the text, and of the text to the author.28 In other words, they erect a simple and direct
connection between author and text, which fails to take account of the complexities of other
factors which contribute to meaning.
The first premise of the syllogism - that feminists share a vision of the world - is simply false.
There is no such thing as "feminism"; only "feminisms". The debates among feminists are
wide and varied, as Nancy Tuana and Rosemarie Tong show in their short summary of the
diversity involved;
Feminists disagree about which aspects of women's lives [...] best explain women's
oppression, repression, and suppression under patriarchy. They also disagree about
which legal remedies, job opportunities, sexual experiments, reproductive technologies,
and linguistic revisions are most likely to liberate women. Finally, they disagree about
which forms of oppression other than gender oppression feminists must address:
racism, classism, homophobia, ageism, or any and all forms of systematic
discrimination.29
Criticism such as that provided by Lucy Freibert is clearly guilty of ignoring such diversity.
This is what makes the type of analysis of Utopian fiction I have been examining so limiting; it
28 See E. M. W. Tillyard and C. S. Lewis, The Personal Heresy: A Controversy (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).
29
Nancy Tuana and Rosemarie Tong, 'Introduction' to their edited collection Feminism and Philosophy: Essential Readings In
Theory, Reinterpretation, and Application (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. xi-xii (p. xi).
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attempts an impossible task which it assumes the novelist to be similarly attempting - an
exposition of a definitive feminist vision.
The second premise - on the role of Utopian novelists - springs from the view that Utopian
fictions portray 'situations of social perfection', but also adds the figure of the author as
political theorist. A simplistic understanding of the genre as so many descriptions of a good
place, combined with the purely political interpretations of which I have offered evidence, has
led critics to see the worlds of the Utopian texts as recommendations for readers' real lives.
Conversely, so-called dystopian novels are seen as warnings against the development of
misogynist cultures. This idea introduces the idea of means and ends to the debate on Utopias.
Here, Utopian fiction is pictured as a means to a politically improved situation, or as 'a literary
form put to the service of social analysis and social criticism'.30 Arguments proposing the
political service of Utopian ideas have been a common feature of Marxian aesthetics, which
tends to gamer support for the arts in terms of their potential political function.31 This mirrors
the argument proposed to explain how literature can be philosophical, by philosophers
exploiting literature. I argued that the gendered terms makes this kind of argument
misogynistic, and that the exploitation of literature for non-literary ends is ethically
problematic.32 I think that those arguments apply here, and that to lose sight of the literary
value of Utopian fiction, as so many critics seem to, is to simplify the way in which they work;
in particular, it is to neglect their textuality.33
30 Krishan Kumar, Concepts In the Social Sciences: Utopianism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), p. vii.
31 This can happen in two ways, as I understand it. The first is to the denigration of Utopias, and the second to their veneration.
Frederick Engels, in his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, trans, by Edward Aveling (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1892), takes
Marx's line that Utopias are unrealistic and therefore to be avoided in political theory, but that they can work as a precursor to real, or
scientific, socialism. This contrasts with Bloch's notion that Utopian ideas presented through or by artistic endeavours can lead to
social democracy and political harmony.
32 See Chapter One, p. 39.
33 For an interesting attempt to call this neglect into account see Darko Suvin, 'Defining the Literary Genre of Utopia: Some
Historical Semantics, Some Genology, a Proposal, and a Plea', in Metamorphoses ofScience Fiction: On the Poetics and History
ofa Literary Genre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 37-62.
141
Yet a simplistic focus on the artistic nature of Utopias also creates difficulties. Karl Popper
argues that Utopian writings are politically unethical precisely because they propose political
means for ends which are fundamentally aesthetic. Objecting to Plato's Republic as a
representative Utopia he says
I do not believe that human lives may be made the means for satisfying an artist's
desire for self-expression.34
If there was a problem in erecting political ends for the means of Utopian fiction, there is a
parallel problem of proposing Utopian ends by political means. The problems with the political
connections claimed for Utopian fiction is that they invariably offer a specific function to
literature. As a result, although it is clearly a mistake to posit Utopian fiction as a means to an
end, it is also problematic to see Utopias as an end. Again, to place Utopian fiction on either
end of a cause-effect relation, is to provide an overly simplistic reduction of the genre. This is
not to say that Utopian novels cannot produce effects. Popper himself offers proof of the
evocative power of the genre when he recalls having read a Utopian fiction classic as an
adolescent;
The first book on socialism I read [...] was Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward. I
must have read it when I was about twelve, and it made a great impression on me.33
But the effect which such novels bring about may be usefully described in terms of
'indeterminacy'.36 The identification of a political theme, and even the suggestion that a novel
may be identified as a representative book 'on socialism' may be distinguished from the
positioning of the novel either as identifiable cause, or as determinable effect in the formation
of the young Popper's political sensibility. The temptation to invoke the fable of necessary
connection must be resisted Humeanly.37
14
Popper, Open Society, vl, p. 165.
33 Karl Popper, 'Autobiography of Karl Popper', in The Philosophy ofKarl Popper, 2 vols., ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle,
IL: Open Court, 1974), pp. 1-181 (pp. 8-9).
36 Catherine Belsey applies this label to the genre of Utopian fiction in Desire: Love Stories In Western Culture (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994), p. 201.
37 See David Hume, 'Of the Idea of Necessary Connection', in A Treatise ofHuman Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp.
205-223.
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I have argued that the derisory definition's identification of a close, necessary and limiting
relationship between Utopian novels and politics is to be avoided, particularly by feminists. I
now want to make a connection between this idea and the notion of generic stasis proposed by
the derisory definition. The way in which the definition speaks of examples of the genre having
been numerous at a point in the past, and of the genre as having been in 'decline' since the days
of '[ejarly science fiction', suggests an historical approach to the genre, one which has been
fairly prevalent.38 Yet the identification of Utopian fiction as a genre which may be confined in
the past is not historicist in any simple way. I can make this clear by comparing it to an anti-
historicist approach to Utopias, such as that described dismissively by Engels. Engels says that
those who have faith in Utopian socialism claim that it expresses
absolute truth, reason, and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the
world by virtue of its power. And as absolute knowledge is independent of time, space,
and of the historical development of man [sic], it is a mere accident when and where it
is discovered.39
The Hegelian notion of an absolute knowledge invokes a myth of transcendence, which is at the
same time a myth of confinement, because it seeks to separate the theory from the theorist, in
precisely the same way that purveyors of historicist analyses seek to place the genre and its
texts at a distance from their own position.
In this sense, both historicist and anti-historicist approaches stress the containment of the
genre. They suggest that Utopias form an holistic genre, whose substance is entirely self-
sustaining, and whose beginning and end can be pictured together, either in the past, or in the
world of Spirit, but always sealed off from the one who does the picturing. The Utopian novel,
on this view, is an entire world in a glass ball, to be taken up and shaken, then disposed of at
will. This follows from the identification of Utopia either as means to a specified end, or as the
38 So many analyses of the genre tend to be chronological. For perhaps a definitive example see Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P.
Manuel, Utopian Thought In the Western World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). The authors assert that 'the whole of this work is
intended to endow the idea of Utopia with historical meaning' (p. 5). Interestingly enough, Frank Manuel undertakes a similar project
with regard to the history of philosophy, where even greater emphasis is placed on the author's role as objective reader of historical
events, with the remark T come before you to bear witness to the flood, not to swell it', in his Shapes ofPhilosophical History




end itself, because a world in which causes and effects are in principle identifiable encapsulates
precisely a fully determined universe, a world where free will is an illusion because all
"choices" which people may make are pre-determined by some external force. Stability, and
probability, are words which describe positively this state which is at the same time
constraining and restrictive. This is truly the bland situation of social perfection decried by the
derisory definition, and it comes about not in spite of but because of any claims of the genre
(on behalf of its theorists) to be politically realistic.
The attempt to rescue the genre of Utopian fiction by emphasizing its polemic content is
misguided and at odds with the notion of an incitement to read. It incoherently posits Utopia as
politically realistic and at the same time, determined; sealed off from the world. As a result,
this conception of the genre is closer to a tradition of stories told by philosophers in order to
illustrate their arguments. In the next section I will develop the comparison between these
stories, and a particular understanding of Utopian fiction.
3. UTOPIAS AS POSSIBLE WORLDS
In this section I want to examine a particular version of Utopian literary theory which seems to
offer an understanding of such literature as philosophical. Rachel Blau DuPlessis argues that
contemporary women writers use the genre of Utopian fiction to focus on themes associated
with mind and consciousness. Moreover, she examines Utopian fictions specifically within the
context of kinds of writing which radically resist stasis. For DuPlessis, the possibilities offered
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by the genre - for both reader and writer - are peculiarly feminist, in the sense that they offer a
'critique' which 'can involve the visualization of the world as it could be'.40
On this view, writing within the genre is premised upon an appeal for the reader to "imagine a
world where...", helping he/r to suspend disbelief and picture a whole world, completely unlike
he/r own, in order that s/he might leam something about the world which is he/r own. Some
philosophers have sought to explain the operations of all types of fiction in terms of such
possible worlds.41 For example, Noel Carroll suggests that statements in fiction can be
understood as working in terms of our being asked, as readers, to 'entertain [...]
proposition [s]'.42 Specifically, in the case of The Wanderground, readers are asked to
entertain the proposition that plant-life can communicate and cooperate with people. To make
this clearer, Carroll says that ideas in fiction are ones which
I suppose [...] as I might suppose the proposition that the moon is made of green
cheese, (p. 99)
Such a notion offers an explanation of how literature may be philosophical by saying that, for
example novels may propose putative solutions to philosophical problems. Indeed, the notion
of fictional texts as possible worlds seems to refer to a kind of fiction which is already widely
used within traditional philosophical texts. I am referring to those stories or thought
experiments employed by philosophers to illustrate their arguments, which I rejected in Chapter
One as a subtle relegation of literature. For even if the current status of these examples
colludes with the Platonic value system, this may be something which can be redressed through
analysis of a whole genre.
40 Rachel Blau DuPlessis, ' "Kin with each other": Speculative Consciousness and Collective Protagonists', in Writing Beyond the
Ending: Narrative Strategies ofTwentieth-Century Women Writers (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 178-
197 (p. 179). Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
41 This involves the application of modal logic to the question of fiction. See for example David Lewis, 'Truth In Fiction', American
Philosophical Quarterly, 15:1 (1978), 37-46.
42 Noel Carroll, 'Critical Study: Mimesis as Make-Believe', Philosophical Quarterly, 45:178 (1995), 93-99 (p. 99). Subsequent
page references will be given in the text.
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Daniel Dennett identifies a particular category of thought experiments as 'intuition pumps',
and makes a strong case for their 'centrality and influence [...] in the development of
philosophy'.43 Moreover, their significance can be explained in relation to the very purpose of
philosophy, the study of which is designed with a view to 'enlarging our vision of the possible'
(p. 18). Dennett's notion of intuition pumps has many parallels with DuPlessis' conception of
feminist Utopian fiction, and as such seems to offer hope by association that Utopian literature
may be seen as philosophical. Yet I feel that this notion of possible worlds does not work to
explain literature's capacity for philosophical analysis, specifically because Dennett is in
agreement with DuPlessis at precisely those moments when she invokes the flaws of the
derisory definition.
DuPlessis characterizes the genre of Utopian fiction as fundamentally teleological, consisting of
texts which may be understood as 'teaching stories' (p. 179). Like DuPlessis, Dennett
emphasizes the didactic nature of thought experiments, asserting that philosopher's tales
function as 'powerful pedagogical devices'(p. 18). Both writers, then, invoke the functionality
of literature which I criticized above as a problematic induced by the derisory definition. But
there are hidden additional difficulties with their conceptions.
I can illustrate my concerns by looking at a specific example offered by Dennett. John Searle's
Chinese room argument is designed to show that computers cannot be said to think or
understand for themselves, and so that mind is not reducible to physical components, as certain
materialists (such as Dennett, for example) would have us believe. Searle asks his readers to
suppose themselves in the position of the computer as he sees it;
43 Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties ofFree Will Worth Wanting (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 17. Subsequent
page references will be given in the text.
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imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of
Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but
that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating these Chinese symbols [...]
the rule might say: Take a squiggle-squiggle sign out of basket number one and put it
next to a squoggle-squoggle sign from basket number two.'44
The model demonstrates that a person is in principle able to deal with and process information
written in Chinese even though that person is not able to understand the language. Therefore,
the fact that computers can deal with difficult and complex notions does not mean that they
may be said to understand such concepts themselves, only that they are able to do things with
them, as instructed by programmers.
The illustration works by an interesting reductive analysis of the elements involved to simple
oppositions. The notion of computer programming, which might seem remarkably complex
and sophisticated, is reduced to lo-tech symbols of baskets and overtly simplified rule-books,
with an added touch of humility which places author and reader in the position of the
mechanical sorter. In contrast, the conscious development of ideas which come from people,
the collective intellect which is so brilliant as to make human minds indubitably unique, but
which people often take for granted, is figured in an alien language of 'squiggle-squiggle' and
'squoggle-squoggle'. Whilst anyone - or, crucially for Searle's argument, anything - can be
reasonably expected to apply 'the rule-book in English' appropriately, it is of course ridiculous
for us to expect them to understand something so incomprehensible as the Chinese language.
I have argued that the derisory definition instigates a close, necessary and limiting relationship
between Utopias and politics, and that this may be used by critics either to criticize Utopian
novels as politically unrealistic, as does Lynn Williams, or to interpret the texts of the genre in
terms of their contributions to political science, as does Lucy Freibert. A political
interpretation of Searle's story would be relatively simple to initiate; the story is an
44 John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 32. Subsequent page references
will be given in the text.
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imperialistic one. Searle's story is a story of prejudice. The most obvious sense in which this
is the case is in its presentation of the Chinese language as a kind of gobbledegook which no
reasonable person could be expected to understand. Moreover, the reader is made complicit in
this operation, since
the whole point of the parable of the Chinese room is to remind us of a fact we knew
all along, (p. 33)
This represents a second sense in which the story is founded on prejudice; its force lies in our
understanding its point before we hear it. To this extent the story of the Chinese room reads
itself for us; its first move is to lock us in a room in an attempt to force our agreement.
Such stories, as conceived by DuPlessis and Dennett, are paradigm cases of 'telic art', or art
which is best understood as a means to an end.45 In addition, because that end is pre¬
determined by the author, whose will is personified by the story, the story is also self-
containing. It is a means to its own end. Again, intuition pumps like Searle's are
fundamentally circular because they assume and are premised on their own truth; they pre¬
judge themselves. A connection with this idea is suggested by DuPlessis in her analysis of
character in Utopian fiction. Character marks the place where DuPlessis makes the specific
connection between the genre of Utopian fiction and the philosophical. She says;
[cjharacters in these teaching stories are like Socratic questions; the ideas, not the
characters, are well rounded, (p. 179)
To illustrate this point, she later refers to a specific character in a Utopian novel written by
Joanna Russ as being '[l]ike a Socratic question to which Russ knows the answer' (p. 184).
Most obviously, this notion indicates that a philosophical connection is conceived in terms
which offer a simplistic and direct account of the relationship between the author and the text.
More specifically, DuPlessis implies an authorial determination which views effects of texts as
being fundamentally decideable. DuPlessis underestimates the way in which such a restrictive
45 I take this term and its sense from John Passmore, Serious Art: A Study of the Concept In All the Major Arts (London:
Duckworth, 1991), p. 6.
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view of the genre itself works to generate stasis. Because Russ is to be understood as making a
point, the role of the reader comes to be simply to find out what that point was; to be open to
didactic manipulation. Rather than facilitating a possibility which is beyond the text, such an
aesthetic identifies the text as essentially unified and holistic, and inevitably static.
This is also made clear in the second notion cited by Dennett as philosophy's raisoti d'etre. In
addition to expanding the realm of the possible, intuition pumps are said to illustrate a further
philosophical task of 'breaking bad habits of thought' (p. 18). If the case of Searle's Chinese
Room is representative, this term might be understood to mean that free thinking is to be
avoided in philosophy, because such tales only seek to persuade the reader of the author's point
of view; thinking is thus an unnecessary 'bad habit'. Intuition pumps become a way of
breaking that bad habit of thinking. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on the pervasive influence of
intuition pumps are followed by a critical dismantling of the intuition pumps which he argues
'feed' anxieties relating to the subject of free-will. This critical dismantling, readers are told,
will necessarily preface the analysis of the 'residual philosophical problems of genuine interest'
(p. 18). In other words, intuition pumps, or holistic philosophical tales, mislead and distract by
admitting only of a singular perspective, and so can be stripped away to leave the substantive
arguments for which they served as decoration.
In this way both Dennett and DuPlessis end up discussing, albeit in very different ways, a type
of story which can count as neither literature nor philosophy, and so cannot explain how
literature can be philosophical, in spite of the apparently promising nature of their arguments
with regard to my discussion of Utopian fiction. And this is why philosophers' illustrations, or
indeed all analogues which are apologues, count as neither literature nor philosophy. Such
stories are persuasive tools of torture, pushing readers to a single conclusion, rather than
developing and stimulating ideas in different directions.
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The notion of possible worlds, then, is inadequate as an explanation of how it is that literature
can be philosophical. This is because, to return to Carroll's example, the philosophical issues
which arise from my reading of the novels are said to be like the supposition that the moon is
made of green cheese, involving an absolute suspension of disbelief. Readers are to take
seriously notions which they would not ordinarily consider at all, but only temporarily, and for
a particular pre-determined purpose. Crucially, Carroll specifies that entertaining fiction
notions involves 'supposing them without commitment'.46 This description allows the notion
of 'possibility' to slide into an emphasis on 'mere possibility'.47 It permits Utopias in fiction to
make philosophical points, but only as addenda to real philosophical arguments. In other
words, it is not possible to escape from the Platonic value system through the gate of possible
worlds, putative solutions, or thought experiments, even when these ideas are conceived in the
terms of a whole genre, because they follow the derisory definition in picturing Utopian novels
as glass balls containing glitter and snow covered villages. Feminist versions of these future
worlds may indeed show how feminism could really work, but only in terms of a political
blueprint for a feminist theme park.
Moreover, texts understood as descriptions of a perfect world tell their readers what to think -
firstly that whatever happens there must be judged as good, and secondly that whatever
happens there could never really happen. In other words the restrictions of this definition
transform themselves into restrictions on conceptualizing. Philosophical tales take place in a
vacuum, where responses which draw attention to, for example, the racism of Searle's
illustration, are labelled irrelevant; the person objecting seen to be "missing the point".
46 Carroll, p. 98.
47 See Hilary Putnam, 'Literature, Science, and Reflection', New Literary History, 7:3 (1976), 483-491 (p. 488, author's italics).
My use of Putnam's contrast here is similar to the contrast drawn by Karl Mannheim between 'history' and ' "mere history," ', where
the latter term draws out the inadequacy of certain analyses of the concept, in Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the
Sociology ofKnowledge, trans, by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harvest Books, 1936), p. 92.
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Searle's room assumes itself to be free of socio-political constructs, but in fact cannot entirely
abstract itself from prejudice; it is locked in the room with us.
Marge Piercy's WET offers an interesting account of the kinds of discussion which might take
place in such a context. Connie describes how the dystopian world of the institution in which
she is incarcerated encourages, or at the very least facilitates, abstract thinking, since it was
only there that the inmates found the
leisure to argue about God and Sex and the State and the Good [...] sitting around
talking philosophy, (p. 86)
The grim constrained reality of life as an inmate ironically nurtures a free thinking about
society, its beliefs and structures, a 'leisure' which comes at the price of dislocation from each
of the elements of life which they represent. Religious, sexual, political and moral freedoms
are not part of life for those in the hospital, and so the subjects of their debate can be discussed
without seriousness. There is a futility in the tone of the statement which collects together all
those Big Ideas, concepts which have occupied Great Minds for centuries, and then sums up
their invocation as an impotent 'sitting around talking philosophy'. The anti-climax works as a
critique of that philosophy which belongs to the ivory tower, or to Searle's room, where ideas
are discussed in isolation, without taking account of the prejudice which must perforce infuse
them.
The traditions of the derisory definition, and the non-traditional adherents to it, keep the genre
distinct from feminist, philosophical and Utopian thinking. I now seek to bring them together.
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B. Making Utopian Fiction Feminist Philosophical
In this section I will propose three notions which connect Utopia with feminist philosophy as an
incitement to read. The first is that of defamiliarization, the second is uncertainty, and the third
possibility. I will conceive of the three notions in a developmental fashion.
1. DEFAMILARIZATION
Defamiliarization is a term coined by the Russian formalist Victor Shlovsky, who argues that
Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness ofan object; the object is not important,48
Shlovsky seeks to focus attention upon not what art represents but rather how it presents; its
technique or 'artfulness'. At the same time, there is no reason why focusing on the technique
should necessarily preclude analysis of that which is presented. Rather defamiliarization can
be understood as describing the process whereby technique calls attention to the object, forcing
me to consider that which I take for granted in everyday life as if it were my first encounter
with it. It is an aesthetic attitude adopted in order to stimulate consideration of life as it is not
normally considered.
Daphne Patai has shown that defamiliarization of this kind is a fundamental element of Utopian
fiction. She says that such novels' employment of defamiliarization effectively
breaks through our automatic familiarity and acceptance of our own society by
estranging us from it and making us view it critically.49
Works within the genre of Utopian fiction create new worlds and, thereby, new relationships
between the readers and their world. Defamiliarization describes how this works most usefully.
48 Victor Shlovsky, 'Art as Technique' trans, by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays,
ed. by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 5-24 (p. 12, author's italics).
49
Daphne Patai, 'Beyond Defensiveness: Feminist Research Strategies', in Women and Utopia, ed. by Barr and Smith, pp. 148-169
(p. 152).
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It relates aspects of the world in which readers live as if from a perspective outside that world,
in order to urge the reader to read differently. In this sense defamilarization brings the
relativity implied by the evaluative aspects of Utopia - namely eutopia and dystopia - to the
centre of my understanding of the genre, by introducing a notion of wilful alienation.
Traditionally, philosophers have promoted a strategy of alienation as a philosophical method.
Philosophical study is often usefully introduced to new students as the "asking of naive
questions" which concern the search for meanings of notions with which they are already
familiar, for example knowledge, justice, truth, art, and so on.50 These concepts are stripped
of their everyday contexts, whilst methods such as logical analysis are used to allow the
philosopher to assess them anew. Philosophers thus might focus on the idea of detachment to
characterize philosophical understanding. In Chapter Two I suggested some ways in which
detachment from philosophical issues might be problematic. However, the notion of
defamiliarization may be employed to salvage the ways in which philosophy can usefully make
strange the world and my experience of it, whilst retaining an awareness of where I am coming
from. For example, a version of defamiliarization may be read in this description of the
philosophical method by Bertrand Russell;
Philosophy [...] is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and
free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty
as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge of what they may be; [...] it
keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.51
The notion of defamiliarization can be used to distinguish this analysis of Russell's from his
urge to omniscience which I queried in Chapter Two. Here, there is no appeal to discard
situation or specificity. Nor is the subject of philosophy abstracted as 'man' (p. 93). Rather,
the call to alienation is a call to 'our' subjectivities to make an imaginative, intellectual
extension from subjectivity. The effect of this extension is described coherently in terms of
3" This approach is captured effectively in the title of A. F. Chalmers' popular introduction to the philosophy of science; What Is This
Thing Called Science? An Assessment of the Nature and Status ofScience and Its Methods (Milton Keynes; Open University
Press, 1978).
51
Russell, p. 91. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
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individual writers and readers, their relationships, and the possibilities for movement between
them.
That defamiliarization focuses on relationships and change makes it peculiarly appropriate for
feminist writers. Feminists have often sought to shift the focus of academic concern from
isolated objects and subjects to the spaces between them.52 The advantage of defamiliarization
is that it implicates the notion ofmovements in these between places. As a conception of
Utopian fiction it resists stasis, and requires kinesis, or, more specifically, an ongoing
willingness to move.53 This movement may be understood as a crucial element of feminism, in
two specific senses. First, having thought that certain ways of regarding ourselves and others
are not only acceptable but also natural, defamiliarization of patriarchal attitudes can lead to
new perspectives on our existence and behaviour.54 Furthermore, this defamiliarization may
initiate a process whereby feminists continue to resist that which presents itself as natural.
I would like to illustrate this second stage of association with reference to a remark by Sheila
Rowbotham. Rowbotham's persistent emphasis upon the role of praxis for feminism may be
captured in her reference to 'the oppressive distancing of theory'. However, Rowbotham also
manages to theorize another version of theory which is fundamentally motivating;
'Abstraction' should help us to move when we wish and settle in the best camping
places.55
Movement is, I suggest, the most significant element of this intuition pump, which resists the
permanence of bricks and mortar and instead emphasizes the importance of shifting ground.
Moreover, Rowbotham's gesture, in de-camping from her rejection of theory, rather than
52 A significant example is that of object relations theory. See Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction ofMothering: Psychoanalysis
and the Sociology ofGender (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).
33 H. G. Wells draws a distinction between traditional Utopias, which may be labelled static, and Utopias for the new age, which must
perforce be kinetic. See A Modern Utopia (London: Nelson and Sons, [n.d.]), p. 16.
3 See Sandra Lee Bartky, 'Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness', in Femininity and Domination: Studies In the
Phenomenology ofOppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 11-21.
55 Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright, Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making ofSocialism
(London: Merlin Press, 1979), p. 55.
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settling within the safe binary opposition of praxis defined against theory, offers a
demonstration of the importance of such feminist movement. By incorporating this kind of
resistance, then, the notion of defamiliarization offers to draw feminists to the Utopian and the
philosophical.
Philosophy, feminism and Utopian fiction share common ground in the defamiliarization
process. Another way of saying this is that the genre of Utopian fiction's employment of the
techniques of defamiliarization make it a particularly appropriate camping place for the
feminist and the philosophical. The incitement to read which the disciplines thus share may be
seen as a process whereby our automatic understanding of such ideas is replaced by an
approach which
exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to
make the stone stony.56
In this way defamiliarization offers hope for the beginning of a new way of understanding
reading as feeling, and for these reasons forms the first premise for my understanding of
Utopian fiction as feminist and philosophical.
2. UNCERTAINTY
The second stage of this process initiated by defamiliarization invokes uncertainty. Utopian
fiction, understood as feminist and philosophical, has a destabilizing effect, in the sense that it
makes the reader think in a way which insists that I regard myself as an other. In this way, not
only is the reader barred from assuming the familiar context of he/r life, but s/he is also to be
drawn out of he/r own subjectivity. This challenges, for example, Searle's rhetorical




understand a word of Chinese', by removing any certainty that others are like him in this
respect. Traditionally, Utopian fiction achieves this uncertainty by having a stranger from
another world express wonder at features of society which readers may take for granted, or by
presenting a world where certain features which readers may regard as indispensable are
dispensed with. In the case of feminist Utopian fiction, this may mean that notions are exposed
as sexist, and supportive of patriarchal power relationships. Uncertainty arises as a result of
the position of the reader, who is invited to move between locations of strangeness and
familiarity, becoming less sure of, for example, what is natural, what is inevitable, and what is
good.
Moments of uncertainty in WET are presented during the scenes concerning human
reproductive methods in Mattapoisett. The eutopian society employs a process of mechanical
reproduction, and collaborative parenting, both designed to free women from the labours of the
birthing process. A number of critics have noted similarities between these sections of WET
and feminist visions of society which see biological functions as working against women, and
make the case that liberation would be liberation from them."'7 Far fewer critics note that
mechanical reproduction is not simply a preferred alternative in the text. In fact, the novel's
protagonist is greatly disturbed by the reproductive technology of the future world. Connie's
upset and anger focuses specifically on the mechanization of the reproductive process, as she
imagines 'a canned child', and contrasts this with her privileged phenomenological knowledge;
How could anyone know what being a mother means who has never carried a child
nine months heavy under her heart, [...] who has never suckled a child. What do they
know of motherhood?
Connie goes on to make a direct connection between the 'bland bottle-bom monsters' of
Mattapoisett, and the oppressive forces of her world which took away 'my flesh and blood' (p.
106). Connie's perspective, then, opposes that of the eutopia. But her perspective is not a
37 An example of such a political text is Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic ofSex: The Case For Feminist Revolution (London:
Bantam Books, 1971), p. 211. The connection between Firestone's text and WET is pointed out by Moylan, pp. 134-135; and Sarah
Lefanu, In the Chinks of the World Machine: Feminism and Science Fiction (London: Women's Press, 1988), p. 59.
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straw figure, invoked for purposes of ridicule. Similar arguments, for example, are presented
by Iris Marion Young in an article presenting a phenomenological analysis of pregnancy.
Young argues that in a patriarchal society '[p]regnancy does not belong to the woman
herself'.58 Specifically
the pregnant subject's encounter with obstetrical medicine [...] often alienates her from
her pregnant and birthing experience [...] because medical instruments objectify
internal processes in such a way that they devalue a woman's experience of those
processes, and because the social relations and instrumentation of the medical setting
reduce her control over her experience, (p. 168)
Such a feeling is expressed in Connie's negative response to the futuristic methods of
reproduction in Mattapoisett. As part of her tour of Luciente's village, she is shown around
the 'brooder' (p. 101), where she sees not 'embryos', as they are described by Bee, but 'seven
human babies joggling slowly upside down' (p. 102). Aghast at the notion of mechanical birth,
Connie immediately experiences a parallel physical reaction, and 'gaped, her stomach also
turning slowly upside down' (p. 102).
The fact that Connie has experienced biological motherhood is not ignored by the inhabitants of
the future world, but the questions they ask seem superficial and mystify the reader as much as
they do Connie;
"Did you bear alive?" [...] "Was there a lot of blood?" [...] "Was it exciting? Did it feel
sexual?"(p. 103)
Connie's experience of pregnancy makes her an oddity to the people of Mattapoisett, even
though it is perfectly ordinary for the reader. Yet is it? The alienation which Connie
experiences seems to parallel that of Young's pregnant subject in the patriarchal world. The
uncertainty here is to be found in the extent to which readers simultaneously share and reject
Connie's position. Alienated by her contemporaries, her family, and the authorities, Connie
has turned to this new world for solace and understanding, only to find that its inhabitants also
38 Iris Marion Young, 'Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation', in Throwing Like a Girl, and Other Essays In Feminist
Philosophy and Social Theory (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 160-174 (p. 160). Subsequent page
references will be given in the text.
157
exclude her. Moreover, she finds that her attitude to the reproductive methods of Mattapoisett
may mean that she excludes herself. As a result the reader, like Connie, doesn't know where
s/he stands, either in relation to others, or even in relation to he/rself.
The success of the technique whereby readers invest in Connie's uncertainty may be apparent
in the number of critics who assume without question that Connie's world and that of the
readers are one and the same. My conception of the genre urges a resistance to the certainty
that this is a representation of contemporary life, because although I can see similarities, there
are also differences. It might be more accurate to say that in WET, readers react with Connie
to the new concepts with which they are confronted. As a result, her alienation is our
alienation, and, crucially, ours is also hers. The text cleverly places us in the position of the
oppressed rather than merely presenting us with images of oppression. But at the same time, it
refuses to offer a simple position with which we may identify, because the alternatives are so
compelling. Instead, readers are forced to read in the in-between. As a feminist philosophical
strategy, then, this creation of uncertainty through defamiliarization is a technique which
effectively engages the reader in active reference.59
3. POSSIBILITY
Thirdly, and relatedly, I suggest that potential for feminist interpretations of Utopian literature
lies in the notion of the genre representing real possibilities for my consideration, rather than
make-believe possibilities for my entertainment. At first these possibilities may not make
sense, and may even prove disorienting and disconcerting, but gradually, readers may learn to
59
My reading of WET here contrasts starkly with that of Frances Bartkowski, in Feminist Utopias (Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1989). Bartkowski insists that Piercy's novel is 'static', and 'places the reader in the position of passively receiving'
(p. 50).
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rethink conceptual schemes, the way in which we regard people and objects around us, and the
way in which different aspects of our world fit together.
In The Wanderground, readers are asked to consider the possibility that the natural world
participates in harmony with the human world; that plants communicate with people, and offer
mutually beneficial exchanges. A poignant example occurs when, eager but exhausted on her
journey to the Remember Rooms, Clana asks for help from a fern;
"will you pretend that you live on tiredness? And I will live on being excited?" The
fern immediately agreed and [...] Clana [...] inhaled the rich energy that was the fern's
exhalation and gave back to the plant [...] tiredness; that tiredness was the stuff of the
fern's life. She could actually see the plant soaking up her fatigue, quenching its
thirst. "It works!" she thought, (p. 134)
Such a possibility can be seen in terms of a defamiliarization of the natural world, followed by
an assumption of uncertainty as to the reader's attitude to this. This background means that
the consideration of possibilities is not confined within a binary opposition whose role is to
decide "is this possible or is it not?" and then "given that it is not possible, what would a world
in which it was possible look like?", but rather focuses upon questions like "in what ways does
Clana's attitude differ from my own?", and "what might it mean for me now to make this
supposition?". In this way the possibilities of Utopian fiction may signal the achievement of
movement beyond conceptual schema with which I am comfortable and familiar, towards a
radical contingency which values openness and creativity, and the freedom of space in the
middle excluded by the logic of binary oppositions.
Utopian fiction, then, may be premised on the claim that the world which appears to us is not
the way it is necessarily; it might have been otherwise. However, where traditional
philosophical skepticism may focus upon the negative here, Utopian fiction may emphasize the
positive. It can reflect an important element of optimism in the genre of Utopian fiction, by
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addressing that which could be. So, the notion of contingency offers a way of talking about
otherness in a new and positive way.
The possibility of otherness does not constitute a denial of my subject position. Rather it
incorporates a recognition of this position along with the demand that I be able to move
imaginitively beyond that position to a position of otherness. In this sense, contingency is a
way of looking at the world openly. It asks readers to notice that this could be that, then could
be now, there could be here, and you could be me. Moreover, because my own position is
radically implicated as, at the very least, a reference point, in all of these possibilities, they can
never be mere idle speculation, but rather constitute a serious consideration of multiple
possibilities.
Contemplation of contingencies then, is one crucial way in which defamilarization operates
through uncertainty to demand the possibilities of feminist philosophical movement. I will
continue my meditative project by looking at the possibility of knowledge which is not
introspective, involving knowledge ofmy own subject position, but rather involves knowing
others. This may materialize into specific philosophical questions such as "do other minds
exist?"; "how is communication possible?"; "how can one mind interact with others?", all
questions which the genre of Utopian fiction as I have described it seems peculiarly placed to
address.
C. Reading Philosophical Utopian Fiction
The problem of other minds arises from Cartesian skepticism, and begins by asking "how can I
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know of the existence of other minds?". Utopian fiction offers a way of looking at this question
liberated from its skeptical origins, by focusing on the possibilities of growing aware of other
minds and their contents. So, where analytic philosophy tends to concentrate on the
examination of the significance and consequences of a putative impossibility of the existence of
other minds, fiction which falls within the remit of this genre can examine the significance and
consequences of a putative possibility of the existence of other minds. In addition, Utopian
fiction is well placed to offer a much greater range of analysis in connection with this
philosophical question, because it asks it afresh. As a result, I hope to develop the concerns of
this section to the consideration of the communicative potential of investigating other minds.
But the novels which I have chosen to examine might be shown to begin with an analysis of
that strange question, "how can one mind know of the existence of other minds?".
1. THE ABSURD QUESTION
How is it possible to be aware of the existence of other minds? From outside the traditional
field of philosophy, this sounds like an absurd question.60 In this section I will take the two
novels upon which I have chosen to focus to argue differently in response to this absurdity. In
the case of The Wanderground, an attempt is made to represent the imaginative picture of the
relationships between minds, and so overcome the superficial absurdity of the question. On the
other hand, I will suggest that WET argues that the absurdity is not a superficiality of the
question, but rather a crucial element of it, and further, that this absurdity itself offers a way of
imaging the problem. I interpret this novel to suggest that any answer to the question about the
existence of other minds is equally absurd, and both question and answer can only be
understood in terms of madness. Note that this is quite different from an argument that the
60
My starting point here may be contrasted with Cavell's argument in Disowning Knowledge that dramatic tragedy may by said to
revalue the discredited claims of radical skepticism.
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question cannot be "made sense of' at all, but nonetheless, it is a perspective which refuses to
be certain of the significance of questions about the existence of other minds.
In the first of Sally Miller Gearhart's stories in The Wanderground, the reader is introduced to
a layering of experience which offers the opportunity of experiencing the point of view of
others. I want to refer closely to the opening of this story in order to make my point clear. The
story begins like this;
Opening
Jacqua stood above the Eastern Ensconsement gazing across the high meadow. Far
below, anger was being spoken. She knew that anger came from two sisters who had
overvisited with each other, but she could grasp no words - only intentions. Suddenly
from a completely different direction she heard in her head the clang of armor, (p. 1)
The title of this first story warns the reader that something new and different is going to happen
here. In addition, opening is the word which will be used in the novel to describe the process of
allowing other people into one's consciousness. The different layers of consciousness are set
up spatially. Jacqua stands with the reader high up, looking across the landscape, whilst the
core events of the story of 'Opening', and the scene to which the reader's attentions eventually
will be drawn, happen on the ground beneath her. There is a traditional premise of distinction,
between someone monitoring, and other separate groups being monitored. This is the premise
of the question as to whether or not other minds exist. It opposes object to subject in a picture
of communication through confrontation. However, Jacqua's knowledge does not conform to
such a pattern. To begin with, her knowledge of anger is not a result of inferring mental causes
from linguistic effects; the latter are not available to her. What she does 'grasp', are the
projections of the women; their intentions. Because her awareness is cited at the level of
projection, the general knowledge of existence of other minds contributes to the specific
knowledge of this case of anger. Again, contact with others occurs at the point where they also
interact with their environment, having 'intentions' towards it.
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The reader becomes involved in the estrangement from language as, at the same time, invented
words are included within the text. The term 'overvisited', for example, does not exist in the
English language, and yet the word does not disrupt the flow of the text. I seem to know what
it means as a result of combining the knowledge of the meaning of 'over' and 'visited' with the
knowledge of the context in which it appears, as something which, when someone does it
together with me, can cause anger. The collaboration of factors which contribute to meaning
mirrors the collaboration of the term. Again, both the signifier and the signified share the
theme of collaboration.
This kind of open listening for meaning is in turn experienced by Jacqua, as she hears a sound
in her head 'from a completely different direction'. This is a source of spatial confusion for the
reader, but for Jacqua the place where noise comes from becomes increasingly the focus of
concern, and source of additional information;
How did she know it was armor? Who in the world wore armor anymore? It sounded
as if the wearer walked at a good pace. With each step the armor sighed and creaked,
rattling a bit. In the background were the winter forest noises. [...] All she could do
was listen, (p. 1)
These questions might be part of the reader's response, as s/he shares Jacqua's puzzlement
with regard to what is happening. A pattern of involvement, or drifting together, and
estrangement, or drifting apart, is tentatively established between Jacqua and the reader. Any
fixity must be resisted in this relationship; detachment is as unwise as overvisiting. But Jacqua
allows herself to focus on what she can discover. She will allow the layers of information to
build up until they become a fuller, more meaningful picture.
And then, as suddenly as it began, the noise, or flow of information, stops. The story cannot be
told. But just as doubt threatens to take over, help is at hand;
Jacqua grew impatient. She was only beginning to train herself. Perhaps she was
making some mistake.
"You're doing fine." The thought was enfolding her. (p. 2)
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Diana intervenes in the form of an 'enfolding', reassuring thought to restore Jacqua's faith in
her senses, telling her that '[w]hat you're hearing is really happening' (p. 2). Diana cannot be
fixed on the linear model which placed Jacqua as monitor and the woman in armour as
monitored; she is behind Jacqua, supporting her, but also between her and the core scene,
attempting to bring the two together. The theme of collaboration is then pushed even further
with Diana's offer of co-operative perception;
"Look with me," said Diana.
They locked minds, Diana's eye-seeing pushing outward and away, expanding with
her power, (p. 4)
In this way the senses, whose ability to convey information is often thought of as fixed, and to
be taken for granted, are stretched with the power of self-belief. This is shown to have
immediate effect; the addition of visual to aural information facilitates the narration of the core
story of Seja meeting the woman wearing armour, as Diana, Jacqua, and the reader, look on
and listen in.
This first story uses the theme of layering to ease the reader into a position of empathic
consciousness. It presents the story of the strangers meeting, balanced out with a scene
involving friends who have become too close. Both of these narratives are filtered to the reader
through the senses of first one, then two, women, whose foregrounded stmggle to attain the
details of the story echoes the difficult task of the reader. The difficult task is, nevertheless,
made manageable, through collaborative effort.
The resistance to singularity offers a resistance to solipsism, and the theme of balance demands
that in order to make sense of the question as to whether other minds exist I presume that
others may ask it of me, and in this sense, answer it with the asking. I will develop this notion
throughout this section.
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The first two sentences of WET offer a contrasting insight into Connie's insecurities with
regard to her perceptions;
Connie got up from her kitchen table and walked slowly to the door. Either I saw him
or I didn't and I'm crazy for real this time, she thought, (p. 9)
Like Jacqua and Diana, Connie experiences sights and sounds in her head, but in the dystopian
society in which she lives this is given an absolute and direct interpretation of unacceptability,
of madness. Jacqua's doubt regarding the sounds in her head lead her to wonder if she was
accessing information properly, or if she has made a 'mistake' (Gearhart, p. 2). Similarly, for
Connie, the experience has to have been full and directly in front of her eyes, or she will regard
herself as 'crazy'. Clearly, there can be no sense in which one can see another person's mind.
Perhaps, then, to imagine they exist is to declare oneself mad. And yet what would this
madness mean? It would mean that compared with other minds I am unable to reason. In other
words, to declare myself mad is to declare the existence of other (sane) minds.61
As with the beginning of Gearhart's Utopian fiction, this early section of the novel leaves the
reader in an interesting position. For it is Connie's thoughts, the thoughts which Connie herself
does not trust, to which readers are immediately offered access. Furthermore, it is the specific
thought that Connie does not trust her thoughts, which introduces the reader to the
protagonist's mental life. Access to this other mind is premised on uncertainty.62 This
presentation of alternate possibilities offers a fuller picture of the mental, allowing the reader to
make up he/r own mind about Connie and what she may or may not have seen.
61 For ways in which madness may be historically determined as a defensive move by those who wish to define themselves as rational
and therefore not mad see Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History ofInsanity In the Age ofReason, trans, by
Richard Howard (London: Routledge, 1989).
62 This reading of a position with regard to other minds in WET contrasts with Nussbaum's reading of the ethical other in Woolf s To
The Lighthouse, because Nussbaum's position is characterized by certainty. See Martha C. Nussbaum, 'The Window: Knowledge of
Other Minds In Virginia Woolf s To the Lighthouse', New Literary History, 26:4 (1995), 731-753. Nussbaum says that Woolf's
novel offers 'a miraculous access to thoughts of the characters' (p. 741), and so demonstrates that the form of 'the literary text [...]
alone permits us to have what amounts to knowledge of the mind of another living person' (p. 750). Indeed, Nussbaum has such
confidence in this interpretation of the novel that she expresses her own certainty that 'this novel representsWoolf s own personal
attempt to know the minds of her own parents' (p. 741).
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Significantly, Connie's doubt is not paralyzing. Indeed, the thought occurs to her as she is
walking to answer her door, where her niece is desperately seeking sanctuary from the man
who has physically abused her. The hectic scene which follows, where the violent Geraldo
arrives to reclaim Dolly, culminates in Connie's institutionalization. Geraldo blames the
incident on Connie, and in the dystopian world of the institution, his version of the story is
accepted as true. Connie is labelled mad, and her remarks and behaviour interpreted in
accordance with this label. An interesting consequence of the conviction on behalf of the
institution that Connie is 'crazy for real' is that she has no authority over her own mind. So,
when Connie asks for a doctor to examine the injuries she received from Geraldo, her requests
are treated with a patronizing disbelief by the social worker;
"You say it hurts you. Where do you believe you feel pain?"
"In my side. My ribs [...] Those are the worse places. The rest is just bruises."
"In your side?"
"It hurts every breath I take. Please?"
"Well, you do have bruises. All right, I'll speak to the nurse." (pp. 27-28)
Connie's reports of her feelings are treated as valuable only insofar as they offer insights into
her mental instability. Her complaints of pain are given no credence in themselves, because
they are interpreted in terms of the label of madness. Only when the external evidence of
bruising, a bruising which Connie herself sees as insignificant, seems to substantiate her claims
will her story be taken seriously. Yet still the expressed "belief' that she feels pain may be
doubted. How is this possible?
In one sense such a doubt may be said to demonstrate the problem with strict logical
behaviourism, which argues that to feel pain is to report it, and vice versa. Since it is clearly
possible for me to say I feel pain when I don't, this way of explaining the way in which
sensations work is overly simplistic. Again, when Connie says she is hurting, this may or may
not be the case. External evidence, such as bruising, is the only accurate guide others can
have. In another sense, such doubt suggests a refutation of Cartesian dualism, which argues
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that I have a clear and distinct impression of all my mental events such that 'there is nothing
which is easier for me to know than my own mind'.63 In contrast, the doubt engendered by the
scene in WET suggests that this may not be the case. Even if Connie is not lying, as the
critique of behaviourism seems to propose, she may be regarded by the social worker to be
simply mistaken about her pain.
This latter seems to be an interpretation which is more faithful to the text, and the fact that
Connie's behaviour is seen through the filter of the institution, which assumes that she has no
control over her actions and statements, supports this. The social worker's remarks seem
consistent with this criticism of Cartesian dualism. However, rather than simply taking into
account Connie's identification as mad, I think that such an identification is central to a
philosophical understanding of the social worker's comments. Connie is being seen as a
different kind of person to the rest of us. Her alleged madness means that her reports of her
feelings are to be treated in a certain kind of way. One consequence of this is that her mind is
not representative of others precisely because of her social status.
This is in part why the world in which Connie lives counts as dystopian. It classifies people
according to pre-determined criteria, placing some people in a position to distinguish
themselves from a collection of others, and to delineate the boundaries of those other people's
thinking. In Connie's case, the social worker, along with others who work on behalf of the
institution, believes that she has direct access to Connie's mind. Her position of power allows
her to assume this access against Connie's openness, refusing to use the patient's remarks as
an invitation to share her thoughts, lest this lead to her seeing something which is not
commensurate with the prescription she already has. The social worker will only use
information which has been presented in a way which fits with this prescription.
63 Descartes, p. 58.
167
In this way the dystopian power structure is presented as working against the collaboration
which people can have with regard to sharing each others thoughts, cutting people off from one
another, and preventing them from the possibilities of sharing access to each others' thoughts.
As a victim of the system, Connie is not subject to these restrictions of mind. In fact we are
told that frequently she 'knew at once things about others she should not know' (p. 43). She
realizes that Dolly is pregnant when she comes back from Puerto Rico just by looking at her (p.
39), and she knew that her husband Eddie had been having an affair in the same way. But her
gifts lead to her being called 'crazy' and 'witch' (p. 43). Such a labelling, on behalf of the
dystopian world, may be fruitfully contrasted with Connie's own questioning of her sanity in
the first line of the novel. When other people wish to label her mad, it is a way of making her
otherness manageable, facilitating an automatic interpretation of her behaviour in terms of that
madness. Whilst denying mental experience to those of whose prior mental experience it
disapproves, such an accusation also interprets all subsequent mental experience in accordance
with this label. In this sense, labelling others mad is revealed to be subject to Freudian kettle
logic, since multiple propositions are offered simultaneously 'where only an "either-or" is
possible'.64
On the other hand Connie's drawing attention to her own alleged madness is a way of placing
her experience in the balance. If she is sane, then she did see Luciente in the outside world. On
the other hand, if she is 'crazy for real this time', then Luciente will have been part of her
imaginative experience. This once more may be said to reflect the absurdity of the question as
to whether or not I can be aware of other minds, because it suggests that only if I am mad can I
be aware ofmy own mind. To consider myself mad, then, may be to allow myself to conceive
of the philosophical question "how can I be aware of the existence of other minds?"
64
Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, trans, by James Strachey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1960), p. 62.
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The future world ofMattapoisett offers a comparative revaluation of the perspective of the
mad. Indeed, Connie has been successfully contacted by citizens from the future world via her
peculiarly receptive mental qualities. Luciente, the first person to contact her from
Mattapoisett, describes Connie as 'basically good and wide open to others' (p. 57). She values
Connie as 'an extraordinary top catcher' and says that in the future world of Mattapoisett she
'would be much admired' (p. 42) for her heightened intuitive capacities. This is, perhaps, due
to the different conception which the people of Mattapoisett have of madness. For them,
madness is a faculty of the brain, the achievement of a state from which one '[e]merges and
sets to work again with harnessed passion' (p. 65). Respect for such a state means that the
minds of the mad are not confined and defined, in the way in which those in Connie's world
are, but rather are given more control over their thoughts, in order to fulfil their mental
potential. Luciente says;
"Our madhouses are places where people retreat when they want to go down into
themselves - to collapse, carry on, see visions, hear voices of prophecy, bang on the
walls, relive infancy - getting in touch with the buried self and the inner mind."
These experiences have to be left under the control of the individual; they must be a response to
he/r feelings. Crucially, this is because madness is a possibility for anyone;
"We all lose parts of ourselves. We all make choices that go bad....How can another
person decide that it is time for me to disintegrate, to reintegrate myself?" (p. 66)
WET introduces us to the notion that there may be cultural blocks to our capacity for growing
aware of the existence and possibilities of other minds, and that there are absurdities embedded
in the question of whether or not I can be aware of the existence of other minds. At the same
time, together with The Wanderground, it offers hope that at some future date people may
become open enough to appreciate mental otherness, in terms of similarity in difference.
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In both novels, then, a crucial response to the question about other minds is the implication of
the questioner. S/he too must see he/rself as an other mind, if the question is to be made sense
of at all.
2. PRIVATE LANGUAGE
The private language argument may be seen as Wittgenstein's response to the proposed
Cartesian doubt of the existence of other minds. Wittgenstein argues in his Philosophical
Investigations that the idea of a private language is incoherent, because by its very definition,
there can be no rules for understanding such a language.65 Viewed as a response to the
question about other minds, it may be said to cite the existence of a functioning communication
system as proof that other minds exist. I read the Utopian novels which I have chosen to focus
upon as participating in this debate. In them, communication becomes an issue of sharing
one's mind. In WET, for example, Luciente describes various attempts of the community at
Mattapoisett to contact another world;
"After a whole generation of communicating with the Yif, we are merely transmitting
digital code. We think of the Yif as superrational, a world of mathematicians - and
maybe that's how they vision us." (pp. 56-57)
Because language systems have a fundamentally public function, they must be positioned at a
comprehensible level. This places a restriction on relationships, as Luciente acknowledges, in
the sense that this level may be said to determine either participant's view of the other. And yet
this level is not fixed, and Luciente takes this as a hopeful sign for she and Connie in spite of
their mutual misunderstandings;
"We have only been at this a few weeks, and look how strong and clear we are talking.
If we both work at it, we should hear better and better!"
"Work at it!" Connie chuckled, remembering Professor Everett Sylvester in bed,
working at sex. Her body was a problem he was solving. He put everything in pass-
fail terms. "You're crazy, you know that? If I'm not." (p. 57)
65 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans, by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackweil, 1953), para. 269.
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The view that language can be worked at, practised, and achieved, seems to be counter¬
intuitive, since language often presents itself as a natural mode of communication; like good
lovemaking, you either understand how it is done, or you don't. In fact, Luciente's conception
seems so unlikely to Connie that she reverts back to her assessment of madness. This may also
take the reader back to the second line of the book; '[e]ither I saw him or I didn't and I'm crazy
for real this time, she thought' (p. 9). The difference here is that Luciente is also implicated in
the assessment of madness. And Luciente's positive interpretation of madness allows the
reader to feel perhaps that here it becomes a shared possibility, rather than an accusation.
The reemergence of this topic draws attention to the way in which the private language
argument highlights the absurdity of the question about other minds. But it also shows that the
private language argument itself adopts this absurd quality, since it employs the skeptical
perspective with questions like, "but how can you know that other people are following rules
correctly when they use language?". In fact Luciente's approach to language rules, which
follows a developmental model, improvements upon which will change the conversants images
of each other, is far more helpful, since it offers a possibility of future 'interseeing and
comprending' (p. 56), terms for which, once more, readers have no ready meaning, but can
almost glimpse the kind of communication to which they refer.
However, finding out what others are feeling has a negative interpretation in the novel, for
example technologically, as the hospital where Connie is incarcerated begins a series of
experiments on its patients involving brain implants to control behaviour. Post-operative
responses are made to follow rules absolutely; they become acutely predictable, in the sense
that they are controlled from the outside by others. But are they? Alice, for example, says that
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her submissive behaviour is pretended; 'I just stringing them along' (p. 261). Connie also has
faith that Skip's mind is not completely under the control of the doctors;
They had not burned out or cut out as much as they thought, she hoped. Something of
Skip survived, (p. 271)
This uncertainty is crucial, because it distances the reader from the medical establishment
which believes that mental content can be made to follow rules. For example, during a brain
probe, Connie shares with the reader her thought that her brains are being scooped out like
food from a can. This confidence alienates us from Dr. Reddings' conclusion that, when
Connie refers out loud to eating, '[djoubtless we stimulated an appetite center' (p. 282).
Reddings is convinced that he holds the rule book for the language which the patients use to
express thoughts, but the reader is not, thankfully, permitted this certainty.
The doctors treat the patients in the hospital as if they are machines. When the same doctor
describes the procedure carried out on the first of their experimental subjects, Alice, Connie
notes that
[h]e sounded like the repairman from the telephone company calling in to report on a
job. (p. 202)
Reddings' communications with Alice are staged for the video camera, and apart from these
scripted lines he does not speak to her at all. Most importantly, he does not consider her as
someone with a mind like his own. This may be contrasted with Sybil who, immediately after
the demonstration is over, offers both sympathy and empathy;
"Poor Alice!" Sybil shook her head. "She must be humiliated! Imagine playing up to
that fascist because he presses a button." (p. 205)
The imagination which Sybil assumes is not only an imagining of how she would feel, were she
in Alice's position, but also of how Alice feels given Alice's pride and strength of character,
personality traits with which the reader is also familiar, having been shown Alice's previous
behaviour (p. 145). This projection brings together compassion from empathy (not identity)
and difference, to effect a dismissal of the suspicions that other minds do not exist. This
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dismissal occurs on two grounds. First, because Sybil, along with the reader, can see what a
confident denial of the existence of such entities can lead to, namely the behaviour of the
medical staff carrying out the experiments. Second, because to regard others as people at all
means continuing to assess them in terms of how I am, and how they have been. Questions like
"but how do you know for certain" thus once more take on an absurd quality, because to know
for certain that they did not exist is to deny my own existence, and to know for certain that they
did exist, is to deny the uncertainty, and therefore the possibility. In these ways WET helps to
highlight the ways in which the private language argument may be said to perpetuate the
absurdity of the original question.
Like Luciente, the women of the Wanderground realize that communication is something to be
practised. Nevertheless, the expression of their telepathy in the novel often seems to constitute
an argument which questions the distinction between a public and a private language since,
through being open, each woman may reveal her mental experience to others without speaking.
Ijeme, for example, is able to relate in silence the story of her fleeing from the city (pp. 63-66).
In this way, the women are able to understand each other's stories, privately, yet in
communion.
However, there are sticking points for this kind of communication. The first is knowledge or
assumption of the kinds of minds involved. The process of making mental contact is termed
'enfoldmenf, and is defined by Evona in genderized terms. Evona is clearly threatened by the
demonstration of telepathy by the friendly men (gentles) in the city. She tells the men that
whilst the powers of the women are characterized by care, their power is
"just another fancy prick to invade the world with. And you'll use it because you can't
really communicate, you can't really love!" (p. 179)
Evona is angry because the men have come too close to displaying a capacity which she
associates exclusively with women. The reason that she accuses them of not being able to
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communicate is because they have not followed her rules for who is allowed to communicate in
this particular way. In this sense Evona is unable to recognize otherness.
A related difficulty arises in the attempts of the women to keep alive the memory of
heterosexual experience. It is often considered to be the case in philosophy that whatever is
conceivable, is thereby logically possible.66 Philosophers who do not explicitly advocate this
position often consider the fact that an argument is counterintuitive to be a strong objection to
it, thus carrying forward the implications of logical impossibility for the inconceivable. In The
Wanderground, the reader is asked to consider a future world where something which s/he
might take for granted as natural or normal, is inconceivable. So, Jacqua reacts to a history
lesson - a telling of our time - by saying
Love men? The idea did not fit. It was uncomfortable and backward in her mind.
(P- 2)
For Jacqua, the notion of female heterosexuality is inconceivable. Though philosophically
significant, this inconceivability does not entail logical impossibility, since female
heterosexuality is a feature of an historical culture.
The idea that female heterosexuality is inconceivable arises again later in the novel, in the story
of 'The Remember Rooms'. These rooms are where the children of the Wanderground learn of
their past. Having been told of female heterosexuality as it used to exist, Clana reacts in a
similar way to Jacqua;
Clana was still confused. How could you let someone enter your body that way and not
be a victim? How could you ever want that to happen? (p. 158)
Once again, the consideration occurs within the context of a character's attempt to understand
history. The connecting feature of the two ideas which the women struggle to understand is
men. The women of the Wanderground seem to have a wholly negative conception of men,
66 For a full analysis of the issues involved in drawing connections between the two concepts see Stephen Yablo, 'Is Conceivability a
Guide to Possibility?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53:1 (1993), 1-42.
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which causes problems when they wish to communicate with men, or when they wish to be
open to memories which present a different view of relationships with men. This is made clear,
appropriately enough, when the women of the Wanderground are in the city, masquerading as
men. Betha, for example, on greeting the gentle Aaron, is 'astonished and pleased to realize
that he could respond to an enfolding of care', because '[h]e was not a woman, after all' (p.
115).
Recalling lessons from the Kochlias, Betha sees that its simplistic teaching that participants
must approach each other in a certain way if they are to communicate meaningfully, is
inadequate here, as Aaron forces her to ponder 'What makes him a man?' (p. 115). The
recognition that the meanings of terms can change implodes the myth of direct understanding of
a mental experience; of a private language made public. Significantly, it is when the women of
the Wanderground live as men in the city that they are led to question their essentialist notions
of subjectivity. The movement from one world to another, here eutopia to dystopia, but also in
the Remember Rooms from eutopia to dystopia, brings out the process of defamiliarization and
uncertainty. The application of the terms of the private language argument facilitates the next
progression to possibility, since it points out that terms such as "man" are always in a state of
flux; they are alive and moving, like Wittgenstein's beetle.67
3. EMPATHIC AWARENESS
I will argue in this section that both WET and The Wanderground propose that empathic
treatment of others is required both ethically and politically, but that in addition, they offer
particularly sophisticated conceptualizations of empathy. I begin then with an exegesis of what
67
Philosophical Investigations, para. 293.
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is meant by the term empathy. I resist absolutely the mythic version delineated in the OED,
where empathy is defined as
the power of projecting one's personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object
of contemplation,
and adopt instead a notion of empathy as an imaginative exercise which involves placing
oneself in an other's position. Or better, by empathy I understand the imaginative attempt to
place myself in the position of the other.
Connie has different versions of her self in WET. The possibilities of the novel are related
through the possibilities of her own being, and vice versa. In this novel, then, the arguments
concerning the accessibility of other minds may be said to focus on my seeing others as myself.
Connie is figured as a woman on the edge because her life conditions are fundamentally
contingent. Luciente is a picture of the person she might have been in the future. Superficially,
this highlights the effects of nurture on human potential, where Connie has lost out and
Luciente benefited.68 More significantly for my interpretation, is Connie's reaction to meeting
the woman she could possibly have been.
Connie begins by positioning herself in opposition to Luciente. She assumes that the person
from the future is a man, and that as such he represents a threat to her. Her considered
response is aggressive; when speaking to him readers are told that '[s]he made her voice harsh'.
The implication that any hostility is a position adopted, rather than felt, is emphasized further
in Connie's response to Luciente's request that they might talk together back at her house. She
says ' "No. Why should I? Who are you?" ' (p. 41), moving from rejection to defensiveness
and finally, interest, in the space of a few seconds. Later, when Connie comes to know
68 This point is made by Tom Moylan who says that Connie and Luciente are 'actually versions of the same character with one being
shaped by the violence of the present and the other begin shaped by the nurturing of Utopia' (Moylan, p. 139).
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Luciente better, she expands the possible frame of comparative referends, to include the college
professor from whom she suffered "mere" sexual exploitation;
Maybe he wouldn't beat or rob her. Just genteel slavery, like Professor Silvester.
(P- 53)
Later, when Connie and Luciente discuss sex and reproduction, Connie begins to fall into the
role of seducer to Luciente;
Like sunshine in her cell, he looked so human squatting there she heard herself ask
half coyly, "Do you like women?" (p. 64)
But Luciente is mystified by the question and Connie comes to realize that the attempt to define
the person from the future in terms of the relationships she has had in the past simply will not
work. Puzzled by her own disappointment when she discovers that Luciente seems to show no
sexual interest in her, Connie reasons that because she has created the person from the future,
that person ought to fit into one of the categories she knows. In other words, 'shouldn't a
figment of her imagination at least satisfy her?' (p. 64). Such a satisfaction would involve
conforming to her pre-conceived specifications that she might, in the OED's terms, 'fully
comprehend' Luciente. But this does not happen.
The satisfaction of expectations is most clearly defied when Luciente is found to have breasts.
The shock which Connie feels at finding this out reflects the way in which assumptions about
people are often largely based on gender. Connie has to reassess her entire attitude to Luciente,
and comes to realize that her assumptions about gender differences are based on contingencies,
rather than necessities;
Luciente spoke, she moved with that air of brisk unselfconscious authority Connie
associated with men. Luciente sat down, taking up more space than women ever did.
She squatted, she sprawled, she strolled, never thinking about how her body was
displayed, (p. 67)
The recognition that Connie was wrong in her assumptions about Luciente's gender forces her
to become aware of, and take responsibility for, gender associations which she makes. The
repetition of particular verbs together with the female pronoun suggests that Connie has to
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practise referring to women doing certain things in a certain way, in order for Luciente's
actions to make sense. Even so, the assumption that Luciente's behaviour is "unwomanly"
breaks through in this passage. Aware now that she is a woman, Connie tries again to fix
Luciente in terms of who she sleeps with (p. 67), or in terms of how old her children are (p.
74), but the reader, with Connie, is encouraged to question the significance of such markers of
identity. The lesbians with whom Connie associates Luciente, for example, represent a
different way of being as a woman already present in her time. The difficulties with using the
second marker are drawn out when Connie compares herself with Mrs Polcari, since
differences in their social status means that the other woman looks younger than she is (p. 35).
In response to Luciente's enthusiastic assertion of her ability to play the drums, it is said of
Connie that
[s]he could not imagine any woman of the age they must share saying in El Barrio or
anyplace else she had lived, "Me myself, I drum magnificently!" (p. 75)
From this point onwards, it is clear that the only way to make sense of Luciente is to appreciate
the new imaginative possibilities which she represents, when this 'she' refers both to Connie
and Luciente.
This appreciation needs must give rise to a serious empathy of commitment, which is
demonstrated in the way in which movement between the future and Connie's present is
facilitated in the terms of consciousness. This means that Luciente's presence in Connie's time
and Connie's presence in Luciente's is dependent upon the coming together of their two minds.
Explaining why future food cannot nourish Connie, Luciente describes how this contact works
and what its limitations are;
"As in dreams. You experience through me. [...] If I was knocked on the head and fell
unconscious [...] you'd be back in your time instantly." (pp. 78-79, author's italics)
The notion of concentration and effort are presented as crucial to this kind of empathic
exchange; of experiencing through someone else's mind.
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And yet the individuals concerned do not have absolute power over the process. In chapter
fifteen, Connie's frustration at failing to find Luciente results in her visiting a different future
world;
She had tried and tried to make contact with Luciente, but she had been unable to feel
her presence all day. Finally, in a stubborn fury she had cast herself forward,
demanding that Luciente receive her. (p. 287)
Is it Connie who has been unable to fell Luciente's presence, or Luciente who has been unable
to feel Connie's? At this stage they are so accustomed to keeping each other in mind that it
does not matter. The effect is the same; to secure their separation. Stubborn contact, which
makes demands rather than requests from other minds, does not work. Instead, Connie comes
across another possible future self in the form of Gildina 547-921-45-822-KBJ, whom, in
contrast to Luciente, she immediately recognizes as a woman (p. 287). In fact, Gildina appears
to be 'a cartoon of femininity', (p. 288) having gone through the numerous skin grafts and
dramatic plastic surgery which make women acceptable in the future dystopian world. That
this person is more recognizable as a woman than Luciente was to Connie reflects the danger
represented by the dystopia in which Connie dwells. This is further stressed by remarks
Connie makes connecting herself and this 'cartoon', noticing for example that '[t]hey were
about the same height and weight', and that Gildina's surgically altered breasts resemble the
image towards which 'Connie herself had striven in her teenage years. And yet there is a
distance in these comments, such that, for example, Connie notices the stifling effect which her
body shape has upon the way Gildina moves, which suggests that part of a task of describing
Gildina must at the same time involve an other description of Connie, as someone who, in
another time, used to wear those fashion 'brassieres' (p. 288).
The knowledge of their similarity, as described by Connie, is also an awareness which comes
from experience. When she begins to describe how she came to be there
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Connie smiled with sophistication. It was almost fun. She imagined how Luciente
must have felt laying down the unbelievable truth to naive ears. Now she was the
visitor from elsewhere, (p. 289)
This time Connie initiates the sharing of worlds through minds, and this gives her a confidence
and ease of being which is almost unknown to her in her own time, and even during her visits to
Mattapoisett. Moreover, she is now in a position to reflect both on this future possibility for
herself, and, at the same time, the future which is presented by Luciente, whose time travelling
to dystopia to contact a mystified version of herself, she is now practising. Crucially, the
shifting of roles does not mean that Connie now has knowledge of how Luciente felt visiting
her. Instead imagination is invoked, to resist any notion of certainty, and emphasize
possibility. By considering how Luciente may have felt, Connie refuses to appropriate her
experience, whilst at the same time, allowing that experience as she imagines it, to inform her
own.
The confidence which Connie feels in this situation develops as a security android arrives to
threaten Gildina with demotion for subversive activities, and Connie tries to defend her
presence and Gildina's status to him;
"I can only stay here through her. Gildina has a special power, even if she doesn't
know it [...] Break my contact with her and I disappear." (p. 299)
Eventually it is Connie's confidence which startles the android, and necessitates her immediate
evacuation from the world where she may have been Gildina (p. 300). Yet back in her world,
the knowledge she has acquired of that possible world is acutely motivating. Now Connie
understands its significance; '[t]hat was Luciente's war, and she was enlisted in it' (p. 301).
The movement which Connie experiences on her psychic travels to eutopian and dystopian
worlds ripples on to a movement in her own life. Incarcerated in the institution, she looks
forward to the meagre life of poverty she left behind, where at least she had her freedom;
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she would rise in the morning when she wanted to instead of when the attendant came
yelling [...] Nights of sleep with real dreams [...] Around her kitchen she would sing
and dance [...] Her life that had felt so threadbare now spread out like a full red velvet
rose. (p. 28)
Connie's Utopian optimism emphasizes the significant effect which being in another place has
upon one's vision of where one was and will be. The contribution ofmovement to perspective
occurs to Connie not long before she is hospitalized, where she recalls moments of enthusiasm
from her teenage years;
Yes, like the teachers she admired in her high school, she was not going to marry until
she was old, twenty-five even. Like Mrs. Polcari, she was going to have only two
children and keep them clean as advertisements, (p. 47)
Temporal perspective clearly becomes an issue here. Connie is thinking about a past where she
had hopes for her future. Moreover, she is thinking about it in a scene which is chronologically
prior to the scene in the hospital where she relates her Utopian dreams of life outside, but which
is related at a later stage in the novel. The effect is to stress the motivation ofmovement. Back
in her apartment, Connie admonishes herself for her current apathy;
So who was the worst fool, then - herself at fifteen full of plans and fire, or the woman
of thirty-seven who had given up making any plans? Despair had stained her with its
somber wash and leached from her all plans and schoolbook ideals, (p. 47)
And yet the apathy of the thirty-seven year old woman is not current, since she is now narrating
from within the perspective of the hospital. She is looking at what and how she has thought,
and discovering a position for herself now. This is how empathy, including empathy with one's
own subject position at different times in one's life, is presented in WET as a tool to rout
apathy and impotence, and to incite movement.
Paradoxically, this is further developed when Connie finds herself without a subject position.
In a chapter after the first stage of Connie's planned brain surgery, which begins with the line
'Connie was an object' (p. 302), Connie adopts a strategy of contemplating the gossip of the
ward;
Somewhere in this fund of trivial bits of garbage [...] must be some clue on how to find
herself again, how to fight, (p. 304)
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Finding out others' thoughts about others, will be a first step to regaining her sense of self.
The detail of the gossip is then listed for the benefit of the reader (pp. 304-306).
Connie's movements from mind to mind, from possible self to self, and from good to bad
engender hope. They also bring tangible results; the drifting to otherness finally leads to
contact with Luciente, whom Connie had been 'afraid' to contact earlier (p. 302), and the
appearance of unconsciousness which her body takes on in the hospital as she visits the future,
convinces the doctors to postpone the next round of experimental surgery. Contemplating
others then, has finally led to Connie's 'first victory' (p. 324), and the empathic strategies
which she learns as a result, facilitate her shaping of the future.
In contrast, the empathic strategies of The Wunderground contribute to the creation of the
past. For example, although it is possible for the telepathic women of the Wanderground to
protect themselves from the reading of unpleasant experiences in someone else's mind by using
'memory shields' (p. 23), Alaka says that
[ojften they elected not to shield or to shield only partially as they watched so that they
might experience a story, a description with more nearly its full reality, (p. 24)
To be fully open to another's mind, then, seems to entail seeing what they have seen, and
feeling what they have felt. A most striking example occurs after the discovery that the woman
found wearing armour in the Wanderground, Margaret, has just been raped. The slightest
unshielded glimpse into her mind leaves the telepathic women of the community reeling. Such
a glimpse has Seja, for example, falling into a rage during which, in a strange echo of
Margaret's memory, she almost murders her lover (pp. 24-26).
The empathy which enables the women of the Wanderground to find out about the experiences
of other women is fundamentally teleological. The method, and its results, contribute to the
creation of the community's history. But the philosophy of history proposed by the Utopian
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society has few references to events as objective reality. Telling the past from the point of view
of others is not to know how others have interacted with the world, but rather to know how they
have seen that interaction. This is demonstrated in the novel by the use of theatrical and
dramatic imagery to emphasize a highly speculative philosophy of history which literally
depends on other minds.
The teaching of history in the remember rooms is carried out by the older members of the
society to younger members of the society; by those with knowledge of a past to those without
this knowledge (pp. 138-166). In this way the community of the Wanderground may be said to
have a collective history, in the form of collective memories. And yet this knowledge is not
knowledge of how things were, but rather of how things were for particular people. Knowledge
of the past is thus nothing more than knowledge of stories, since this is all that the past consists
in. This is emphasized by the technique employed by the teachers, or 'remember-guides' (p.
139), of beginning each of their lessons with a traditional language of storytelling; 'Once upon
a time' (p. 140; p. 158).
That the narration is not a simple description of reality is made clear when Alaka speaks of
Margaret's tale of her rape as one of many striking 'stories of outrage' which form an
important part of the history of the women (p. 24). The story is of the response, not of the
event. The women who learn about the past are learning that response, becoming, as Seja does
in response to Margaret's story, a 'crazed and outraged sister'. In understanding the past
perspectives of others they may create their own stories of outrage. In the middle of this scene
the earth is said to halt for the story which Seja is constructing for herself and expressing to
Alaka '[i]n a frozen moment';
It all seemed mock-heroic at first, and Alaka could almost hear a militant musical
score in the background, (p. 25)
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The story of Seja the hero, preparing to rid the world of all sex attackers follows. The irony is
that this miniature mock epic tale is transmitted whilst Seja has her partner Alaka pinned to the
ground, ready to kill her. The tale is separated from the rest of the text, and culminates in
myths of separatist essentialism;
"It is not in his nature not to rape. It is not in my nature to be raped. We do not co¬
exist."
Seja, the woman-of-war. Seja, the righteous killer, (p. 25)
This nonsensical analysis could only occur in a period of stasis, and when it is completed, the
earth can move again. From the position where the ground is once more shifting, it is clear that
the two visions Seja has of herself are paradoxical images bom of a temporary madness which
deludes to a false absolutism and anti-philosophical surety. The moves to bring Seja out of this
madness emphasize the problems of such a position, and their preferred replacements. The
physical remedy is an act of pseudo sexual violence, which has two women jumping on top of
Seja and Alaka, thus positioning Seja literally between, rather than in opposition to, other
people. In this position Seja is forced to listen to what the women have to say, their
presentation of what happens next in terms of options for Seja;
"Your choice, Seja," Beula was saying. "Your choice. We release you and you go free
to do whatever harm you wish to yourself - but no other - or you yield to us here and let
us hold you, give you earth. Your choice."
"Your choice," repeated Rowena.
"Your choice, Seja," Alaka sent.
The alternative offering mantra eventually releases Seja from the madness, from where she
'continued coming down for a long time' (p. 26). The height of presumed objectivity, which
threatened to offer all the answers to the problems presented in terms of 'Margaret's ugly
drama' (p. 23), has been left in favour of coming down to earth. Seja has been reminded of her
place and restored to it, by being presented with the possibility of choice.
The women of the Wanderground, in sharing the horror and revilement of the rape victim, write
themselves into their own history books. In this way, the history of the women of the
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Wanderground is held together by memory; they understand by having looked into other
women's minds.
The significance of this is clear from Ijeme's recollection in the city of the 'words of an early
lesson: "What we are not, we each could be, and every women is myself" (p. 63), a chant
recalled and repeated by Betha, when she too is in the city (p. 113). This blithe echo of the
OED definition of empathy is, however, not simply a revised easy answer to the problems
which women like Betha encounter. This becomes clear in the scene where some of the women
go to meet with the gentles, and insist to them that '[w]e don't come as representatives of the
hill women, but only as ourselves' (p. 170). The absolute simplicity of the early lesson is
further undermined with Tulu's report to the gentles that 'we could not find a unity among us
on the matter ofmeeting with you' (p. 171). The chant is a shortcut, a summary, which
suffices until further experience can be had ofmemory and imagination. These two, in the
Wanderground, are presented as the factors which will make a more sophisticated empathic
awareness possible. Learning from the past, through the memories of others, and imagining
other positions, offer hope that the women of the Wanderground will not remained trapped in
delusions of solipsistic omniscience like Seja's. Memory and imagination offer ways in which
they might move beyond.
According to the two novels I have chosen, empathic awareness is, then, a crucial factor in
ethical and politico-philosophical life. Seeing myself in the position of the other is a useful way
of approaching the philosophical problems which begin with the question "how can I be aware
of the existence of other minds?". It seems odd then, that Luciente informs Connie on their
first meeting that in spite of many linguistic reforms, the language of the future retains the
'weakness' of the plural you (p. 42). For it is by imagining others as herself that Connie will
come to see herself implicated by and active in, the war for the future. Far from being a
linguistic weakness, the potentials and possibilities introduced by the plural you is a personal
and political strength. Luciente's mistake, as I read it, suggests another way in which the
eutopian world ofMattapoisett does not recover all the difficulties of Connie's world, and also
proposes a way in which the novel experiment of time travel may offer a new way of looking at
language. In other words, the reader may spy in the surprising dismissal of the plural you by
Luciente a way in which places like Mattapoisett, eutopian though they may be, can learn from
the novel.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to show that feminist Utopian fiction can usefully address the
philosophical problem of other minds. It can do this by employing a philosophical progression
from defamiliarization to uncertainty, eventually leading to possibility. And as suggested by
the quotation from George Eliot with which I began this chapter, possibility determines the
crucial philosophical contribution of the genre. It is this reminder of the contingency of our
world which facilitates 'shifting the position from which [we] look', and in turn developing our
theories about the ways in which we may look, particularly at and as others.
Just as my analysis of autographical philosophical fiction was, to some extent autographical,
so this analysis of Utopian fiction is Utopian. In contrast to Kumar, who viewed the
possibilities of human creation as inherently dystopian, it invests in the possibilities of
configuration, not only in terms of writing,69 but also in terms of reading. I harbour the hope
that the resistance of binary oppositions will enable the consideration of Utopian fiction as
m Kumar's position on this may be contrasted with Isabel Allende's position in her essay 'Writing as an Act of Hope', in Paths of
Resistance: The Art and Craft of the Political Novel, ed. by William Zinsser (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 39-63.
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philosophical, and, by the same token, that the consideration of Utopian fiction as philosophical
will enable the resistance of binary oppositions.
In this chapter I have focused upon the analysis of the philosophical question about other minds
in relation to Utopian fiction. In the next chapter, which will constitute the final part ofmy
philosophical story, I will go on to examine the philosophical problem of how people may know




"The purpose of my display [...] is to demonstrate the difference between saying and
showing. Signs speak. Pictures show."
Angela Carter1
An analysis of the philosophical potential of detective fiction, with a view to discovering how it
is possible for literature to be philosophical, forms the third and final part of my philosophical
story. Where autographical fiction attempts to present a sense of self, and Utopian fiction
attempts to assess the possibilities of otherness, detective fiction may be understood to be
concerned with discovering the world. So, if the second chapter confessed the story of the self,
and the third explored the possibility of that self's awareness of others, then this chapter will
investigate the notion of that self acquiring knowledge of the world.
Historically, the relationship between the practitioners of philosophy and of detective fiction
has displayed periodic warmth. Since the detective novel depicts, by its very definition, a
process of knowledge acquisition, philosophical connections have seemed straightforward to
some critics. Throughout this chapter, I will challenge this supposed straightforwardness. In
particular, I will begin with an analysis of the critical relationship between traditional detective
fiction and philosophy, which will undermine many of the assumptions of connection, before
going on to present an alternative vision of the philosophical potential of the genre. I will then
proceed to fulfil my vision of philosophical potential, by showing the philosophy of learning as
it may be found in the V. I. Warshawski novels of Sara Paretsky and Barbara Wilson's Pam
Nilsen trilogy.
1
Angela Carter, The Infernal Desire Machines ofDoctor Hoffman (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 47.
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A. Traditional Philosophy and Detective Fiction
[A]ny writer who tries to make a detective story a work of art at all will do well if he
[sic] writes it in such a way that Aristotle could have enjoyed and approved it.2
Dorothy L. Sayers argues persuasively that Aristotle's writings on tragedy may be aptly
applied to contemporary detective fiction.3 The title of the collection of essays in which it
appears - Unpopular Opinions - suggests that Sayers considered this thesis to be controversial.
In this section I wish to propose that certain connections between philosophy and detective
fiction, radical as they may at first appear, in fact confirm the sterility and inadequacy of
traditions in both fields.
Talk about traditions and the traditional often involves certain generalization and skirting over
of differences. In an attempt to negotiate this risk, I will ground my analysis in specific
examples, namely Plato's Theaetetus and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's The Sign ofFour. In
taking these texts as representative of traditions in both fields, I am not discounting the
possibility of diversity, but rather hoping to draw a general pattern of connections. Inevitably,
this involves some element ofmyth, particularly in my discussion of the figure which I call the
"superhero philosopher-detective". I defend this on two counts. First of all, there is a history
ofmythical analyses of the detective story, and conforming to that tradition makes my
deconstruction of tradition all the more effective; a way of fighting fire with fire.4 Secondly, I
take the mythical tendencies as I see them to provide an imaginative and useful basis for my
alternative vision of this genre's philosophical potential.5
2
Dorothy L. Sayers, 'Aristotle On Detective Fiction', in Unpopular Opinions (London: Gollancz, 1946), pp. 178-190 (p. 190).
3
Sayers is not the only critic to employ Aristotelian aesthetics in defence of detective fiction. See for example W. H. Auden, 'The
Guilty Vicarage', in The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays (London: Faber, 1963), pp. 146-158.
4 For an outline of the use ofmythic criticism in detective fiction theory see George N. Dove, 'The Criticism of Detective Fiction', in
Detective Fiction: A Collection ofCritical Essays, ed. by Robin W. Winks (Prentice-Hall, NJ: Spectrum, 1980), pp. 203-208.
5 For an analysis of the power of myth as a feminist strategy see Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism,
Deconstruction and the Law (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 165-196.
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Umberto Eco's conception of the connection between philosophy and detective fiction provides
a useful starting point. Eco asserts starkly, yet cryptically, that
the fundamental question of philosophy [...] is the same as the question of the detective
novel; who is guilty? To know this (to think you know this), you have to conjecture
that all the events have a logic, the logic that the guilty party has imposed on them.6
I take from this assertion the suggestion that features of detective fiction have philosophical
correlatives. This notion has interesting implications which are not drawn out by Eco, but
which I now wish to explore. The connective features between detective fiction and philosophy
may be said to consist most clearly of a question and an answer, or a crime and its solution.
These elements themselves necessitate intellectual contribution, in the form of a 'conjectur[or]',
whose role in turn demands an audience. These features may be described in such a way that
they define the content and purpose of both philosophy in general and the literary genre. In
philosophical terms, they form the substance of the genre - without them, it would not be what
it is, but rather would be something else. In this section I will investigate each aspect in turn,
examining the sense and extent of connections between traditional philosophy and traditional
detective fiction through them.
1. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The first feature of the substantive definition is then, the puzzle, which often, though not
inevitably, takes the form of a crime. In traditional detective fiction, the puzzle represents a
situation of chaos which the story must leave ordered. In other words, the story is the tale of a
restoration to order, in the form of a solving of the 'artificial and external problem' represented
by the puzzle.7 In The Sign ofFour, for example, Miss Morstan visits Holmes and Watson in
6 Umberto Eco, 'The Detective Metaphysic', in Reflections On The Name of the Rose, trans, by William Weaver (London: Seeker &
Warburg, 1985), pp. 54-58 (p. 54).
7 Colin Watson, Snobbery With Violence: English Crime Stories and Their Audience (London: Eyre Methuen, 1979), p. 42.
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their Baker Street rooms, to confront them with her tale of a missing father and an anonymous
message which she has received.8 Neither Holmes nor Watson had previous knowledge of her,
and so have no particular interest in the outcome, as yet. As a result of her visit, the goal of the
text is to solve the mystery as she presents it and on her behalf. Other mysteries introduced
into the text suggesting that her inheritance may not be rightfully hers, as for example when
Major Sholto tells his sons that
[wjhen in India, [Captain Morstan] and I, through a remarkable chain of
circumstances, came into possession of a considerable treasure, (p. 34)
are ignored by Holmes and Watson, who still consider the restitution of the 'treasure' to Miss
Morstan as a 'securing of] her rights' (p. 39). The specificities of colonial exploitation are not
to be investigated here, and will only be discovered partially and incidentally.9 Also deemed
unworthy of investigation is the fate of the servant who claimed to have seen Sholto killing
Morstan, but assured the Major that he wouldn't breathe a word to anyone (p. 35). Like the
woman deserted by Small (p. 113), this character's story is deemed peripheral to the detection,
and so is not inquired after by the investigators.
Since the mysteries are to remain within the control of the detective, they must not be allowed
to expand beyond the imminently solvable. Questions like "why did high ranking members of
the British army believe themselves to be justified in looting India's national treasures?" will be
snipped away to leave the neat, more straightforward puzzle ofMiss Morstan's communiques.
In this sense the disorder in traditional detective fiction is made into comfortable, "bite-sized"
pieces, that the detective, and the reader, might cope with it more easily. It is defined and
confined within the detective's terms, as he decides what is worthy of investigation, and
proceeds to investigate just that. This process of choosing the puzzle is hidden and
unacknowledged, because the puzzle appears merely to have presented itself, in the form of
8 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign ofFour (London: Penguin, 1982), pp. 18-21. Subsequent page references will be given in the
text.
'' The story of the appropriation of the treasure is narrated by Jonathan Small in The Sign ofFour, pp. 113-136.
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Miss Morstan's testimony. Yet Holmes's enthusiastic response to the quality of information
provided by her betrays the correspondence between them; when she produces the specific
documentary evidence which he enquired after, he tells her
You are certainly a model client. You have the correct intuition. Let us see now.
(p. 20)
Miss Morstan is the ideal initiator of a puzzle because she has told him everything he might
want to hear in order to be able to construct a narrow teleological programme of detection.
Nevertheless, closer examination reveals a much more complex interweaving of puzzles.
Translated into philosophical terms, the puzzle becomes represented by the philosophical
problem. In Plato's Theaetetus the puzzle is the question - what is knowledge? Philosophy,
like detective fiction, may be said to presume disorder, enter because of that disorder, and seek
to overcome it. Moreover, like detective fiction, philosophy may distinguish itself from
disorder, whilst at the same time defining what counts as disorder. Just as traditional detective
novels assume that the problems against which they define themselves would be regarded by
everyone in the same way, the texts of philosophy may assume that the questions they pose,
they pose on behalf of everyone else; that anyone who is interested in philosophical problems
will perceive them in the same light, and that all such people will share their desire to overcome
those problems in the same way. So, in the Theaetetus, Socrates says that they can allow for
two outcomes of their philosophical discussion;
either we'll find what we're after, or we'll be less inclined to think we know what we
don't in fact know at all.10
In fact there may be other possibilities; for example that they know, but cannot articulate in the
current context, what knowledge means. By ignoring this and other possibilities Socrates not
only moulds the discussion but also seeks to define exhaustively all conceivable outcomes of
that discussion in an attempt to make the question "what is knowledge" manageable, a
10
Plato, Theaetetus, trans, by John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 187c. Subsequent paragraph references will
be given in the text.
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requirement which it may not satisfy. The attempt to delineate what counts as an appropriate
response to the philosophical question is restrictive in the same way that the attempt of the
detective to determine a simplistic picture of the puzzle presented to him is restrictive.
Related to this is the suggestion that traditional philosophy may be said to ignore the context of
human relations, and the philosopher's own human position, in order to concentrate on a pre¬
defined way of approaching philosophical questions. For example, Socrates says that a
philosopher is open to a question of 'what, exactly, a man is', but that
he's oblivious not only of what he's doing, but almost of whether he's a man or some
other creature. (174b)
Similarly, Sherlock responds to Watson's remarks on Miss Morstan's beauty by insisting that,
because of his profession, he never notices such things;
"A client is to me a mere unit, a factor in the problem. The emotional qualities are
antagonistic to clear reasoning." (p. 21)
Socrates' role as philosopher and Holmes's role as detective demand that they reduce
everything to factors of the sort to which they are accustomed, that is, to terms of the puzzle as
they see it, and its projected solution. Excluding aspects which they regard as trivial or
unnecessary is another mechanism by which the philosopher and the detective control the
puzzle, and which paradoxically may contribute to their failure. As I showed in Chapter Two,
the philosophical analyses of subject positions can benefit from personal contributions in the
form of autographies. Holmes's unnecessary exclusion of all things emotional may similarly
inhibit his learning.
Traditionally, the puzzle is introduced into detective fiction that it might be solved. In other
words, the fact that there is a problem necessitates a solution. Part of the popular appeal of
traditional detective stories has undoubtedly been their escapist qualities; that they offer closure
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in the form of a restoration to social order.1' The crime exists to be solved, and the detective
exists to solve it. If the detective is unable to solve the crime, then he has failed as a detective,
and the story has failed as a detective story. All loose ends must be tied, everything explained.
The solution in traditional detective fiction is conceived as a definitive answer to all the
problems posed by the text, facilitating a return to the state of grace evident before the problem
arose. In the terms of an Aristotelian interpretation of detective fiction, solution facilitates the
essentially cathartic experience involved in the reading of detective fiction. It is perhaps for
this reason that Julian Symons argues that detective novels 'assert [...] the static nature of
society',12 and Eric Routley insists that the genre may be defended in terms of its reactionary
status.13 In The Sign ofFour, this stasis figures as a weary circularity, which sees Holmes
taking drugs from boredom at the beginning and at the end of the novel. The return to the
beginning is a sign that Holmes has successfully restored order as usual.
In the detective story, there may be debate/ legitimate differences of opinion as to how order is
restored, but not that the restoration of order is ultimately desirable. The reader's attitude to
the puzzle - that it must be solved - is assumed and reinforced by the text. This strictly
dichotomous attitude of detective fiction to order and disorder has also infiltrated the theory of
the genre. For example, Jessica Mann remarks;
Certainly there can be no disagreement with the view that the crime novel reflects -
rather than tries to alter - the society in which and for which it is written.14
The hostility to disagreement is twofold here. Firstly, the projected morality of the fiction is
unquestionable, since the story is merely showing the facts about society, and as such has no
responsibility for the vision of the text, which must be tme. In this way the novel's insistence
on its descriptive nature is precisely what makes its ideology prescriptive. Secondly, Mann
11 For a detailed account of the conservative sociology pervasive throughout traditional detective fiction see Stephen Knight, Form
and Ideology In Crime Fiction (London: MacMillan, 1980).
12 Julian Symons, Bloody Murder, From the Detective Story to the Crime Novel: A History (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p.
19.
13 Erik Routley, The Puritan Pleasures of the Detective Story: A Personal Monograph (London: Gollancz, 1972), p. 205.
14 Jessica Mann, Deadlier Than the Male: An Investigation Into Feminine Crime Writing (London: David & Charles, 1981), p. 58.
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forbids disagreement with her diagnosis of this feature of detective fiction. There is to be no
debate here. For such texts then, fictional and theoretical, the reader is offered no incitement to
read, but rather must expect to be told.
The philosophical correlative here is not quite so straightforward. Indeed, the notion of
compulsory completion, and the suggestion of traditional critics that the detective story must
have a particular type of solution, seems to entail an anti-philosophical attitude. For example,
it may be argued that part of what makes a question philosophical is that there is no answer to
it, and further, that a problem ceases to be philosophical when an undisputed answer is found
for it, and instead enters the realm of science or art. A genre which guarantees an "answer"
would not easily facilitate a philosophical interpretation, and indeed might usefully be regarded
as incompatible with a philosophical outlook.15 In the Theaetetus, a satisfactory definition of
knowledge is not found, and so using his famous analogy of knowledge production as birth,
Socrates labels the discussion a successful purgation of pseudo foetal matter (210b), and
suggests that Theaetetus might return the next time he thinks he is pregnant (210c). In other
words, although Socrates' project as philosopher is to deliver a healthy new solution to the
philosophical problem, the greater part of philosophical practice involves helpfully exposing
the different, specific inadequacies of phantom pregnancies, or of putative solutions. In the
terms of this analogy, having a solution is not a simple matter of celebrating when the pink
strip turn blue, because there are more complexities involved.
As a result, although Theaetetus does not give birth, the dialogue is not entirely impotent, since
it helps to clarify many issues concerning theories of knowledge. The failure of the parties to
discover a definition opens the way to further debate, and once the debate has been opened, it
13 It is perhaps for this reason that Ernst Bloch , in his essay 'A Philosophical View of the Detective Novel', in The Utopian Function
ofArt and Literature, pp. 245-264, diminishes the significance of the endings of traditional detective fiction, insisting that 'many of
the best readers read the last pages first' (p. 250), and instead chooses to emphasize the 'omitted beginning' (p. 264) as the
philosophical aspect of the genre.
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may continue indefinitely, to serve as an incitement to read. It is for this reason that I suggest
that the necessity and inevitability of a solution in traditional detective fiction has no
philosophical correlative, but in fact is diametrically opposed to the aims of philosophy. This
is a problem which must be overcome by any analysis which seeks to demonstrate that
detective fiction can be philosophical.
2. THE PHILOSOPHER-DETECTIVE
Another element I identified as a feature of both detective fiction and philosophy, and which I
have begun to speak of already, is the human element - the problem-solver. It is interesting that
Eco himself does not mention explicitly the individual behind the problem-solving, suggesting
that this individual does not affect the facts, but merely serves as an objective interpreter of
them. And yet as conjecturor the philosopher-detective is allowed to reconstruct the facts in
order to find out their cause. This person clearly is placed in a role of significant power,
creating a world which he will dominate as hero, and yet with which he will remain
fundamentally unconcerned.
Detective fiction is perhaps the only literary genre where candidates for inclusion must,
uncontroversially, contain a particular character type. Our understanding of this individual
dominates the genre.'6 It is obvious, but nevertheless bears repeating, that fictional detectives,
like philosophers, have traditionally been men. Even when many successful writers of detective
fiction were women, they were often creating male detectives. One reason for this is that the
fictional detective inhabits a masculinist culture, which includes the stereotypical figure of the
16 For a history of the detective figure in fiction see T. J. Binyon, 'Murder Will Out': The Detective In Fiction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
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detective. As Eric Routley typically observes, '[tjhis was manly stuff.'7 Less crudely, Ross
MacDonald points out that a
close paternal or fraternal relationship between writer and detective is a marked
peculiarity of the form.18
The suggestion here is that the creator moulds his detective in his own image as a form of male
bonding. By extension, women creators of detectives can attempt to emulate this relationship,
but can never achieve it in the way men can. MacDonald's notion goes some way towards
explaining why it might be that women writers and readers can struggle to find a way into the
genre, without conforming to its masculinist ideology.19
This notion too has its philosophical parallel, as philosophy may be viewed historically as a
kind of writing by men, about men, for men. Women philosophers can also collude in this
restriction, by adopting traditional methods without questioning them. To question the hidden
structures of philosophy which make it exclusive and limiting is, in Elizabeth Grosz's terms, to
expose the philosophical tradition as phallocentric, as opposed to merely sexist or
patriarchal.20
The traditional detective conforms to two types. The earliest fictional detectives often fall into
the type of the aristocratic intellectual; an all-knowing all-seeing detective. Omniscient and
aloof, this first type has been labelled a 'Nietzschean superior man'.21 The other type is often
referred to as the "hard-boiled" detective - a paradigm ofmachismo who is brave, smart, and
able to assess situations and people with a psychic's touch.
17
Routley, p. 23.
18 Ross MacDonald, 'The Writer as Detective Hero', in Self-Portrait: Ceaselessly Into the Past (Santa Barbara, CA: Capra, 1981),
pp. 113-122 (p. 113).
" For an analysis of the ways in which women writers of detective fiction may be said to conform to the genre's traditional ideology
see Cora Kaplan, 'An Unsuitable Genre For a Feminist?', Women's Review, 8 (1986), 18-19.
20 See E. A. Grosz, 'The ln(ter)vention of Feminist Knowledges', in Crossing Boundaries: Feminisms and the Critique of
Knowledges, ed. by Barbara Caine, E. A. Grosz and Marie de Lepervanche (Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 92-104.
Grosz points to Janet Radcliffe Richards and Carol MacMillan as two women philosophers who have objected to the rising current of
feminist philosophy, and seen fit to 'act as female guardians of male knowledges' (p. 96).
21
Symons, p. 69.
In the interests ofmyth, the two types of traditional detective may be combined to form a
masculinist representation of an all-round philosophical superhero. When the Superior Man
meets with the intuitive, hard-headed second one, the result is an individual who seeks truth,
and through a construction of truth - you'd better believe it, sister - will restore order. This is
an individual who has the power to right the world with his reasoning, and is ready to break
your legs if you try to stop him. It is a distinctly male combination of the man of machismo
and the aesthete - two sides of a kind of philosophical superhero who lives by his wits and
always discovers the truth, because he is defining, perhaps even conjuring, the boundaries and
structures of that truth.
Socrates and Holmes most obviously count as the first type of intellectual hero. Socrates
pictures his philosophical role idiosyncratically as that of a male midwife, delivering knowledge
out of those who consult him.22 Like Bertrand Russell, he connects his profession with the
notion of a deity, as he asserts that 'for the delivery, it's God, and I myself, who are
responsible' (150d-e). Again, he wants to be recognized as having divine beneficence,
reasoning that 'no god bears ill will to men, and [...] I don't do anything [...] out of ill will'
(15 Id).
At the same time, Socrates is characteristically modest, pointing out that an extension of his
analogy dictates that, like the traditional midwife, he himself is unable to conceive (150c).
However, this is not bome out by the text, where Socrates demonstrates his intellectual
superiority and invulnerability. When Socrates persuades Theaetetus that he has been fooled
by a relativist theory of knowledge, Socrates explains that this has happened as a result of
Theaetetus' inexperience as a philosopher; it is 'because you're young; so you listen carefully
22 An interesting parallel may be found in the fictional detective Millicent Newberry's declaration that 'I might be called a mind-
nurse', quoted in Patricia Craig and Mary Cadogan, The Lady Investigates: Women Detectives and Spies In Fiction (London:
Gollancz, 1981), p. 46. Craig and Cadogan take this remark to be evidence of the 'conventional trappings of the genre [of
sentimental fiction]' (p. 47), but in the context ofmy argument it may suggest Socratic pretensions.
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to debating-points and let them convince you' (162d). The heavy irony of this remark becomes
evident throughout the text as Theaetetus repeatedly has his individual thoughts and ideas
crushed under Socrates' manipulative debating-points, and what is worse, must show gratitude
to him for this;
SOCRATES. [...] don't you understand yet?
THEAETETUS. No, I don't think I do.
SOCRATES. So you'll be grateful to me if I help you to dig out the truth that is
hidden in the thoughts of a distinguished man - or rather, distinguished men?
THEAETETUS. Of course, very grateful. (155d-e)
What else could he say? Socrates' method ensures that Theaetetus is bullied from open-
mindedness to accepting the "truth" of Socrates' debating points, in whatever terms he chooses
to present it.
Holmes also strives to make readers aware of his own genius. At the beginning of chapter
three of The Sign ofFour he asserts that ' "[t]here is no great mystery in this matter" ' (p. 23).
Throughout the novel, Watson's emotional and intellectual mystification is doused by Holmes's
unfailing ability to know what to do, and then proceed to do it;
"This is terrible!" I said to Holmes. "What is to be done?"
"The door must come down," he answered, and springing against it, he put all his
weight upon the lock. (p. 45)
The addition of the practical to the theoretical is interesting, because it indicates how Holmes's
character, although conforming strongly to the first intellectual type of detective, also
participates in the second more physical type. His skill at amateur boxing, vouched for by one
who has been on the receiving end of his blows, confirms this intuition (p. 41). Socrates,
perhaps even more surprisingly, compares himself to famous contemporary wrestlers,
justifying the comparison by suggesting that arguing is like fighting;
I've got more endurance than Sciron or Antaeus. Countless times already a Heracles
or a Theseus, dauntless in arguing, has met me and given me a good thrashing, but
that doesn't make me give up: such a terrible passion for exercise about these matters
has infected me. (169b-c)
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The adversarial approach to philosophy contributes to its phallocentric nature, by focusing on
aggression and competitiveness as tools for philosophical debate. Janice Moulton has clearly
shown how the "one-up-manship" and combative nature of traditional philosophical practices
is not conducive to constructive debate, and discounts feminist approaches to the subject.23
Mentally, physically and morally superior to other characters in the novel, the superhero
detective has an interesting relationship with the participants of the reading experience. In one
sense he represents the reader within the text; he stands between us and the world of crime,
from which he protects us. In a parodic reversal of dramatic irony, the detective provides us
with an interpretation of the events of the novel of which the reader would otherwise be
unaware. He reads for us, to save us from thinking. In this way the detective usurps the
position of the reader. At the same time, the detective imposes his readings upon others. In the
next section I will look at the ways in which the traditional detective novel includes an audience
for the detective, who is made to prove that their readings of the world are inadequate, and so
that the detective's readings might be transferred onto others without challenge. Again, I will
argue that this picks out a problematic feature of traditional philosophical writings.
3. READERS IN THE TEXT
Traditional detective stories may include within their texts ideal passive readers of the
situation. Since the detective is the definitive conjecturor, the one whose investigations must be
trusted absolutely, this passive reader represents a method of investigation which is somehow
inadequate. In detective fiction, this may appear in the form of a police force, or it may be the
"idiot friend". The mental incapacity of members of the police force or the idiot friend to
23 Janice Moulton, 'A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method', in Discovering Reality, ed. by Harding and Hintikka, pp.
149-164.
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figure out "who dunnit" effectively creates the gap which the detective will fill. In The Sign of
Four, for example, Inspector Jones remembers Holmes as a 'theorist' who 'lectured' he and his
colleagues on a previous case, which they were then able to solve. But rather than learning
from Holmes for the present case, Jones calls for '[s]tern facts here - no room for theories' (p.
54). Instead of theorizing, he urges Holmes to join him and 'apply common sense to the
matter' (p. 55).
In detective fiction analysis, Watson is the paradigmatic idiot friend, to the extent that he
effects the ninth of Ronald Knox's definitive rules of the genre;
IX. The stupid friend of the detective, the Watson, must not conceal any thoughts
which pass through his mind; his intelligence must be slightly, but very slightly, below
that of the average reader.24
Watson is a foil for Holmes, making Holmes's detecting intelligence appear astonishing in
comparison.
There are two philosophical correlatives here. Parallel to the police force, that mass of
intellectual inadequacy, I may posit the silent majority outside the ivory tower, for whom
philosophical questions are presumed not to arise.25 Reactionary and static, members of the
police force in detective fiction search for the easy way out of the puzzle, even at the cost of
truth. They accuse the detective of making things too complicated, of finding problems where
none need be found. Their thesis is that there is a straightforward, 'common-sense' answer to
any puzzle, and if it fits, then it must be the right one. Socrates' remarks about 'uninitiates'
ascribe such an attitude to a particular social group of
people who don't think there is anything other than what they can grasp firmly in their
hands. (155e)
24 Ronald A. Knox, 'A Detective Story Decalogue', in The Art of the Mystery Story: A Collection ofCritical Essays, ed. by Howard
Haycraft (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1976), pp. 194-196 (p. 196).
23 A version of this mythic conception of non-philosophers is, for example, invoked by P. D. James, when she asserts that 'in the pits
of the inner-city area, where crime is the norm and murder is commonplace, you don't get a moral choice, you don't get contrasts
between good and evil', quoted in Barbie Dutter, 'Crime Writers At Daggers Drawn', Guardian, 16 September 1995, p. 7.
This works as a way of flattering Theaetetus and the reader, who immediately associate
themselves in opposition to this group of fools, focusing as they are on the questions that
matter. If this figures as the philosophical correlative of the ideal passive reader in the text,
and the reader is encouraged to identify against it, it would seem that Plato's text is working to
inspire active readings.
Insofar as the Theaetetus counts as philosophy, and philosophy is defined as incitement to read,
this is indeed the case. However, the operation of the dialogue, which is restricted and confined
by Socrates, in fact serves to inhibit active readings, because of Theaetetus' unrelenting
concessions to Socrates' ideas. Precisely the same thing happens in The Sign ofFour, as
Watson accepts without question Holmes's interpretations of events. That the reader is to do
likewise is made clear by the inclusion within the Theaetetus of the philosophical correlative of
the idiot friend.
Whilst Holmes and Socrates display their own ability to reason logically, claiming that they are
merely pointing out what is already obvious, it seems that Watson and Theaetetus are there
simply to acquiesce and flatter. Almost as soon as they are introduced into these two texts,
both Watson and Theaetetus are placed in hierarchical submission to their partners. Watson,
for example, expresses to the reader in the strongest terms the admiration he has for Holmes
and the investigative work which he achieves. He is prompted to remember the detective's
solution of the first case of which he wrote, and assures Holmes 'I was never so struck by
anything in my life' (p. 4).
In contrast to Watson, the paradigmatic idiot friend, Theaetetus is introduced by Theodorus the
geometrician as his prize pupil to Socrates. Theodorus praises Theaetetus' exemplary
intelligence and courage (144a), and encourages Theaetetus to engage in discussion with
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Socrates (146b). But when Socrates begins their discussion by asking Theaetetus for a
definition of knowledge, and Theaetetus finds he cannot think of a satisfactory answer, the
young man begins to worry that his teacher has been over-enthusiastic about his abilities.
Socrates assures him that his failure to answer does not constitute an admission of stupidity,
and that Theodoras was not overselling his pupil;
suppose he'd praised you for running, and said he'd never come across a young man
who was so good at it; and then you'd run a race and been beaten by the fastest starter,
a man in his prime. Do you think his praise would have been any less true? (148c)
Theaetetus is not to feel inadequate, but rather is to come to terms with his secondary position.
This is because in this discussion, he is pitting his wits against the 'fastest starter, a man in his
prime', philosophically speaking. Theaetetus must lower his expectations and position himself
within the role of the one who responds to rhetorical questions, allowing Socrates to win the
philosophical race.
Socrates' position as consulting philosopher is unique, his art 'secret' (149a). Sherlock
Holmes also asserts his singularity on account of his mental powers in The Sign ofFour. He
says
I crave for mental exaltation. That is why I have chosen my own particular profession,
or rather created it, for I am the only one in the world, (p. 8)
However, Watson, being beyond the impressionable age of Theaetetus, is not quite so easily
convinced, responding to Holmes's declaration by 'raising his eyebrows' (p. 8), and later
actually being
irritated by the egotism which seemed to demand that every line of my pamphlet
should be devoted to his own special doings, (p. 9)
This remark draws attention to the fact that where Socrates' dialogue with Theaetetus was
dictated to Eucleides by the philosopher himself, Watson narrates his experiences with Holmes.
Watson manages to share his reservations about Holmes's arrogance with the reader in a way
that Theaetetus cannot.
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The relationship between Watson and Holmes is an unequal one, as evidenced by the
discussion in the first scene of their work. Whilst Watson praises Holmes warmly for his
detection skills, Holmes declares his dislike of Watson's writing of a case. Watson is hurt by
this because, he says, the story 'had been specially designed to please [Holmes]' (p. 9). Since
Holmes has only a selfish interest in his writing, Watson generously indulges him in a -
naturally one-sided - discussion of the difference between observation and deduction, in order
to distract him from the cocaine which Holmes uses to occupy his mind when he does not have
a case (p. 11). Watson knows that the only way to take Holmes's mind off his boredom is to
have him talk about himself;
More than once during the years that I had lived with him in Baker Street I had
observed that a small vanity underlay my companion's quiet and didactic manner.
(P- 9)
Such remarks contribute to Watson's depiction as a nurturing, abused partner to Holmes.26
Watson's suspicions with regard to Holmes's selfish attitude to their relationship, are shared by
Theaetetus, who tells Socrates;
I can't make out the truth about you [...] whether you're saying it as something you
think, or just trying me out. (157c)
Socrates' responds by insisting that he doesn't think at all; as a midwife he is leaving that to
the pregnant Theaetetus (157c-d). With this answer, Socrates can be understood to abdicate
responsibility for control of a discussion which he clearly dominates. Although Theaetetus
introduces, for example, the theory that knowledge is perception into the discussion, Socrates
defines this doctrine in his terms, as the Protagorean thesis that man is the measure of all
things, which allows Socrates to set the traps for the theory in its very outline. Further,
Socrates adds radical instability as a necessary implication of the thesis that man is the
measure of all things, and instead of criticizing the first argument, attacks this 'secret' doctrine
26 For a light-hearted, seriously misogynistic exploration of this interpretation see Rex Stout, 'Watson Was a Woman', in The Art of
the Mystery Story, ed. by Haycraft, pp. 311-318.
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of eternal flux (152c). In fact, the thesis that knowledge is perception may be made distinct
from the idea that man is the measure of all things, and radical instability is not a necessary
implication of either thesis. In criticizing the latter notions Socrates has postponed talking
directly about the thesis that knowledge is perception, so that when he does come around to
confronting the concept directly, doubts have already been implanted. The philosopher
constructs the theory in such a way as to assist his critique.
Socrates' rejection of the relativism of Protagoras is interesting in the context of this
construction, which suggests that Socrates is the measure of all things concerned with this
philosophical argument. This is why he can respond to Theaetetus with remarks like '[yjou've
got it perfectly; that's exactly what I mean' (159b). The implication of the syntax of this
remark is that the second half of this sentence is the semantic equivalent of the first; for
Theaetetus to get 'it perfectly' is the same as understanding what the philosopher means.
Later, Socrates admits that ' [tjhat was what I thought myself, but I wanted you to think so,
too' (185e), and Theaetetus keeps him happy by responding, '[wjell, I do think so' (186a).
Again, Theaetetus can win Socrates' approval by anticipating or echoing the philosopher's
argument.
Holmes's use of Dr. Watson is similar in the sense that he allows Watson to guess incorrectly
before he supplies the answer which will override all others in its veracity. He says to the
doctor;
"What do you make of this fellow's scribble?"
"It is legible and regular," I answered. "A man of business habits and some force of
character."
Holmes shook his head.
"Look at his long letters," he said. "They hardly rise above the common herd. That d
might be an a, and that / an e. Men of character always differentiate their long letters,
however illegibly they may write." (p. 22)
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Like Socrates, he explains how he came to the conclusion he does, in the hope that his
addressee will learn to make similar mental deductions. Like Theaetetus, Dr. Watson will fail
to make any independent assertions which are not radically revised by his companion. And
because of this these partners remain ideal passive readers of the texts, overawed and
overimpressed by their teachers, and unable to see the world in any other way. The
identification of the police force and the general public as the ideal passive readers, of whose
intellectual passivity the reader must be wary, is then a red herring, as the idiot friend, or
dialogic partner, confirms the necessity of passive readings of the philosopher-detective's
perspective.
For the active reader, this form can prove most frustrating, since it restricts meaning before the
words even leave the page. The philosopher-detective shows us something which, we are led to
believe, was there all the time; readers were just unable to see it. This enlightenment does not
affect the facts themselves, and so permits of no alternative interpretation. The passive reader
has no choice but to accept the philosopher-detective's version of and emphasis on events, and
so confirm his status as superhero.
The philosopher-detectives know all the answers, the reader knows they know all the answers,
and there may be no challenge to their view of the world. Jessica Mann's remarks on the
supreme confidence demanded by traditional detectives may be applied to the attitude of
traditional philosophers with regard to their position;
long-lived heroes [...] must show an almost magical power, which makes them
superior to the uncertainties and inefficiencies of everyday life. The true hero restores
order without doubting that it is right and necessary. He undertakes the
responsibilities of others, to whom he is superior.27
Socrates' story of Thales is reminiscent of this mythic individual; ' [t]he story is that he was
doing astronomy and looking upwards, when he fell into a pit' (174a). Socrates' point is that
27 Mann, p. 61.
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the work of philosophy is so important that those who practice it may legitimately exclude
themselves from that which they deem to be outside their field of interest. The story also,
however, offers an alternative interpretation of significance, by including a criticism of Thales'
ivory tower attitude;
a Thracian servant, a girl of some wit and humour, made fun of him, because, as she
said, he was eager to know the contents of heaven, but didn't notice what was in front
of him, under his feet. (174a-b)
I conclude that the superhero proposed by traditions in philosophy and detective fiction, who
manipulates a story to massage his own ego, has a stultifying and reactionary effect on each of
these fields, and I propose his immediate demise, in favour of the kind of wit and humour
expressed by the Thracian servant girl, who can use her class and gender position to criticize
those who deem themselves superior.
I have tried to show that the connections between philosophy and detective fiction highlight and
reinforce the reactionary function of tradition in both fields. In the next section I propose an
alternative, which instead seeks to encourage development and growth through such
connections.
B. Alternatively
In the previous section I showed that traditional detective fiction was phallocentric in ways
which are comparable to traditional philosophy, and that certain reactionary features of the
genre made it incompatible with my conception of the philosophical as an incitement to read.
Yet just as I began this thesis with the conviction that feminist revisions of philosophy are both
possible and desirable, I now hope to show how feminist writers might transform the genre of
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detective fiction. Again, this is not an attempt to describe a type of detective fiction in any
systematic way - the genre is so vast that there will always be counter-examples to any such
outline - but rather it is a mythic depiction of the potential for the genre to demonstrate
philosophical notions relating to knowledge acquisition.
Feminist writers may reclaim the literary philosophical by accepting but transforming the
notions of crime, solutions, readers, and detectives in the detective story genre. Retaining these
features of a substantive definition means that feminists can speak from a tradition at the same
time and in the same texts within which they critique that tradition. Like feminist philosophers,
feminist writers of detective fiction, by engaging with a tradition which opposes its political
aims, may draw attention to the contingency of the tradition, and demonstrate the flexibility of
the framework.
1. MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
Feminist detective fiction may question the notion of crime and all its associations, adopting a
broader sense of crime in order that unjust acts, as well as illegal acts, may be viewed as
criminal. For example, whilst in traditional detective stories, that which is feminist may be
regarded as illegitimate and undesirable, here the patriarchal system itself can count as
criminal. Feminists can reclaim the moral framework to put it in our terms; our sexist society
becomes part of the real world of crime, contributing to the disorder experienced by the
characters with which the reader empathizes.
One of the consequences of this broader conception of criminal acts is that characters and their
actions cannot be judged as simplistically; whilst it is a fairly simple matter to decide if an act
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is in contravention of the legal system, there are more complexities in deciding whether or not it
counts as unjust. These problems necessitate examination of people and their motives in depth.
So, in contrast to the many stereotypes to be found in traditional detective fiction, in feminist
detective fiction there may be more subtleties of characterization which the reader must work
out for he/rself, evidenced for example in the ambiguous and shifting relationships which many
feminist detectives have with characters in their stories. As a result, it is less possible to have
assumptions about people and their actions without knowing the background and motivations
of everyone involved. A fuller picture must be shown in order for there to be anything upon
which the detective might make a judgement. The worlds of disorder and order do not declare
themselves, and are not clearly differentiated. This means that the detective must show how
s/he will make sense of the events with which s/he is confronted, rather than pretending that the
problems are pre-determined and pre-defined.
As a result, rather than being presented and known at the beginning, the crime or puzzle may
change and develop throughout the feminist detective novel.28 It is a process, rather than
something already in place to be separated and treated, and so the ends of the text cannot be
predicted from the beginning. Invoking a notion of process allows the detective to acknowledge
her own position in relation to the crime; how s/he will affect as well as effect the investigation.
Similarly, feminist philosophers have often sought to show that the practitioners of their
profession cannot afford to separate themselves from the uncertainties and inefficiencies of
everyday life in their analyses of problems, because to do so would be to ignore how their
background experiences influence the way in which they picture philosophical problems.
28 John G. Cawelti describes the development of the puzzle or crime throughout the story as one way in which the hard-boiled strand
differs from the classical. See the section entitled 'The Hard-Boiled Detective Story', in his Adventure, Mystery, and Romance:
Formula Stories as Art and Popular Culture (Chicago, OH: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 139-161.
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The reactionary effect of the completion enacted in detective fiction by the perceived necessity
of an absolute solution would seem to be anathema to feminist critics. It is certainly at odds
with my definition of feminism as an incitement to read, and of a feminist literary criticism
committed to open readings and boundary breaking. Nicci Gerard, for example, argues that the
'consolations' of generic features like fictional closure are at odds with the projects of women
writers, and, as such, a genre for which such closure is an elemental feature, namely detective
fiction, is no longer a viable literary type for feminists.29 In other words, for Gerard, to
recognize the achievements of women writers is to reject the detective fiction genre. I would
like to argue more positively that, perhaps by refusing to supply the absolute and certain
solution which marks the success of the superhero, feminist detective fiction can provide a
philosophical review of what an answer is, and what counts as a solution. Just as Socrates
with the analogy of the philosopher-midwife revises the role which answers play in
philosophical contexts, feminist detective fiction may revise the roles which solving the crime
plays for texts which fall into the genre. As a result, solution can come to have alternative
interpretative possibilities, proposing an ending which is philosophically significant, because it
perpetuates a desire to question as well as an incitement to read. In the next section I will
examine the way in which these principles are also made possible by the challenge posed by
feminist detective novels to the notion of empathetic ideal passive readers within the text.
2. REJECTING IDEAL PASSIVE READINGS
Feminist detective novels may transform the notion of the ideal passive reader in the text in
order to salvage the philosophical possibilities of the genre. If philosophical texts encourage
the reader to define he/rself in opposition to ideal passive readers of the world in the form of the
29 Nicci Gerrard, 'Gunning for the Girls', Observer, 23 April 1995, p. 6.
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general public, feminist detective fiction may encourage the reader to identify he/rself against
the police. I showed earlier that the traditional philosopher-detective distinguishes himself from
a conception of 'uninitiates,' or those who valorize common-sense at the expense of theory. I
argued that the distinction is offered by Holmes in terms of intellectual superiority, and by
Socrates in terms of open-mindedness, both of which are philosophically attractive qualities.
However, I showed that in both cases the appearance of another passive reader serves to
manipulate the reader of The Sign ofFour and the Theaetetus into an ideal passive acceptance
of the protagonists' viewpoint, which is not commensurate with the philosophical incitement to
read. In order to avoid this trap, feminist detectives must instead expose the police as corrupt
as a result of their being ideal passive readers of events and situations.
This may be contrasted with the alienation from and opposition to the police force apparent in
American hard-boiled detectives like Phillip Marlowe and Sam Spade, whose creators have
often sought to emphasize the fact that they have a different moral agenda to the police force,
and that the institution of the law in general is corrupt.30 The contrast begins most clearly with
the invocation of a feminist agenda. Women are alienated from such an institution in ways that
men are not, and so feminist writers of detective fiction may expose the police force as a
patriarchal hierarchical structure that is permitted to take the law into its own hands, and which
has its supposed solutions sanctioned by a sexist society. Feminist writers may thus investigate
the way in which the patriarchal nature of the institution itself engenders corruption, at the cost
of the individuals caught within it.
The second point of contrast may be found in the emphasis on the problem of passive readings.
Systemic corruption in feminist detective fiction may be figured not as a result of conspiracy or
greed, but as a failure to read actively. In this way, feminist detectives may attempt to seek out
30 See Cawelti, p. 146.
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and expose the ignorance which refuses to question in the course of their investigations. This is
significant because it emphasizes the importance of the feminist detective's task in engaging
with other people's way of seeing the world rather than regarding different visions as being
simply signs of those uninitiated into their own way of seeing the world. Crucially, the ideal
passive reader is in this way regarded as having a problematically different moral agenda to the
detective, which cannot be neglected by her.
The figure of the idiot friend does not fit into my understanding of feminist detective fiction.
Anne Cranny-Francis suggests that the preference of feminist detectives not to have partners is
in part at least a defensive strategy;
The female detective [...] must work solo if she is to have the same textual authority as
a male character.31
My response to this is twofold. I have argued that the textual authority of the traditional
detective, where the investigator becomes a pedagogue, is undesirable from both a
philosophical and a feminist point of view. In addition, there are good reasons for the feminist
detective to abjure notions of partners in the tradition of the idiot friend. Such a character does
not, as I have argued in the case ofWatson and Theaetetus, represent part of a valuable
relationship, but rather involves the exploitation and humiliation of the friend by the detective
and the philosopher. It also functions to discourage active readings of the texts, and so is at
odds with my conception of feminist detective fiction's participation in the philosophy of the
incitement to read. In the next section I will examine the alternative offered to the traditional
notion of the idiot friend by feminist detective novels, in terms of the way in which the
abjuration of such a character affects the position of the feminist detective.
31
Cranny-Francis, Feminist Fiction, p. 168.
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3. PHILOSOPHIZING DETECTIVES
The feminist detective's independence contributes to the incitement to read in detective fiction.
This independence is not the isolation of traditional hard-boiled detectives; feminist detectives
are rarely cocooned in the way that Marlowe and Spade tend to be. Rather they may operate
within a network of equally independent female friends, who are both helpful and reliable. The
reader of feminist detective fiction may be placed in the position of being one of these friends,
and so offered a more complete picture of the life of the detective. The detective describes her
own actions, which the reader is invited to judge, to pick and choose moments of identification
and agreement. Where traditional texts are often stripped of supposed superficialities, with
only those clues which are deemed important emphasized for the reader, feminist texts may
present the reader with a plethora of detail, from which s/he must piece together he/r own
analysis of the situation. In this sense, feminist detective fiction allows the reader to conduct
he/r own investigation.
One obvious way for women writers to challenge the anti-feminist culture of traditional
detective fiction is to simply make the detective a woman. This might be seen as a liberal
feminist solution; a formalist inclusion of women in a men's world. The need to question the
tradition may be efficiently fulfilled by this gender-reversal. Yet because of the way in which
many female detectives have fallen in line with the traditions of the genre, their altered gender
does not fulfil the radicalization sufficiently. As Michele Slung notes of nineteenth and early
twentieth century female detectives in fiction;
they were usually overendowed with feminine charms to compensate for their mannish
profession.32
Far from exploding stereotypes, female detectives often confirmed them; for example, by
exploiting the myth of the female busybody, paradigmatically captured in the name of Clarence
32 Michele B. Slung, 'Introduction' to her edited collection Crime On Her Mind: Fifteen Stories ofFemale Sleuths From the
Victorian Era to the Forties (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp. 13-28 (p. 17).
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Rook's female detective, Nora Van Snoop.33 For my purposes, then, the female-ness of the
detective is a necessary but not sufficient element of a feminist detective story. A feminist
detective story will have to challenge the whole myth of the superhero detective.34
This may be done by changing not only the gender of the detective, but also how she works; her
approach and attitude to the crime, her methods of investigation, and her ambitions, as constant
challenges to the phallocentric culture of detective fiction. In this way female detectives must
serve to counter the stereotypes that women are constantly confronted with in our patriarchal
world. They can do this effectively because unlike many traditional detectives, they are part of
the real world in which they operate. These women are not superheroes who always know that
answer, but rather face a day to day struggle against a system which not only does not want
them to know, but also presumes that they can never know, and so should be protected from
information. For feminist readers, the female detective is our crusading representative, fighting
for recognition and information in a patriarchal world. Where the empathy which the reader
has with Sherlock Holmes is motivated by intellectual pride, the feeling for the feminist
detective's position comes from the way in which she battles to find out things which she is not
supposed to know, thus embodying the incitement to read.
The notions of puzzles, solutions, readers and detectives need not be regarded as reactionary or
anti-philosophical aspects of the genre. The feminist perspective on detective fiction which I
have outlined releases the core questions of the genre in terms of the process of finding out, of
getting from an unknowing state to a knowing one. And best of all, this process is described
stage by stage, that readers might be shown how this happens, and what the process looks like.
33 See Clarence Rook, 'The Stir Outside the Cafe Royal: A Story of Miss Van Snoop, Detective', in Crime On HerMind, ed. by
Slung, pp. 85-90.
34 A similar point is made by Lawrence Block, interviewed in Marilyn Stasio, 'Lady Gumshoes: Boiled Less Hard', New York Times
Book Review, 28 April 1985, p. 1, pp. 39-40 (p. 39). Block says, 'if they want to go into the profession seriously, women writers will
have to change the myth itself, instead of trying to fit themselves into it' (p. 39). Although I agree with the general sense of this, I
would not endorse Block's implied querying of the seriousness or the professionalism of women writers in the genre.
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The philosophical interpretations which are facilitated by this approach will be far more
effective than those suggested under the approach of traditional philosophical correlatives. The
focus for my investigation here will be the traditional philosophical subjects of logic and
epistemology; I intend to show that detective fiction may be philosophical in its analysis of
how and what subjects can know.
Where traditional philosophers, for example Socrates in the Theaetetus, often treat these as
isolated questions, I will show how the novels I examine will "complicate matters"
philosophically, by their demonstration of the preconditions, contextual operations, and
consequences of knowledge acquisition. The texts I will use are Sara Paretsky's V. I.
Warshawski novels, and Barbara Wilson's Pam Nilsen series. By using as illustrative texts
two detectives rather than two novels, this chapter posits a series of texts interacting with one
another, thus appreciating the detective's function as a connecting device between those texts.
Once more, then, I follow the progress of the knowing subject, this time in terms of a
demonstration of how it might be possible for that subject to acquire knowledge about the
world.
C. Feminist Philosophical Detective Fiction
The Theaetetus attempts to produce an explicit definition of knowledge, which is abstracted
from all context, and yet applicable to all possible cases of knowledge. It also begins from a
position of skepticism. As such, it serves as a useful contrast, both with the notion I
established in Chapter Two, that literature offers a philosophy of perspective, and with the
notion which I established in Chapter Three, that literature offers a philosophy of possibility.
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In this section I will argue that feminist detective fiction may present a challenge to the
epistemological agenda of the Theaetetus in both of these senses, and in a third; that where
Plato attempts to offer an a priori statement of what knowledge is, feminist detective fiction
may instead offer a demonstration of the philosophical process which constitutes knowing.
Thus, I will establish in the course of my textual analysis in this chapter that some
philosophical stories may be usefully shown rather than simply told. In this, I share
Wittgenstein's conviction that
[w]hat signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their
application says clearly.35
Detective fiction has the potential to investigate knowledge anew, to ask the kind of questions
which have been side-stepped by philosophers following a tradition, and to ask them in a way
which is both accurate and useful, as only theory in 'application' can be. This lends a
philosophical freshness and freedom to the genre. Philosophically, as I have said, detective
novels are about finding out; they present an individual's development from an unknowing state
to a knowing one. In the first person, they offer a picture of knowledge acquisition in action.
This can incorporate any number of epistemological questions, from the significance of the
knower to the implications of knowing. The learning process offers a structuring strategy for
the rest of this chapter, in terms of a first section on the contextual base for knowledge and the
position of the knower, a subsequent one on methodology or logic, and a final section on the
consequences of knowing. Although these are all very general questions, they will be analysed
in terms of the detective; in terms of how the individual subject of the chosen texts can know.
Together, these three sections will contribute to a picture of a knowing self, as painted in
feminist detective fiction.
35
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans, by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1974),
remark 3.262.
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1. A CONTEXTUAL GROUNDING FOR KNOWLEDGE
[Ajcademic philosophers commonly treat 'the knower' as a featureless abstraction.
Sometimes, indeed, she or he is merely a place holder in the proposition 'S knows that
p, 36
In order to understand knowledge, do we need to refer to the knower in greater detail than as a
place-holder in a knowledge proposition? If we do need to know about the knower, how much
background do we need? Which, if any, contextual features are epistemologically significant?
How do contextual features contribute to finding out? Traditional philosophers have produced
contradictory responses to this type of question, by on the one hand answering chauvinistically;
saying that for philosophical purposes the knower is male, and on the other labelling the inquiry
meaningless; insisting that no contextual features are epistemologically significant, and that
circumstances prior to the actual knowledge acquisition are not the concern of the philosopher,
but rather of the sociologist and the psychologist. Yet some feminist epistemologists have
shown that since knowledge acquisition is contextually defined, then the items acquired as
knowledge will always bear the marks of this context. If this is the case, then any analysis of
knowledge items must include a study of context.37 I regard this suggestion as a radical
development in epistemological study. It is also one which feminist detective stories propose as
a grounding for their epistemological quest, focusing particularly on the individual knower. I
wish to claim that these stories can be seen as texts which are concerned with the establishment
and development of the notion of filling in the contextual conceptual gaps so often ignored by
traditional epistemological inquiry. As a result, they are able to investigate aspects of the
philosophical questions associated with knowing which are often neglected.
16 Lorraine Code, What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the Construction ofKnowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University,
1991), p. 1.
37 See for example Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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The first significant notion established by the novels of this genre is that contextual factors do
indeed play an important epistemological part. Because traditional detective stories form a
genre which is to a large extent plot-driven, detail is often kept to a bare minimum, included
only in so far as it relates directly to the investigation of the crime. In the examples of feminist
detective fiction I have chosen, however, the case is quite different. These texts offer a whole
range of detail which the detective comes upon during the time of the investigation. Some of
this will be directly relevant to the investigation, in the sense of counting as evidence, and some
serves to give readers a rounder picture of the characters and situations involved. In each case,
the detective's whole life for the duration of the investigation is documented; the story is the
story of their lives at the time.
So, the reader is offered a familiarity with V. I. and Pam that is rare in fiction, and perhaps
even rarer in relationships outside it. The female detective narrator leads us through the story,
such that readers see and hear everything that they see and hear, and are given privileged
access to their thoughts. The narrative strives to present these individuals as honest and direct,
in particular insofar as they are willing to confide their vulnerabilities and weaknesses to the
reader; they admit things to us that they will admit to no other character, for example, that they
are scared or unsure about a course of action. This background knowledge is also allowed to
develop through the novels, in terms of the way that the books constitute a series. They display
a consistency, with each novel in a series including familiar characters in familiar places. Pam
Nilsen is a twin, and so not easily separated from her sibling surroundings at any time, but the
twins are also part of a printing collective, featured in each of the novels. Familiar characters
are presented throughout the series, and relationships between them develop and inform the
reader as the stories move on. For V. I. Warshawski, the familiar characters include Mr.
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Contreras, the grumpy protective neighbour, Lotty Herschel, the friendly and efficient doctor,
Bobby Mallory, the police chief who was a friend of her father, and so on.38
With consistency also comes connecting developments between the novels, as in Bitter
Medicine, where V. I. develops an affection for a character's pet golden retriever Peppy. At
the end of the novel Peppy's owner, confronted with his crimes, shoots himself, leaving V. I. to
take care of the dog,39 which will feature in the novels thereafter. Similarly, the three Pam
Nilsen mysteries may be regarded by readers as volumes in the same book as well as separate
novels. This is most clear in the way that Pam, having discovered her lesbian identity in the
first novel of the series, is shown to experience the growth and development of this identity
during the course of the two later ones. The same happens with her identity as a detective. In
both of these series of novels, then, the knower and her environment are introduced as fully as
possible.
Because the reader shares a background of knowledge with the detective, problems appear in
the text as and when they are confronted by the detective. Narratively, this often means that
the crime in the novel happens in the detective's immediate environment; unlike in the
traditional detective story, where the crime is brought to the detective by someone else who is
personally involved. The puzzle, then, is neither external nor artificial in these examples of
feminist detective fiction.
Rather, in these novels, the tendency is for the detective to provide a new direct link to the
crime. In Paretsky's Deadlock, for example, the investigation is initiated by the murder of V.
I.'s cousin.40 In Killing Orders, an aunt employs her as detective, and an old school-friend
38 One reason why the film adaptation of Paretsky's books, entitled V. I. Warshawski, was so inadequate, and even frustrating, was
that it confused relationships between characters, making V. I.'s cousin her boyfriend, and Mr. Contreras her landlord.
39 Sara Paretsky, Bitter Medicine (London: Gollancz, 1987), p. 300; p. 304. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
4,1 Sara Paretsky, Deadlock: A V. I. Warshawski Mystery (London: Gollancz, 1984).
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from whom V.I. solicits information is murdered.40 In Tunnel Vision, a co-worker in a
political pressure group is the victim. In these and other works, V. I. is drawn into a mystery
which is already part of her life before it is a "case".41 Barbara Wilson too offers stories in the
context of her detective, Pam Nilsen's, life. In Murder In the Collective, one of the members
of the print collective which Pam and her sister inherited is murdered. In Sisters of the Road
and The Dog Collar Murders puzzles come into Pam's day to day life, not into any separate
life where she is essentially identified as a detective. In both of these novels, the view that the
knower exists in a vacuum is rejected. A world exists around "S". But how is this shown to
contribute to knowledge?
The inner life of the detective is laid out for us in the Warshawski and Nilsen novels, and it
becomes part of the investigation. The reader is permitted insight into and analysis of the
detectives' mental processes, a privilege which allows us to see how the working out of
problems relates to the person who does the working out. One way in which this happens is
through the detective's sudden realization of something, prompted by some unrelated
experience. In Burn Marks, Warshawski introduces the subject of abortion as a political hot-
potato being avoided by an acquaintance with sights set on Capitol Hill. The theme continues
as V. I. is encouraged by this acquaintance to sponsor a political candidate on the basis that
this candidate agrees with Warshawski's own pro-choice views. Next, V. I.'s aunt turns up on
the doorstep out of the blue, drunk and homeless, with nowhere else to go. This reminds the
detective of a time when her aunt appeared similarly at her parents' house, when Warshawski
was a child. Unable at first to comprehend how her mother would allow someone in such a
state to stay in the house, Warshawski is suddenly awakened to the circumstances of that visit
40 Sara Paretsky, Killing Orders: A Novel (London: Gollancz, 1986). Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
41 The notable exception to this is Paretsky's first Warshawski novel Indemnity Only, where the detective is approached by a client in
a scene which can only be described as parodic; a shadowy man offering a false identity appears as if by magic in her office, lit only
by the intermittent flash of neon from the building opposite (p. 3). It might be suggested that this establishes Warshawski within a
tradition from which she can then break free.
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all those years ago, by the warning that the new home she finds for her aunt does not allow
children or pets;
For the first time in my life I found myself wondering what Elena had done for birth
control all those years. And I suddenly realised why Gabriella had been so accepting
the time she showed up at our house thirty years ago. I couldn't put my finger on
exactly what had been said, but Elena had been pregnant. Gabriella helped her find
some kind of underground abortion and Elena got drunk.42
Warshawski comes to know this through a series of apparently unrelated events and comments.
This knowledge is not simply acquired through experience, as the empiricist would have it, but
depends upon connections made through the knower herself; the form and content of the
knowledge are shaped specifically from her perspective. She had a feeling at the time when
Elena came to stay with the family, which she could not explain. Then, when the memory
returns at a time when issues of abortion are at the forefront of her mind, she makes the
connection, giving meaning to the feeling, and eventually coming to know why her mother
allowed a drunken relative to stay in the house.
A similar moment occurs in Barbara Wilson's Murder In the Collective. The story of the
investigation is also the story of Pam's discovering a lesbian sexuality in herself, and so while
Pam is finding out about the circumstances and characters involved in the murder, she is also
finding out about herself. Pam's identity in this novel has a bearing on the form in which she is
offered information. For example, Elena, a co-worker, warns her not to place an evaluative
interpretation on sexuality, urging her to realize that
lesbians aren't one bit better than anyone else [...] They're jealous, they gossip and lie,
they're promiscuous, they drink, they fight, they hurt people.43
Pam leaves the scene distracted by this self-deprecating outburst, and doubting her own self, as
she enters the printworks. When Pam's partner leaves in frustration at Pam's preoccupation,
42 Sara Paretsky, Burn Marks (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990), p. 30. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
43 Barbara Wilson, Murder In the Collective (London: Women's Press, 1984), p. 162. Subsequent page references will be given in
the text.
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Penny makes fun of her twin's first lesbian relationship; ' "Lover's tiff?" asked Penny, with
what seemed like a sneer' (p. 164).
This condescending attitude forces Pam into a new awareness of her self as an outsider - her
sexuality has become a new degree of separation between her and her twin. And it is this
experience which leads Pam to a realization;
I suddenly walked out the door.
Lesbians were no better than anyone else; lesbians were terrible people. What Elena
had been trying to tell me had finally sunk in. (p. 164)
Pam sees that Elena was confessing to her, in a way only she might have understood. Going
back to Elena, she doesn't need any further confession, instead asking simply, "But why?" (p.
164). In this way the two discourses, one about the crime and one about Pam being a lesbian,
are shown to weave into each other, each of the discoveries counting as an epistemological
framework for the other.
These examples of contextual realization reveal that seemingly unrelated items can share an
epistemologically significant connection; their knower. Readers are shown how the knower
processes the various potential knowledge items, in order to give them meaning as knowledge.
In both cases the knowledge eventually achieved is revealed as peculiarly inextricable from the
way in which it was achieved, and the knower is shown to have significant implications for the
known. Coming to know in the one case, a mother's reason for putting up with a drunk in her
house, and in the other, that Elena has committed the crime, is found to be crucially
perspectival. It is part of a process of knowledge gaining which cannot be explained with
reference to anything other than the detective's analysis of her experiences. There is a visceral
quality to this knowing; both Pam and V. I. seem to sense something at the time, but have to
work out on the page what that feeling signifies.
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This may be fruitfully contrasted with the notion of tacit knowledge, which has been thought to
operate in detective novels and explain the detective's mysterious skills at working things out.44
This latter refers to knowledge which we use and display without conscious thought, for
example, in the way that an experienced driver knows the highway code tacitly. The
knowledge of V. I. and Pam in these instances is not tacit because in the first case, V. I. has no
knowledge of Elena's pregnancy or Gabriella's role in the matter until she has thought it
through in new circumstances. Similarly, Pam isn't aware of the "confession" immediately.
The information has to be processed by the two detectives in context in order for it to make
sense. Both of these moments in the texts show how understanding elements of the person, for
example, that V. I. is a concerned believer in pro-choice politics, who was very close to her
mother before she died, and that Pam is a new lesbian, can help us to understand how the two
detectives possess certain knowledge items - how it is that they know.
The examples of feminist detective fiction which I have selected may be said to set out on their
epistemological quest by emphasizing the importance of the context in which knowledge may
be acquired; in particular the crucial role of the knower in this process. That knowledge may
be acquired is supposed by the detectives in the novels. Indeed, this supposition is required by
the very identity of the detective; in placing themselves in the position of knowledge seeker,
they assume that there is something for them to find, in order that their identity in this case be
meaningful. In this way feminist detectives reject the radical subjectivism often associated with
feminist theory. Radical subjectivism45 takes issue with the dominant positivistic stance in
epistemology, which says that a decontextualized, ahistorical, impersonal proposition is a
paradigm of knowledge. As feminists, radical subjectivists argue that this is a masculine
perspective, which ignores other factors in knowledge acquisition traditionally associated with
44 See for example Joseph Keller and Kathleen Gregory Klein, 'Detective Fiction and the Function of Tacit Knowledge', Mosaic,
23:2 (1990), 45-60.
43 This concept, as I describe it, is closely related to the notion of 'Gynocentric Epistemics' analysed in depth by Jane Duran in her
book Toward a Feminist Epistemology (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), pp. 71-157.
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women, typically emotion, and intuition. So they propose instead the thesis that all knowledge
is relative with regard to its nature and as far as its truth value is concerned, to the subject/
knower. In other words, if I know something, it has meaning and is true for me, here, now.
Radical subjectivists aim to reverse the masculine bias in epistemology, and re-value women's
ways of knowing. Yet the resulting theory tends to be problematically both narrow and
essentialist. It is respectful of the objective/ subjective dichotomy, even as it critiques it.46
The feminist detective stories I have chosen reject the dichotomy of objective/ subjective. As a
result they find themselves able to locate knowledge in a contextual framework, and so allow
for interpretations of knowledge items, whilst at the same time making sense of their role as
knowledge-seekers, by positing some discoverable knowledge item which exists independently
of themselves and other knowledge-seekers. In discovering the item, it is moved out of the
world of objects, and begins to have meaning through its relation to the knowledge-seeker as
subject. Knowledge is neither strictly objective, nor subjective. The dichotomy is presented
and rejected in different ways, but always in the terms of the novels.
Perhaps this position is most clearly presented in the first Pam Nilsen mystery, Murder In the
Collective. Having discovered that their friend and co-worker is under suspicion of murder,
three responses emerge;
Penny [...] shook her head. "It's not important to me to know the answer. I'll support
her either way."
"Pam," Ray said, almost imploringly, staring at me. I almost replied the way he
wanted [...]. But I said nothing. I just didn't know.
"Well, I don't think she did it," said Hadley firmly. "And I want to find the person
who did." (p. 129)
Penny's suggestion that the truth doesn't matter may be said to represent a radical
subjectivism, contrasted with Hadley's objectivism. Pam's uncertainty places her in the
middle, unwilling to commit to either extreme. Ray's response is interesting in its ambiguity.
46 For a full analysis of this difficulty with some feminist epistemologies, see Hekman, Gender and Knowledge, pp. 62-104.
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He has already expressed his belief in the innocence of the accused, but Penny's declaration of
support, it seems, is not enough. Interpreting her subjectivism as uncertainty, he silently
demands an objective response, though not from Penny, but rather from her twin, Pam. That
they are twins is significant, because symbolically they figure as two halves of a whole. Ray
expects one to be countered by the other, and through this expectation, reveals his commitment
to dichotomous thinking. When confronted with a subjectivism he dislikes, he rejects it in the
expectation that the only possible alternative must be objectivism. In this Ray demonstrates
commitment to both the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of the Excluded Middle.
But Pam rejects the objective/ subjective dichotomy, and refuses to play her role in the drama
Ray wants to direct. Although she is still working out her position, she rejects the restriction of
the Principle of Contradiction and instead claims a place in the excluded middle.
In Sara Paretsky's novels the objective and subjective are also shown to work together for the
knower. From a framework of facts and assumptions, Warshawski develops her own
interpretations of events. The episode with the murder victim's daughter in Tunnel Vision is
interesting in connection with this point because it is one where Warshawski speaks from a
position of power (pp. 341-50). She has the words which Emily cannot speak. But this does
not mean that V. I. speaks for Emily; rather she shares her language, tentatively offering her
words up for acceptance or rejection. V. I. tells a story, and waits for the confirmation that her
guess accords with what really happened. Emily's testimony yields valuable information;
although Emily believes that Fabian has committed the murder, V. I. is able to work out from
her statement that he would not have had time to do so, given the gaps between the two times
that Emily sees him at home. Knowledge comes from the fusion of subjective and objective
information available. Warshawski's interpretation of events is open for correction as more of
the complete picture is discovered. The subjective contribution to knowledge does not override
the objective, but rather works with it.
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So, whilst feminist detectives, as would-be knowers, assume that there exists non-subjective
knowledge to be attained, this knowledge does not present itself in terms of a confrontation
with the detective as a subject. This is made clear in the way in which the would-be knower in
these feminist detective novels supposes herself to be capable of attaining that knowledge. This
is clearly a feminist issue, since it is historically the case that in our patriarchal educational
system, for example, it has simply been impossible for women to achieve certain levels of
knowledge, and even when barriers from education for women were lifted, the issue is not
solved immediately; patriarchal myths of women's inferior capacity for knowledge are still
projected by society and internalized by women.47
Penny exemplifies this in Murder, shortly after the objective and subjective responses to the
possibilities and significance of investigation are exposed. Penny begins to share Ray's
perspective of the excluded middle, and it makes her want to withdraw from the investigation;
I've been thinking about it and I decided that what you and Hadley have going for you
is objectivity. I've got a lot to deal with on my own. (p. 134)
Penny has absorbed the blinkers of dichotomy, and is able to make no further distinction
between Hadley's position and Pam's; between objectivity and not-subjectivity. Moreover, she
has now spent enough time with Ray to have learnt to place patriarchal value-judgements upon
each side of the dichotomy, judging her own subjective attitude as both inadequate and
insurmountable, thus making her unwilling and unable to investigate.
In the same novel, Pam's confidence in her role as detective is not as immediately apparent as
Penny's is on her behalf. She appears to be in a state of denial about the investigative project.
When Sam wishes the group well in finding the killer, she replies, ' " We're not the ones
47 For an analysis of the ways in which women have been excluded from the category of knower see Code, What Can She Know '.', pp.
8-12.
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looking" while confiding to the reader, 'But of course we were' (p. 63). Later when Hadley
insists that they stay involved until they find out the truth, Pam claims cowardice;
' "Murder's nothing to play around with," I said weakly' (p. 174).
Yet as soon as Hadley leaves the room, Pam makes '[a]n orderly list entitled: MOTIVES FOR
MURDER'. This time, however, she cannot even admit her interest and skill to herself or the
reader, and insists that this is only done to keep her mind off less honest past-times (p. 74).
She continues to investigate the murder.
In Pam's case, then, her confidence in her investigative role is revealed in action. She chooses
her role of detective, and sticks to it, even when she cannot acknowledge what she is doing.
She wears a mask to protect herself, but her identity as a detective expresses and, significantly,
demonstrates her confidence in her ability to know. The choice of genre here is noteworthy,
because it lends an authority to the female detective; serving to tell us of Pam's confidence even
when she cannot. In contrast Warshawski is a professional detective, and as such states
publicly her role as one who finds out; as a knower. In fact she is so assertive that she often
seems very close to the fast-talking, masculinist hard-boiled detective of traditional detective
stories. Yet Paretksy is able to use the limitations of this stereotype paradoxically to lend a
revolutionary feminist and epistemological credibility to her detective. She is confident of her
own abilities even when others are not.
The characters in Paretsky's novels who do not have confidence in Warshawski's abilities are
usually male characters who are otherwise friends and allies. Bobby Mallory in particular
often good-naturedly articulates what many other chauvinist characters are feeling, for example
when he urges Warshawski 'not to play around in police business' (Burn Marks, p. 296).
Where Pam pretends to herself and the reader that she is not serious about detective work,
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Warshawski is told this by others. It is an interpretation of her role which V. I. strongly
resists, and which is used to taunt her on many occasions. Murray, for example, the
detective's sometime lover and informant, latches on to her insecurity of being regarded as
playing a game by ironically referring to her as a fictional detective. Yet even this is done
genuinely and warmly;
Murray was grumpy for a minute or two, but his basic good nature won't let him carry a
grudge. "What do you propose doing, Nancy DrewT(BitterMedicine, p. 275)
In fact, the notion of a fictional role model is taken up by V. I., who compares herself both to
Harriet Vane,49 and to Lord PeterWimsey (Killing Orders, p. 137). V. I. reads against the
grain of these role models, recognizing wryly that their investigative techniques would never
work for the cases with which she must deal, and so succeeds in positioning herself as an
active reader.
Pam Nilsen also invokes fictional detectives as role models, remembering the novels of her
youth;
some of the happiest days of my childhood were spent at home, with [...] a pile of Nancy
Drews.50
Similarly, in the middle of another investigation, whilst staying at the house of a lawyer she
has met during the course of the case, Pam searches for something to occupy her mind;
I had another beer and looked through Janis' books, decided they were too hard for me,
and turned on the TV to watch Cagney and Lacey.5I
Yet Pam does not absorb the show as mere entertainment. After viewing it, she describes
how she
almost burst into tears. It was as if I understood the story on some profound level and
was afraid of its meaning.
This may be contrasted with Pam's bafflement at a presentation of the speculations of
academic feminist philosophy. In The Dog Collar Murders, as an addenda to the conference
49 Sara Paretsky, Indemnity Only: A Novel (London: Gollancz, 1982), p. 151.
50 Barbara Wilson, The Dog Collar Murders (London: Virago, 1989), p. 79. Subsequent page references will be given in the
text.
51 Barbara Wilson, Sisters of the Road (London: Virago, 1986), p. 160. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
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on sexuality, Miko holds a screening of some videos she has made, introducing and
explaining them;
The third video was longer than the others. Miko said that it was called "Homage to
Luce Irigaray," adding even more obscurely and helpfully for those of us who didn't
know who or what she was talking about, "The [sic] Sex Which Is Not One." (p. Ill)
Here, even poststructuralist feminist philosophy may be raised within the terms of the novel,
where a text can be playfully converted into the subject matter of a porn video. Although
Pam sees value in the way in which women's bodies were 'lovingly photographed' in the
video, ultimately she
couldn't help agreeing with a woman nearby who groaned, scarcely under her breath,
"Bor-ing." (p. Ill)
Miko's interpretation of Irigaray does not help Pam to organize her response to pornography,
and so remains for Pam a theoretical exercise. It thus contrasts sharply with Pam's active
reading of the television show, and the way in which the latter encourages her to ask
questions (p. 161). Active reading in this sense is not pre-determined by the cultural status of
the texts with which the detective is confronted, and Cagney and Lacey may prove to have
more significant philosophical implications than Irigaray.
As such, Pam's role as a reader in the novels offers a sophisticated adoption of role models,
and so allows Pam as well as V. I. to identify as an incited reader. This helps to set up a
pattern in the texts whereby the reader is encouraged to adopt the feminist detectives as role
models. In this way they become crusading representatives of all women in patriarchy,
operating within a tradition from which they are breaking free. This makes their confidence
in their epistemic potential crucial to their feminist identity. They - and the reader - must be
sure that they are able to place themselves in a position of a knower.
To summarize, feminist detective stories begin exploration of how the self can know, by
emphasizing the importance of contextual features for knowing, and then establishing related
conditions for knowing; first of all that the detectives believe there is something to be known,
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and secondly that they reject patriarchal myths and have confidence in their own ability to
know. But how is the feminist detective to go about acquiring this knowledge which she
knows is within her grasp?
2. EPISTEMIC METHODOLOGY
"You know a conjuror gets no credit when once he has explained his trick; and if I show
you too much of my method of working, you will come to the conclusion that I am a
very ordinary individual after all."52
How do we progress from an unknowing state to a knowing one? How do we become
knowers? How do we acquire knowledge items? If detective fiction is to be regarded as
approaching these questions, then its texts must show the detective's 'method of working'.
As Holmes's remark suggests, this depiction may also contribute to the dismantling of the
myth of the apparently magical powers of the philosopher-detective superhero.
There are many different ways in which fictional detectives work things out. I want to begin
this part of my investigation by looking at the strategies for finding out from the perspective
of logic in traditional philosophy, which may be sympathetic to the epistemological
exploration of detective fiction. An important distinction in the philosophy of knowledge
acquisition is the one between inductive and deductive reasoning. Deduction involves the
application of laws and theories to experience, where induction begins from experience, and
concludes with appropriate laws and theories induced from that experience.
Take my investigation into a serial killer, for example. Deductively, my reasoning might
work like this;
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Rule: Every dead person knew the killer's identity
Case: This person is dead
Result: This person knew the killer's identity
Inductively:
Case: This person is dead
Result: This person knew the killer's identity
. .Rule: Every dead person knew the killer's identity
The methodology of reasoning - how I go about finding out - is an area where traditional
philosophy often connects with traditional detective novels. Fictional detectives often
surprise and impress us by having knowledge which seems in excess of the facts as they have
been presented to the reader.
Sherlock Holmes acknowledges this and puts it down to a certain skill of practised logic. In
A Study In Scarlet, Watson reads out a section from an article which, unbeknownst to him as
yet, was written by Holmes to describe his method of finding things out. In this article,
Holmes diminishes the value of experience (or perhaps overestimates the role it can play in
knowledge acquisition) in detecting as largely unnecessary for any 'competent inquirer';
"From a drop of water," said the writer, "a logician could infer the possibility of an
Atlantic or a Niagara without having seen or heard of one or the other." (p. 22)
Holmes, then, makes a strong claim for deduction, one which seems to contradict a traditional
philosophical assertion that logical truths can only be tautological;53 to say that there is a drop
of water in the world is not the same thing as saying that there are huge oceans. But even if
Holmes is right, and deductive reasoning can lead to new knowledge, surely the instance
encountered (the drop of water) has to be closely related to the result inferred (the ocean). It
52 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study In Scarlet (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 40. Subsequent page references will be given in the
text.
53 See Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill B. Hintikka's interpretation of Holmes's article, in their piece 'Sherlock Holmes Confronts
Modern Logic: Toward a Theory of Information-Seeking Through Questioning', in The Si)>n of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce,
ed. by Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 154-169 (p. 154-156).
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may be that Holmes makes too great a leap from the drop to the ocean; as far as reasoning
goes, there seems to be a missing link. How can we come to know of entities merely by
knowing of their constituent parts?
Traditionally, philosophers and fictional detectives may be thought to wish to promote their
professions as anything but ordinary. Yet here this may be seen as a problematic way of
obscuring philosophical analysis. If readers are not to be shown how things are found out,
then they will gain no insight into the learning process. Readers are left then with a
mysterious move from premise(s) to conclusion which prohibits philosophical interpretation.
In addition, Eliot and Chandler might argue that this mismatch of effect (knowing) and cause
(reason to know) reduces the artistic value of a detective novel.54
Perhaps one way in which this difficulty may be overcome is with the notion that the
detective is displaying he/r specialized skills of finding out, using he/r detective's instinct,
developed through experience. I have already shown how meaning can be given to seemingly
innocuous events in a person's past, and that the experience of sudden realization can yield
new knowledge about those events. Perhaps the detective develops a kind of sixth sense, and
sometimes "just knows" about things that happened to others, too.
The function of instinct has been thought to play a particularly important part in female
fictional detecting methods.55 In this case, the drop of water may be subtracted from the
equation altogether, with S just knowing about the circumstances of the crime. This type of
knowledge may be formalized as that produced by abductive reasoning, where
54 See T. S. Eliot's notion of the 'objective correlative', in his essay 'Hamlet', published in Selected Essays: 1917-1932, 2nd
edn. (London: Faber and Faber, 1934), pp. 141-146 (p. 145), and Raymond Chandler's objections to those examples of detective
fiction, typical of the Golden Age of the genre, whose stories are 'too contrived', and as a result 'do not really come off
intellectually as problems, and [...] do not come off artistically as fiction.' See 'The Art ofMystery Fiction', in The Art of the
Mystery Story, ed. by Haycraft, pp. 222-237 (p. 231).
55 For descriptive accounts of intuitive tendencies in female fictional detectives see Slung, p. xix, and Craig and Cadonan, p. 16.
For a derisive response to such intuitive tendencies see Dorothy L. Sayers, 'The Omnibus of Crime', in Detective Fiction, ed. by
Winks, pp. 53-83 (pp. 58-59). For a more typically positive response see Jan Oxenberg, 'The Womanly Arts: Gossip and
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a shrewd guess is a probable premise which, if true, accounts for the observed
phenomenon.56
Abduction would deal with the earlier example thus;
Rule: Every dead person knew the killer's identity
Result: This person knew the killer's identity
Case: This person is dead
Charles Peirce argues for the value of this kind of non-inductive knowledge. Interestingly
enough, he does so inductively. He has an experience where a 'shrewd guess' yields
knowledge, and so concludes from this that such reasoning is in principle useful. The story
goes like this. Travelling on the Fall River boat from Boston to New York, he finds his
pocket-watch missing, and believes it stolen. In order to find out who the thief is, he
made all the colored waiters, no matter on what deck they belonged, come and stand up
in a row. There was something like a score of them.67
Peirce goes on to describe how he walked down the row of waiters, chatting to each one of
them, and trying to get some feeling for the identity of the guilty man;
I said to myself, "Well, anyway, I must fasten on someone, though it be but a random
choice," and instantly I knew which of the men it was." (p. 281, author's italics)
Peirce goes to some trouble to prove that the man he has chosen is the thief, and eventually,
to his immense gratification, succeeds in proving that his instinct was right.
The abductive method is thought to apply to detective stories across the board, both
traditional and feminist detective fiction.58 On this view, the task of the detective in detective
fiction is to come up with some clever guesswork, followed by the search to prove oneself
right. Although simplistic, I think that this does succeed in summarizing, to some extent, the
Intuition as Detective Tools', in The New Bedside, Bathtub & Armchair Companion to Agatha Christie, ed. by Dick Riley and
Pam McAllister (New York: Ungar Publishing, 1993), pp. 261-263.
56 Keller and Gregory Klein, p. 45.
57 Charles Sanders Peirce, 'Guessing', The Hound & Horn: A Harvard Miscellany, 2:3 (1929), 267-282 (p. 271). Subsequent
page references will be given in the text.
8 For a specific comparison of Conan Doyle's texts with the detecting described by Peirce in this article see Thomas A. Sebeok
and Jean Umiker-Sebeok, 'You Know My Method: A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes', in The Sign of
Three, ed. by Eco and Sebeok, pp. 11-54. For a broader application of fictional detective methods to the theory of abduction see
Keller and Gregory Klein.
structure of traditional detection in detective novels. Peirce's analysis fits in well with my
notion of the traditional detective as godlike, since he describes abduction at one stage as a
'Divine privilege'.59 However, I hope to show that this is not an adequate characterization of
feminist detective stories, where all kinds of reasoning are explored carefully and with
greater sensitivity than Peirce's. Peirce acknowledges that abductive knowledge is not self-
contained, and must have some reference to things outside of its equations, but does not give
any detail as to how such references might be assessed. In accordance with the structuring
principle I have adopted in this chapter as an approach to the problem of how it is that
literature can be philosophical, I will argue that feminist detective fiction shows how this
works, a process more valuable than mere telling.
I have established that context plays an important part in the epistemological experience of
feminist detectives. As a result of this, context is found to contribute to the knowledge
process - emotional contexts, for example, will, far from distracting, actually inform. As a
result, feminist detectives may have a distinctive way of finding things out, every stage of
which is played out for the reader. It is often noted that many feminist detectives use
unconventional methods of investigation, and Warshawski certainly conforms to this pattern,
epitomized by the trust which she places in the dreams which she has during the investigation
r 60of a case.
In Bitter Medicine, V. I. acknowledges this process, hoping for 'the appearance of some
brilliant idea in my dreams' (p. 231). Allowing ideas to occur to her in this way enables
Warshawski to employ abduction to gain knowledge; as she says to Murray in Tunnel Vision, '
'I have a hypothesis, but I need to test it'(p. 416). She can have conjectures about the facts,
and then see if they are confirmed by her experience. That this method need not weaken her
59
Quoted in Sebeok and Sebeok, p. 17.
60 Warshawski's dreams are described in most of the novels; for a few interesting examples, see Burn Marks, p. 1; Tunnel
Vision, p. 220; Toxic Shock p. 32.
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confidence in her own judgements is made clear in the expression of the theory in Toxic
Shock, where V. I. expresses her intention to '[g]et the facts, then shoot' (p. 112). In
Indemnity Only, for example, V. I. meets Yardley Masters, who is congenial, even co¬
operative, yet something about him makes him an immediate suspect (p. 26). When her
suspicions of him are confirmed, other characters are upset that they failed to have the same
instinct about him; Ralph, for example, laments to V. I. that he
worked for him for three years and didn't see that about him. You met him once and
knew he was that kind of guy. (p. 236)
However, her feeling about Masters does not dominate the investigation; it is merely a useful
part of it. Her hypothesis about his guilt is proved correct in the end, but unlike Peirce, she
did not set about the investigation assuming that this would be the case.
Warshawski, though confident, does not have the absolute overriding confidence in her
abductive abilities that Peirce had in his. I want to suggest that this is a positive feature of
her detecting techniques. I am troubled by the story of Peirce's search for his missing watch.
I think it shows that abduction can be a dangerous game. Peirce says that there was no reason
for his feeling that one particular man had stolen his watch, but that nevertheless he had this
belief. Yet there is a method here; in collecting together possible suspects, Peirce
consciously chooses men from all decks of the ship, so long as they are men of colour.
Peirce denies that experience plays a role in abductive knowledge, but it seems clear that his
background beliefs about people of colour played a part in his reasoning. That such criteria
are used for deciding who is the thief might be problematized by Peirce's own prejudice is
not considered, as he assures the reader '[tjhere was no self-criticism. All that was out of
place' (p. 271).
The danger with abduction as theorized by Peirce is precisely that it is begins not from the
premise of finding things out, but rather with the aim of proving oneself right. At first
glance, it appears to be radical; the principle of abduction has even been referred to as
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Peirce's 'law of liberty'.61 Yet there are hidden restrictions on this liberty, at least for those
chosen as guilty. Abductively, saying that "I know this", can be a way of justifying my
judgements without showing how I came to them.
Now the problem with essentialist critiques which claim that instinctive - or, philosophically
speaking, abductive - reasoning is a significant characterizing feature of feminist detective
fiction should be clear. Abduction, as it turns out, is a way for the knower to close off other
possibilities. When discussing autographical fiction, I characterized this exclusivity as
anathema to my notion of feminist philosophical literature. Nor do I see it as a feature of
feminist detective fiction. Feminist detectives rather acknowledge and demonstrate the
dangers of both abductive and instinctive reasoning. Their methods involve a risk, every
time.
In Sisters of the Road, for example, Pam has good reasons not to trust Wayne, but when she
meets him, her impression is positive;
I couldn't quite reconcile his reality with the picture I'd built up in my mind. Playboy
maybe, but pimp and hustler? No, he couldn't be. He was too cute, too friendly, too
good-humored, (p. 74)
At the final denouement, Pam ignores still more external evidence and instead trusts her
instincts about Wayne, opening the cabin door to him. She pays for this mistake by being
brutally raped. But self-criticism does have a place here; she tells June ' "[w]e never should
have gone up there alone" ' (p. 200). Admitting mistakes is another part of the learning
process which is a characteristic of these feminist detective stories. Warshawski is also keen
to learn from her mistakes. In Indemnity Only, after warning the town brute, whose beating .
V. I. is just recovering from, that she will not go away, she immediately regrets it, and tells
the reader
I ought to write "Think before acting" a hundred times on the blackboard, (p. 113)
61 Sebeok and Sebeok, p. 10.
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Feminist detectives, then, are fallible. This means that they have to test their knowledge.
This notion is consistent with the idea of knowledge as a social force. It must be measured to
some extent with the world. Feminist detectives formulate theories and then test them in the
social world, that their theories may be gradually corrected and affirmed. One example of
this testing of oneself is the episode in Tunnel Vision. V. I., from the premises of the
atmosphere and interaction of family members at a dinner party held by Fabian and Deirdre,
concludes that when Deirdre is murdered, Fabian must be responsible. The couple's
daughter, Emily, is in a position to provide vital information about the night of the murder,
but disappears. When Warshawski manages to find her, she wants to talk to her about the
night in question. V. I.'s problem is presented to us directly;
I couldn't ask Emily - she wouldn't answer a direct question right now.62
The solution rests on V. I.'s shoulders. She must somehow guess what has happened to
Emily, and in this way find out what did happen;
If I could work out what happened, work it out right, she might trust me enough to speak
to me. (p. 342)
The crucial point here is that this suggesting of hypotheses is not about proving oneself right.
It is about proving oneself trustworthy. And V. I. can do this by being open to the child's
story, even when it does not fit with her suspicions. The desired result is that Emily be able
to talk about her experiences, not that V. I. know what they were. V. I. finds out what
happened to Emily on the night of her mother's murder, but only incidentally. By treating
Emily sensitively, and being aware of her vulnerability, V. I. is able to share Emily's
knowledge about the events that night.
Another way in which feminist fictional detectives might show their methods of finding out
is by reference to evidence. It might even be argued, for example, that evidence actually
offers or facilitates knowledge. Since evidence is a specific technical term in both detection,
fi2 Sara Paretsky, Tunnel Vision (London: Hamilton, 1993), p. 342. Subsequent page references will be given in the text.
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literature,63 and epistemology, it might help to look at what I mean when I talk about
evidence. What counts as evidence? What is the relationship between evidence and the
potential knower? The classic notion of evidence is that of an object offering information -
the proposition incorporating this idea would be "S knows that P because of A", where A is a
blood-stained knife, or an engraved cigarette lighter. It is the object in a specific context of
enquiry. In philosophical terms, however, the notion of evidence refers to an internal state, a
belief, for example, that one has about objects.64 The proposition in this case would be "S
knows that P because of A" where A is a belief that the blood-stained knife was used to
commit murder. The two conceptions of evidence seem very different. And yet both may
function as proof of knowledge. It is with an understanding of this more general definition
that I will proceed. In this way, I hope to bring together both senses of "evidence".
Writers of feminist detective stories bring the philosophical notion of evidence into their
works, not by converting A from object to belief, but by focusing upon the human factor; S.
This is one way in which feminist detectives manage to deal with that classic epistemological
puzzle, the Gettier problem.65 Gettier famously criticizes the common assumption by
philosophers that knowledge may be characterized as justified true belief. He argues that
sometimes belief in an item or event can be both justified and true, in other words seem to
count as philosophical evidence, and yet the person may not be said to know that item or
event. For example, I might set my video recorder to tape the boat race between Oxford and
Cambridge. However, unbeknownst to me, the start of the race is delayed due to a terrorist
bomb threat at Putney Bridge. To cover the airtime, the television company screen last year's
race, which Cambridge won. This is the race which my video records, and which I watch that'
evening. In the meantime, the bomb threat has been exposed as a hoax, and this year's race
begun and completed; Cambridge win yet again. When I watch my video tape, I believe that
63 See for example the special issue of the Periodical of the Modern Language Association ofAmerica on 'The Status of
Evidence'; 111:1 (1996).
M These are consistent with the definitions of evidence to be found in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. by Jonathan Dancy
and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 120.
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Cambridge have won this year's boat race. Moreover, that belief is justified, since I have just
seen them win it. And finally, my belief is true, since Cambridge actually did win. However,
I may not be said to know that Cambridge won this year's boat race.
The Gettier analysis greatly problematizes the notion of propositional knowledge, or
knowledge that P, because it requires better justification for our believing that we know
something. It focuses attention on the quality of evidence, since it points out that although I
may have had justification for believing that Cambridge had won this year's boat race, that
justification did not count as good enough evidence for knowledge.
An important question seems to be "how might the quality of our evidence be improved?" In
the terms of my interpretation, feminist detective writers have addressed this problem, and
found that a possible approach to the Gettier problem is for items or events put forward as
evidence to be treated in human terms; in other words with regard to how they relate to
people, and how people relate to them. In this way my evidence can be constantly tested for
how it functions in the world, and knowledge may be conceived accordingly in terms of a
process.
In Tunnel Vision, a poem written by Emily becomes evidence to V. I. of her father's crimes.
The poem, entitled 'A Mouse Between Two Cats', is printed in full (pp. 151-152), and is
shown to have had a remarkable effect on the writer (p. 151), and also on V. I.;
I shivered. The furies raging in the Messenger home came to grotesque life on the page
"Do you have any idea when she wrote this?" (p. 153)
It is because the text seems significant that the detective will try to place it in a context, to try
to understand it more fully. With this in mind, she shows the poem to a friend, and at the
friend's suggestion they take the poem to a social worker to read it with her. Together they
65 See Edmund L. Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, 23:6 (1963), 121-123.
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try to comprehend the implications of what Emily has written (pp. 164-165). The focus on
collaborative interpretation is crucial here. Reading it together enables the three women to
gain some idea of the meaning of the poem; of what the evidence signifies. Of course, it will
not secure a conviction, will not, in a legal sense, prove anything. But the understanding of
Emily which V. I. attains enables her to proceed with the investigation with some additional
information about the emotional context of the murder victim's daughter.
The poem, as literature within the literature, also works to convince the reader of the power
of reading. Its inclusion in the text works as evidence to the reader, providing a frame of
reference testifying to Emily's character. So, when Warshawski says that she was 'thinking
of the mouse between two cats' (p. 210), she reactivates the reading of the poem which saw
Emily as the victim of two opposing forces. Emily's confirmation of her self-image (p. 341)
supports V. I.'s interpretation of the evidence and shows her methods of hypothesis and
testing of unconventional evidence working efficiently. This particular evidence can also
signify progress and change, and towards the end of the novel comes to signal Emily's
intelligence and surviving identity. As the title of the sixtieth chapter has it, 'A Poet
Surfaces' (p. 459).
In Pam Nilsen's first investigation, a more conventional piece of evidence turns up, but is
used by the detective in a most unconventional manner. In Murder, Pam and Hadley search
the murder victim's flat in an attempt to find out what happened. They find a blue earring,
and instead of placing it with tweezers into an evidence bag, that the evidence might stay as
free from human contact as possible, Hadley puts it in her ear. They believe that in and of
itself, the earring has no meaning for the investigation, and can yield no knowledge. What
they will rely on is other people's reactions to Hadley's wearing the earring. This is unstated
in the text, and as such is attractive for the reader, incited by this feminist philosophical text,
in that it allows he/r to work it out independently. When the confrontation takes place, this
reader opportunity to investigate intensifies, because the identification with the mission of
the detective is strong, and yet the earring is still not referred to as being specifically useful
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as evidence in itself. After Carlos's outburst, demanding to know where they had found the
earring, Pam asks Hadley if that counts as proof that he and Benny killed Jeremy;
"Well, we don't know that for sure, do we?" Hadley remained at the mirror, swinging
the S-shaped earring back and forth with a finger. "Yet, anyway." (p. 159)
When the other earring turns up, it takes them no further, and Pam has to arrange once more
for a possible suspect to be confronted by Hadley wearing both of them. This time it leads to
a full confession (p. 177-178).
My claim then is that such textual treatment of evidence serves to bring together the
philosophical notion of evidence and the everyday or legal notion which seems to be of more
direct relevance to the genre. It describes the former as a fuller version of the legal notion of
evidence often assumed to be at work in detective stories - including the object as well as a
context of attitudes towards the object. In other words, the quality of evidence may be
improved by background considerations. So for example, in the case of the boat race, my
evidence that Cambridge won this year's final was not good enough because I failed to
account for the contingency of the event, and the way in which it might be affected by, for
example, acts of terrorism, and alterations in television schedules.
Pam also gleans information in the course of normal - non-interrogative - discussions. In the
last novel of the series, Pam pays visits to people connected with her private life in order to
find out about the murder of the anti-pornography campaigner, Loie Marsh. She visits
Elizabeth, her counsellor, and questions about Loie's background are weaved into questions
about Pam's state of mind, and Elizabeth's attitude to pornography. Pam even feels that they
are becoming closer as they chat, describing how she 'was touched that she was opening up
to me'(Dog Collar, p. 90).
When Pam decides that she needs to interview someone specifically to get information about
the case, to perform a serious interrogation, as it were, we are offered a highly comic scene in
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a strip club where Nicky works. Unable to find her at another time, or to speak to her
personally during working hours, Pam and Hadley have to pose as customers, putting coins
into the slot in a darkened booth in order to activate the two-ways mirrors which will enable
them to see Nicky in the middle of her erotic dancing, and Nicky to see them. They have a
ready made sign to hold up to the mirror;
It said: NICKY COULD WE PLEASE SPEAK TO YOU DURING YOUR BREAK?
IF YES MEET US AT THE FRANKFURTER ON THE CORNER AT 7 P.M.
She stared at the sign, then at us. Without changing the tempo of her dancing she
nodded her head slightly.
"I guess we have to go now?" said Hadley.
"We've gotten what we came for."
"More or less," said Hadley. (p. 64)
Interrogating a witness has never been such fun. The parodic tone of this scene, where
careful organization and self-conscious preparation are needed to arrange a "questioning
session", serves to emphasize the casual and informal way in which Pam usually gets
information from people. The traditional formalities are exposed and undermined. In
addition, it emphasizes the way in which Pam's role as voyeur eventually leads to her solving
the crime. Her willingness to take on that perspective, abhorrent as it is to her and to the
reader at first, allows Pam to see how the hypocritical attitudes of many of the anti-
pornography campaigners in the novel led to the Dog Collar murders.66
So, contrary to Holmes, Pam and V. I. show how being sensitive to emotions - their own and
other people's - can yield important information; can lead to knowledge. Sympathy with
another's point of view can help the knower to see things that might otherwise have been
missed. In addition, the feminist detective's revealing their methods of working serves to
involve the reader in the investigation, because the texts refuse to tell, preferring to show. As
a result, understanding the detective as an ordinary individual is not the problem which
Holmes suggests. Rather it multiplies the potential for philosophical application.
66 For example, Pam's open mindedness about pornography and sadomasochism contrasts with the way in which Loie is said to
'construct an entire ideology around the things she was most afraid of seeing in herself.' (Dog Collar, p. 68), and with Sonya
(the murderer)'s 'fundamentalist belief system' (p. 49), which includes homophobic and anti-choice positions.
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3. CONSEQUENCES OF KNOWING
What happens after the detecting is done? What do I do with my knowledge? Traditional
philosophers have often assumed that once the conditions for the possibility of knowledge and
the ways in which we acquire knowledge are understood, the philosophical job is done. In the
same way, traditional detective fiction posits a solution, a notion of order, which marks the
conclusion of the investigation.
But for feminist detectives, this is not the end of the story. In particular, the morality of
knowing becomes an issue in these texts. What ought one to do with knowledge, once one has
it? As feminists and outsiders, Warshawski and Nilsen do not have the same obligations to and
interests in the status quo as do traditional fictional detectives. As such, the stories of their
investigations will never come full circle, and like those who hear the dialogue between
Socrates and Theaetetus, they will never be placed in the position they inhabited at the
beginning. As with Esther in The Bell Jar, their experiences will change them. For example,
at the end of Killing Orders V. I. is told in the scene of denouement, where the criminals
confess, that her mother had an affair with a man who committed suicide when she left him.
The effect which this knowledge has on V. I. is spelt out in her remark '[sjince that terrible day
at the priory, I can't stop dreaming about it' (p. 232). The more radical indication that the
knowledge changes V. I.'s sense of herself comes from a reflection on the meaning of her
middle name, Iphigenia, which has Trojan connotations serving as a sign of deception, and of a
father's betrayal (p. 232-3). In this way, knowledge is shown to have consequences for the
knower both directly and personally.
As representative knowers, the detectives have a responsibility for the consequences of
knowing. The most obvious way in which the detectives acknowledge their responsibility for
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assessing the justice of situations, occurs in the decision to allow the guilty party to go free. In
Tunnel Vision, this becomes an issue for V. I. as she comes to terms with the contemptible
Fabian getting away with his crimes. She chooses not to have him arrested, as Lotty proposes,
because he can do more good for Emily out of prison;
"We need to keep him working - he has to pay for day care and school and therapy and
stuff." (p. 472)
Although this decision is probably the best one in the circumstances, Warshawski isn't pleased
that Fabian has escaped formal punishment;
I kept drinking [...]. But I couldn't get drunk. Not even Black Label could wipe the
taste of Fabian from my mouth, (p. 473)
The decision not to prosecute Fabian, or even to expose him as an abuser, is on balance the
most pragmatic, despite leaving the child abuser with his undeserved freedom, riches, and
respect of his peers. The fact that the text resists the automatic response of the generic formula
to have Fabian "taken away and dealt with by the authorities" forces the reader to think of the
consequences of crime and injustice. V. I.'s own dissatisfaction with the outcome undermines
any closure, and urges the reader to share that uncertainty. That finding out has resulted here
in "not knowing" is significant, in its pressing the desire to question, and the incitement to read.
Pam also deliberates the morality of her occupation. In Murder, when she finds out that
Jeremy's murder may have been retributive, she is troubled about going on;
[I]f [Carlos and Benny] had killed Jeremy because he'd caused Amado to be tortured
and murdered, who was I to be investigating and looking for justice? Perhaps justice
had already been done. (p. 157)
In the end the murderer is found to be Zee, but Pam sympathizes with her and decides that the
murder had been the right thing for Zee to do in the circumstances. After confessing, Zee
expresses concern about her future;
"[N]ow maybe I'll spend the rest ofmy life in prison [...]"
Zee said it quietly, as if it didn't concern her, but her black eyes burned into me, asking
for something that I was finally ready to give.
"No," I said, "You can't." (p. 179, author's italics)
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Pam will not turn Zee over to the police; it is enough that she has been trusted with the
information. She is now able to make her own choice as to what to do with that knowledge.
Unlike Fabian, Zee does not deserve to be imprisoned, and so if it is up to Pam, cannot be.
Where V. I.'s choice to withhold her knowledge about the criminal is made from a view to what
will best help the victim, Pam's is made from a consideration of what will be most fair. Letting
Zee off is fair not just because the man she murdered was an FBI informer, but also because
her motivations for killing him were unselfish; to prevent him from raping Elena. In this sense
Zee's actions were heroic, and the system which would punish her does not deserve the
information which would allow it to do so.
Of course detectives are not merely offered the opportunity to share knowledge at the end of
detective novels. As their investigations progress, both V. I. and Pam pride themselves on their
honesty, refusing to treat their knowledge possessively, in the way that many traditional
detectives do. In the first novel in the series, Pam tries out the deceptive techniques of the
genre's history, but finds that she cannot go on;
Flow did these hard boiled-egg detectives do it? I couldn't possibly get any information
out of her without feeling like a heel. (Murder, p. 144)
As the series of progresses, Pam develops her techniques of finding out until she finds a style
with which she is much more comfortable. By the time she reaches her third investigation, she
is able to trust even Miko, who has been trying to seduce her partner. Despite the tension
between them, Pam goes to Miko's recording studio to ask her advice on some film reels which
she has come across in the course of the investigation. To the reader's surprise, this request for
information has the effect of opening her up (Dog Collar, p. 177), just as it had with Elizabeth,
and although she doesn't learn anything about the case from this discussion, it enables her to
trust Miko with the most important evidence she has (p. 179). This culminates in the relaxed
session at the end of Dog Collar, where Pam sits with her friends filling in the pieces of
information which will make everything clearer (chap. 20).
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Warshawski has a similar respect for honesty, and disdain for the detective story trick. In
Toxic Shock, she becomes most impatient with an old friend who has been teasing her with
selective information;
"If you wanted to hire me, why couldn't you have said something about it on the
phone?" I asked. "Your step-by-step approach to me isn't exactly designed to make
me feel serious about you [...] Caroline, lay it out for me [...] tell me the whole story,
front, middle, and end".67
This is not to say that the detectives are naive. On the contrary, they also know when to keep
quiet. Usually they are keen to keep information from those in authority. When Warshawski
confirms this pattern, she puts it in terms of reciprocity, confiding that ' [l]ike Bobby, I hate
giving information across police barricades' (Burn Marks, p. 103).
This might be seen as a forceful argument that she is denied information as a woman from such
patriarchal institutions as the police force, and so has to protect herself and her project by
keeping her knowledge from such institutions as might use it for motivations which differ from
her own. It is also significant that the institution creates a barrier between V. I. and her
father's friend Bobby Mallory, and also, in Tunnel Vision, between V. I. and her policeman
lover, Conrad. V. I. confides in the reader that the police are often trying to find out the same
things, but that because they fail to act within a context of considerations;
you inevitably end up across a chasm from them: you for mercy, they for justice. You
for justice, they for law. (p. 174)
Because the reader has been included within the collaborative interpretative community which
examined, for example, Emily's poem, s/he can be addressed in support of this oppositional
view of the police. Sharing knowledge with members of the police force doesn't work because
they fail to see the significance of testimony and of evidence in context;
They didn't understand me. When I explained that encounter at Home Free two weeks
ago, where Charpentier had come out of Jasper's office and been disconcerted at my
mentioning Deirdre's name, Finchley didn't think it proved my point at all. (p. 395)
67 Sara Paretsky, Toxic Shock (London: Gollancz, 1988), pp. 25-26.
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The reader, having already been told this story (pp. 82-87), is invited to agree with V. I.'s
interpretation, and query Finchley and Conrad's dismissal of the occasion. The two policemen
cannot take her story seriously because it does not fit in with the common sense picture which
they have established, blaming Emily for her mother's murder, and accounting for V. I.'s
version in terms of her 'putting too much emotion into this' (p. 395).
Pam also feels her position as an outsider whenever she comes in contact with the police. But
once more her lack of experience shows, as she begins by expecting them to share her concerns
and moral attitude to knowledge. This is particularly true in the second novel in the trilogy,
where she begins by giving the police detailed information, and then asks if Rosalie couldn't
have been the latest victim of a serial killer;
The cop shrugged. "You never know. It may have just been some guy who was mad at
getting ripped off by two teenage hookers. [...]"
"You're suggesting that maybe she deserved it?"
The more politic detective said somewhat wearily, "No, of course not "(Sisters, p. 10)
The tendency for the policemen to sympathize with 'some guy' rather than the murder victim
and her friend leads Pam to immediately reconsider her role as informer in this context; she
says 'I felt protective of Trish suddenly' (p. 10). Back with a friend, however, she does not
hesitate to reveal the full story (p. 11).
So the feminist detectives consider carefully what they ought to do with their knowledge, and a
pattern emerges whereby it is shared with the trustworthy, a group which does not include the
police, who seem to separate knowledge from ethical - which they may label emotional -
considerations. At the same time, some specific kinds of emotional considerations may be
considered by the police to be reasonable grounds for action, such as killing prostitutes when
they provoke anger.68
68 For a study of the bearing which sexual difference has upon the attitudes of law enforcement agencies and institutions to issues of
provocation, emotional justification, and what it might be reasonable for someone in a given context to do see Helena Kennedy, Eve
Was Framed: Women and British Justice (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), esp. pp. 222-239.
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Ethical considerations then have an important part to play in how feminist detectives use their
knowledge, once they have it. But they also recognize their responsibility as potential knowers.
Both Paretsky's novels and the Pam Nilsen series include an examination of their detectives'
motivations for finding out. How should a potential knower behave? Here once more it is
possible to focus upon the position of the individual detective, and how their role is defined by
themselves and the text. Because they belong to the same parent genre, feminist detectives
share some of the characteristics of traditional detectives - they too are representative, of
feminism in the widest sense. However, they are not investigating on behalf of feminists, but
rather are "doing it for themselves". They take full responsibility for their position as knowers,
and this includes an ethical responsibility which is quite separate from their professions. This
moral dimension is often expressed in terms of a "need to know", which overrides other
perhaps more rational considerations.
For example, Warshawski makes her living as a detective. But on many occasions, she
initiates an investigation purely for the sake of it, and gets paid for it later as an effect of
circumstance. This happens in Burn Marks, where probing into the origins of a suspicious
looking fire on behalf of some homeless people (including her drunken aunt, whom V. I. would
gladly never see again) leads to payment from the insurance company to investigate suggestions
of arson; in Deadlock, where the sudden death of a cousin seems strange; in Killing Orders,
where V.I. cannot understand why she is being called off a case, and so carries on unpaid; and
in Tunnel Vision, where Warshawski turns down paid work in order to look into the murder of
a charity worker found murdered on V. I.'s desk one evening.
In each of these cases, V. I feels that she has some kind of obligation to refuse to settle for the
knowledge which she has been offered, and to use her skills for finding out to some further end.
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This despite the fact that in these and other novels she is warned to leave it to others to find
out. Not happy with an official version of knowledge, she wants to find out more information
regarding the bigger picture, because it is the right thing to do. This carries a strong feminist
message, which is fully in keeping with her position as pioneering representative; she refuses to
be satisfied with the information which others want her to have.
Pam does not depend on detective work for her 'bread and cheese',69 but neither is she taking
on the role of detective for fun. She too has trouble explaining her unselfish motives for
wanting to know. In Sisters, June gets increasingly exasperated at Pam's efforts to locate
Trish and found out what happened to Trish's friend Rosalie, warning her off even while she
claims to know that such a warning is futile;
"Don't get involved in this, Pam. It's too weird. And you'll get dragged into it, I
know how you are [...] The girl is a con artist if ever I've seen one [...] I know these
types of girls. I knew them in high school." (p. 23)
Pam struggles to justify her position in response to June's confidence in knowledge she claims
to have acquired through experience, but does begin to explain to the reader;
There was nothing I could say to that [...] But I trusted my instincts about Trish
somehow. And I wasn't going to send her away without finding out more about her.
(p. 24)
Pam refuses to submit to the temptation to think that she knows the kind of person Trish is, and
rather resolves to investigate further. In this way Pam's awareness of her role as potential
knower turns the tables on June's notion of being 'dragged into' the case, because whereas
June's positioning of Trish within a determinate stereotypical role means that her knowledge,
and more particularly her confidence in that knowledge, has dragged her into a limited picture
of Trish, Pam is able to focus on choosing her own path towards knowledge, and rather place
her confidence in her ability to find out more. In this way the potential for knowledge is valued
more than the knowledge which I presume myself to have already.
69 See A Study In Scarlet, p. 23.
249
One explanation for this offered in the same novel is that I do not always know that which I
know. When heavy snow forces Pam and June to abandon their vehicle and make their way
through the mountains in the dark, Pam asks June;
"How's your training in outdoor survival? [...] Do you know how to dig a snow cave
for protection and conserve your body heat?"
June professes complete ignorance of such climactic conditions and says that as a
Scandinavian, it is Pam who should be aware of how to cope with the cold. Pam confirms that
during a trip to Norway to visit relatives, she acquired some useful survival tips. June
professes to be relieved that 'at least one of us is prepared' (p. 186). Yet when they arrive at
the cabin, to find Trish 'half froze to death', it is June who takes charge, immediately telling
Pam to 'take off your jacket and go down and look for blankets or something' (p. 187). June
assesses the situation, decides what to do, and offers vital medical information;
"She needs a doctor, but we can't take her outside in this cold. I'm going to get help.
You find some tea or soup or anything hot and start feeding it to her. Keep the fire
going and don't rub her, whatever you do. Friction's not good for frostbite." (p. 188)
Pam does not question any element of this detail. Although the disjunction between the
knowledge which June professes to have and the knowledge which she demonstrates in this
situation remains unacknowledged in the text, this moment, in tandem with her earlier
insistence upon empirical knowledge which Pam finds unsatisfactory, may be said to constitute
an argument that statements about knowledge which I regard myself to have are not always
reliable. As a detective, and a potential knower, Pam learns to choose to ignore explicitly
declared knowledge, and act upon knowledge provided by someone who proclaims ignorance.
It is her responsibility to decide upon the quality of information with which she is faced.
In this way Pam, like V. I., develops a keen awareness of her own position as potential and
actual knower, in relation to other potential and actual knowers in the detective novels in which
they feature, and a corresponding sensitivity to the responsibility which that position affords.
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Conclusion
I have sought to demonstrate in this chapter that the way in which detective fiction has been
considered to have philosophical potential has in fact highlighted some problems of the
tradition in philosophy, and also failed to account for feminist detective stories. In contrast, my
examination of the way in which feminist detective stories show a range of philosophical
aspects connected with knowledge acquisition at work demonstrates more satisfactorily the
philosophical potential of the genre, in the sense in which it constitutes an incitement to read.
An epistemological analysis is available in feminist detective novels which focuses on a wide
range of questions in connection with knowledge acquisition, often differing greatly from those
questions which are considered by traditional philosophical inquiry in the field, yet showing
that such questions are epistemologically significant. As well as expanding the philosophical
considerations connected to knowledge acquisition, I have shown how detective novels might be
said to deal with a specific question posed by analytic philosophy, in the form of the Gettier
problem.
Like autographical and Utopian fiction, detective fiction may be conceptualized as a genre
which is peculiarly suited to feminist philosophical understanding. In addition, my analysis
offers another more general contribution to the problem of how it is that literature can be
philosophical. In Chapter Two, I argued that the philosophical potential of autographical
fiction may offer a contribution in terms of a focus upon the question of who is speaking in
philosophical texts, and in Chapter Three, I argued that the philosophical potential of Utopian
fiction may offer a contribution to the question in terms of a resistance of binary oppositions.
In Chapter Four, I have argued that the philosophical potential of detective fiction may offer a
contribution to the problem of how it is that literature can be philosophical by focusing upon
the ways in which literature may be in a position to effectively show, rather than tell.
Specifically here, I have offered evidence that texts within this feminist philosophical genre
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usefully show treatments of philosophical problems concerning knowledge of facts about the
world, rather than merely telling what is meant by saying that S knows that P. In other words,
a crucial part of this chapter has been the emphasis on the way in which fiction is able to
demonstrate approaches to philosophical problems. The grounding ofmy interpretation on
contextual significance is, appropriately enough, a demonstration of the application of this idea
to the theory of how literature may be philosophical.
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Conclusions
My project in this thesis has been threefold. I have shown that and how literature can be
philosophical, such that my answer to this question radically implicates a perspective which
has heretofore been neglected or suppressed in the understanding of the relationship between
philosophy and literature - a perspective of gender. Secondly, I have shown how feminists may
write philosophy, in a way which allows us to speak on and in our own terms, terms which are
not restricted by the patriarchal tradition in philosophy. Thirdly, I have shown how philosophy
as a field can evolve as a discipline by learning from the novel.
The fulfilment ofmy project has been effected in terms of three literary genres, which I
attempted to define as feminist philosophical. The sense of these three genres reverberates
throughout the thesis, which is, in a wider sense, autographical, Utopian and detecting. In the
first case, this project is a story through which I have sought to make sense of my academic
position, caught between philosophy and literature. Rather than choose between the two, I
have elected to examine the ways in which their areas of concern overlap. In the second case, I
retain a hope for the possibility of conciliation between the two disciplines, that each might
learn from the other. I also harbour a Utopian conviction that feminist perspectives have vital
contributions to make both to philosophy and to literature, and to the various places where they
meet. Finally, the notion of finding out, of detecting, in terms of reciprocity, involves a
showing and thus a sharing of knowledge and the expressions of knowledge. As such, this
work may be viewed as way of employing feminist approaches to the benefit of the disciplines
of philosophy and literature. My project of showing how it is that literature can be
philosophical, and that feminists can write philosophy, may in these senses be viewed as
simultaneously autographical, Utopian, and detecting.
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In this thesis I have developed three structural arguments to show that literature can be
philosophical, reflected in the pattern of feminist philosophical literary genres. The first
revealed an emphasis upon the question "who is speaking?". This question, familiar to literary
critics but less so to philosophers, invites both writing and reading thinkers to take
responsibility for their position, particularly when talking about the subject position which they
occupy, and addressing the subject position occupied by an other. In this way the first
structural argument. Chapter Two, rejects metaphysical atomism, and the phallogocentrism of
the metaphysics of presence, both of which have been associated with philosophical
interpretations of the genre of autobiography, and urges instead the principle of the incitement
to read.
The second structural argument, Chapter Three, involved the resistance of binary oppositions.
In Chapter One I argued that the value system erected by Plato placed philosophy and literature
in a binary opposition, such that literature was understood as whatever philosophy was not,
and vice versa. This explains why resistance to binary oppositions could be utilized as part of
the project to show how it is that literature can be philosophical. Moreover, feminist analyses
of the problematic stratification involved in such systems provided a significant backdrop for
such resistance, described in terms of an incitement to read. This contrasted with the
understanding of literature as philosophical in terms of possible worlds, which I argued
presents an interpretation of stories which may count as neither literary nor philosophical.
The third structural argument, Chapter Four, focused upon a philosophical notion of finding
out through demonstration. Rejecting a notion of detective fiction as philosophical in the sense
that the substantive elements of the genre might be said to have philosophical correlatives, this
argument effectively developed notions introduced in earlier chapters, by invoking notions of
reciprocity and contextualization. In this way, the argument of Chapter Four sought to reject
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both metaphysical atomism and binary oppositions, resolving instead to consider information
which might often be ignored by ideal passive readers, and thus participating in the project of
an incitement to read.
The result of this project has been a version of the Meditations, progressing from autographical
fiction and knowledge of the self, through Utopian fiction and knowledge of other minds,
towards detective fiction and knowledge of the world. Indeed, Descartes' project has much in
common with my own. The knee jerk responses to relationships between philosophy and
literature which I described in Chapter One show no sign of abating, and just as Descartes
wished to sweep away the remnants of scholastic philosophy and start anew, so I sought in
Chapter One to begin from the beginning, with Plato's value system, established in the
Republic, and perpetuated by so many both explicitly and implicitly since. However, unlike
Descartes, I am not under any illusions that my meditations mark the end of the matter. Rather
than constituting a resolution of the anxiety I feel at the estrangement of philosophy and
literature, my arguments and evidence here show that bringing the two together can be a way of
addressing difficulties for both disciplines.
As a result of these arguments and evidence, it may be that different philosophical questions
can be understood to require different textual approaches. Equally, it may be that literature
can be recognized as providing ways of approaching philosophical problems which enable new
light to be thrown upon them. In this thesis I have used feminist pathways to make these
connections between literature and philosophy, in order to urge a re-viewing of feminist,
philosophical, and literary projects as incitements to read. I believe that seeing these three
elements in terms of this concept not only facilitates a rejection of the notion ofmaster
disciplines, but also offers new opportunities for active analysis which is cooperative and
effective as well as democratic.
255
Once the principle has been demonstrated that literature can be philosophical, the philosophical
arguments of literary texts may be subjected to comparative analysis with canonical
philosophical texts. This is something which I have avoided in this thesis, lest I fall into the
trap in which I see others, of regarding literature in a subservient relationship to philosophy.
This is not to deny that useful comparisons may be made between the works of Irigaray and
Winterson on maternal mirror images, or those of Levinas and Piercy on relations with others.
Indeed, one of the fundamental goals ofmy thesis was to offer a specific kind of legitimation to
such studies, such that they might not be ignored by those whose topics of interest they discuss,
and in order to remove the shadow of stratified disciplines. Where Descartes regarded himself
to have erected an epistemologically indubitable model of scientific knowledge, I rather hope
that I have indicated the problems involved in adopting any such models. Where Descartes
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